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New Gorbachev Adviser Karasev Profiled

PM2904150091 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No. 15, 14 Apr 91 (Signed to Press
9 Apr p 2

[Olga Kryshstanovskaya article from Moscow: "USSR President's New Adviser"]

[Text] The 38-year old USSR People's Deputy Valentin Ivanovich Karasev, a Russian, CPSU member, head of the CPSU History and Scientific Communism Department at Kramatorsk Industrial Institute, and candidate of historical sciences, has been appointed the USSR president's new adviser [sovetnik].

At the present time he is the first and only representative of the Interregional Deputies' Group in Gorbachev's entourage. His political views are seen as moderately left-wing. Karasev is a consistent socialist who favors USSR unity.

His comrades in the Interregional Deputies' Group speak of him as a decent man who has always been distinguished by a sincere faith in Gorbachev and a deep respect for him.

At the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies Karasev voted in favor of including on the agenda the question of abolishing Article 6 of the USSR Constitution (he was the only man from Gorbachev's team, on its old as well as its new staff, who held this view on this question). Karasev was against supporting the economic program of N.I. Ryzhkov's government and favored the political assessment of the Soviet-German pact of 1939 which was presented in A.N. Yakovlev's report. The voting results on practically all the fundamental issues at the First and Second Congresses of USSR People's Deputies testify to his left-radical orientation. However, later on, at the fourth congress, Karasev's political views began to shift toward the center. For example, he voted in favor of holding a referendum on the question of private ownership of land; he did not take part in voting on the issue of recognizing republics' sovereignty, although he was present at the session. In deputies' circles he is known as a resolute supporter of preserving the Union.

The appearance in Gorbachev's team of a man who is close to democratic circles allows us to suppose that the center is once again looking to form an alliance with left-wing forces.

Gorbachev, Yeltsin Said To Follow CIA 'Scripts'

PM2904152591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 26 Apr 91 p 1

[F. Sizyy report: "V. Chertishchev: 'Yeltsin and Gorbachev Are CIA Agents'"]

[Text] Tyumen—Every day you learn more and more new and, above all, surprising things about the leaders of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation.

Yesterday, the oblast soviet newspaper TYUMEN-SKIYE IZVESTIYA [Tyumen News] published a report of a meeting in Ishim between V. Chertishchev, first secretary of Tyumen CPSU Obkom [oblast committee], and a group of Communist deputies from the oblast soviet.

"I believe that M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin are acting in unison and pursuing the same line," the CPSU obkom first secretary stressed, "and it is important to understand that they are pursuing it according to scripts written by the CIA."

I will remark that in recent times Vladimir Chertishchev has made no secret of his membership of the opposition to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR president.

The Tyumen Communist Party Obkom Bureau itself has been insisting on a Central Committee Plenum and a report by the leaders of the Politburo.

The party leader's statement has generated interest in the Tyumen Oblast Prosecutor's Office. "We intend to conduct an investigation into a case of defamation and slander against the president of the country and the leader of the Russian parliament," Prosecutor V. Bagin has announced.

Krasnodar Soviet Calls Gorbachev to Task

91UN1576B Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 May 91 p 1

[Article by Yu. Petrov: "Where Is the Kuban Striving?"]

[Text] Krasnodar—The fourth session of the Krasnodar Kray Soviet has rendered quite a harsh verdict: "To approach the USSR Congress of People's Deputies with a request that a report by M.S. Gorbachev be heard on the reasons for the aggravation of the political and economic crisis in the country in the years of perestroika and specific ways to overcome the crisis in the country, and to make a determination concerning the expediency of further retaining him in the position of the president of our country."

Let us recall that quite recently the CPSU Kray Committee called for holding the general secretary accountable at a plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee. As is known, the dismissal was "dismissed" there. Now, the Kuban has issued a new call.

One cannot help asking: Are the Krasnodar leaders of the communists and the soviets changing the direction of confrontation? Apparently, they are not. At a press conference several days ago N. Kondratenko, chairman of the Kray Soviet of People's Deputies, spoke quite definitively about differences between the Kuban and the Russian leaders. Is this to say that the Kuban is "flowing" its own way?

Danger of Resurgent Authoritarianism Seen

PM2204131591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 91 p 4

[Aleksandr Yakovlev article: "The 'Strong Hand' Is Involuntarily Reaching for the Brake"—first paragraph is KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Several months ago when the idea of a "Perestroika in the USSR: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" roundtable conference first came up (cf. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 19 April of this year), A. Yakovlev was one of the first people whom we approached. Aleksandr Nikolayevich willingly agreed to participate. True, at that time neither he nor we could have known for certain that in April, in connection with the USSR President's visit to Japan, A. Yakovlev would be in Tokyo. Literally, on the eve of his departure by air, Aleksandr Nikolayevich handed over this article to the editorial office and asked that it be regarded as his speech at the conference which is opening at the "Oktyabrskaya" Hotel in Moscow today. We publish his speech.

The times are the creator, and the times are the executioner. They give, and they take away, both from those who are on the way out, and those who are up and coming. Years fly by, yet weeks drag on with enormous difficulty and strain, weeks full of unexpected developments. The mounting mass of events is approaching a critical mark, it is filled with a menacing latent rumble whose unbridled force and scale can only be guessed at. Under the burden of the sudden breakup of the routine of our life, the swift transformations have produced powerful shock waves which have come largely unexpectedly for the seismic mechanism of social life, shock waves which are increasingly being linked with images of civil war, ruin, starvation, and freezing cities, images known only from history.

It is good that we are mindful of this. This memory is colored by the shudder which the ashes of millions of victims produce in our hearts. The society of 1917, 1927, and 1937 did not know what was in store for it. We can only guess that it must have had a premonition of the trials and tragedies which lay ahead, but it did not have an effective antidote against the destructive affliction of totalitarianism.

The first nonviolent revolution which dates back to 1985 is unique also because, by dint of its democratic thrust and nature, it is trying to cut short the grim tradition of authoritarianism—this national calamity. There is sufficient experience which indicates that authoritarianism, which sometimes appears to be an effective means of implementing changes, rebounds sooner or later against the set aims. And consequently also against people, since no one has ever acquired happiness through tyranny.

Today it is also possible to come across arrogant opinions arguing that our people are not yet ready for democracy, or that they do not need it at all. All this is untrue. Our people want to and can live a life worthy of

free people. Yet how long and how persistently have they been fed with lies, how long has it been impressed on them that the totalitarian regime which grew up in our country was genuine democracy. Today this does not happen any more.

Something else is being claimed now, notably that in the sixth year of perestroika the main force hampering the development of democracy are the democrats themselves. Judging by appearances, they have halted the "great march" toward freedom and prosperity which society "enjoyed" until 1985. No, it is not freedom which alarms people but, instead, the danger of being cheated again. They see that this sacred movement is being joined by all kinds of dissembling loathsome characters who are devoid of morality, who feed on human flesh and sow hatred, intolerance, and lies. They are interested in power and nothing but power, rather than the people's genuine interests. It is enough to read some of the speeches and articles of the neo-Stalinists—they seethe with hatred toward dissident thought of any kind. And the answer to the Shakespearean question whether or not this is merely a trick of the imagination is far from clear.

History today does not give us the right to be thoughtless or irresponsible. Its verdict is imperative: Only the power of the people, that is, democracy, made strong through the strict and unconditional implementation of laws can provide the natural and effective means for resolving the most complex social contradictions.

Is Democracy a Luxury for Us?

Homegrown "ultras" do not tire of arguing. What do we need democracy for if the stores are empty and the streets unsafe? This is how hypocrisy is born, because the economic disintegration which is at the root of all the other troubles did not come about as a result of an excess of democracy but quite the reverse.

Perestroika has now stalled before the decisive step which is also the most difficult one—the transition to the market. It is clear for example that a land reform is necessary, a reform which will be different in different parts of the country, a reform which will provide scope for all forms of management, for competition between them, and for the choice of the best possible combinations. But to this day there is more talk than action, and people at local level are waiting for special instructions because the view still prevails that laws are nothing, while instructions are everything. It is clear that the time has come to embark on the destatization of property and the dismantling of monopolies wherever this is possible. But even here there is little practical progress. More and more discussion topics are being introduced and doubts aired in respect of perestroika in the hope of gaining time, in the hope that people, exhausted by standing in line and by the shortages, humiliated by having to struggle for the bare essentials, will turn their backs on

democratic transformations in both the economic and the political sphere. And calculations such as these are by no means groundless.

It was clear from the very outset that without a profound economic reform the country had no future. However, in practice the potential of organized resistance by the economic and state apparatus was not realistically taken into account.

Other factors were also clearly underestimated. It is true that the implementation of a radical economic reform and the transition to the market demanded a political reform as one of their necessary preconditions. Such a reform could mean only one thing—democratization. As soon as democratic forms of life and of political struggle had become established, they began to follow their own logic of development, which included the emergence of the phenomenon of opposition. And the policy of renewal was insufficiently prepared for this, both objectively and subjectively; it came up against this without the necessary reserves and organizational backup.

The Longest Journey Begins With the First Step

Today people are asking insistently whether a reversal of the transformations has not set in. Are their advocates not backtracking? Some people are even saying that the renewal potential has been exhausted.

I will express a purely personal view which may prove controversial. In my opinion it is possible to speak of a degree of stalling, but it would be incorrect, for the time being, to speak of a full-scale retreat.

It is also true, however, that there are probably more people now than, say, two or three years ago, especially within the power structures, who would like to see perestroika with its back to the wall, who would like to put an end to it. Their actions have become more forceful and they are better organized. The forces of conservatism and reaction have mobilized themselves and have embarked on a coordinated counteroffensive. Furthermore, they make no secret of the fact that it is an offensive, although they try to conduct it primarily under the slogans of perestroika itself, claiming that it is a struggle for the "correct" content of perestroika. Furthermore, certain representatives of these forces specialize in provoking conflicts and exacerbating tension and confrontation, clearly in the belief that only an orgy of violence can restore their former positions.

The opposition to perestroika did not emerge suddenly. By now it has assumed truly hardened forms and manifestations, it has succeeded in formulating its own theory and policy, and is casting off the last shreds of camouflage. However, if all this is happening in the sixth year of perestroika and is accompanied by the risk of a further destabilization of the situation in the country, it means that the opponents of renewal, having to use its very own slogans, cannot be that strong.

However, an opposition which sprang not so much from a deliberately chosen stance as from commitment to customary methods of work and allegiance to established structures made itself felt even earlier, and felt forcefully.

Let me recall that at the beginning, in addition to the proclamation of correct ideas in respect of the economic reform, measures of an overtly antieconomic and even antisocial nature were also adopted. They were initiated by the antialcohol campaign, which was necessary and useful as to its aim but which totally ignored world experience in this sphere, and also our own considerable experience. As of now, direct losses alone incurred as a result of this campaign exceed 100 billion rubles, according to some scientists' estimates. This does not include social losses. The number of alcoholics and drug addicts has more than trebled.

Correct decisions were also adopted on scientific and technical progress, the development of machine building, the cooperative system, and others. But they were surrounded by such a mass of paper instructions and traditional bureaucratic constraints that they proved essentially impracticable. But the main point is not just that individual documents or decisions did not work. Looking back, you can see especially clearly the qualitative losses which perestroika is currently sustaining as a result of the fact that the ground was essentially not prepared for as painless a transition to the market as possible. It was not prepared organizationally, economically, and even politically.

Naturally, under the impact of a head-on blow, or rather a series of such blows, the transformations could not fail to totter. Their results are by no means an unshakable granite wall. And the opponents of renewal are no ping-pong balls. It would be wrong to underestimate their determination. On the "right wing," irrespective of party allegiance, there are many who view perestroika and democratization purely from the angle of their own personal and group interests and advantages. Nationalist interests persistently prevail over the national interest. And many people still remain under the spell of dogmatism.

Naturally, the forces which resist renewal were also aided by the fact that a certain section of the democratic forces proved unequal to their task. They lack experience of political struggle and of management in the new conditions. Some succumbed to the temptation to make a name for themselves by means of cheap intrigues and confrontation with other forces. Some became carried away with personal and group ambitions, giving them priority; they lost the time which is so precious in a revolution, they missed the opportunity to organize themselves on a civilized democratic basis, and failed to get down properly to the hard practical work, the nitty-gritty. Some succumbed to a passion for "unmasking" to the exclusion of everything else, engaging in the "witch-hunts" with which our society is utterly sated.

And yet, irrespective of all this, society has changed. It is seeking the truth and thus creating history.

In retrospect two different aspects or phases, two qualitatively different stages, can be discerned in the process of renewal. First, the initial impulse, the spark. It comprises everything that ended the former social paralysis, which tore away the masks of hypocrisy, which appealed to conscience, and ended the blind inertia of the past in all things. This was the pickup phase, but society dallied in it longer than was necessary.

Much time was lost on realizing the very need for change, on identifying the problems that had accumulated and analyzing their scale and depth.

Nonetheless, the preconditions for a decisive step toward renewal on the basis of democracy, law, the market, and freedom have been created. Objective forces and processes in society will demand—and, in my opinion, more and more insistently as time goes by—that this step be taken. The question is: Will we take this step? I expect that the processes of renewal will continue developing, but it will not be easy or straightforward. It will be necessary to overcome resistance, and there will be individual mistakes and crises, but they will continue developing.

Especially in conditions where, in my opinion, an anti-perestroika program has been formulated. It has been formulated as a concept, in what concerns a clearly and precisely articulated demand to "reexamine" what constitutes essentially the main ideas put forward by perestroika both in domestic and in foreign policy. Such a program has also been formulated as regards the fundamental means and methods of political struggle, the struggle for power.

But views are views. Ideas develop in competition, and for this one participant is not enough. And it would be truly amazing, and in some respects even suspect, if new ideas and concepts became part of life with ease, without a struggle, without having to overcome resistance. It is natural for a normal society to comprise avanguard and conservative, radical and liberal ideas, it is always characterized by a range of stances, approaches, political parties, and movements.

And if the neo-Stalinist opposition to the transformations remained within the framework of the democratic process, if it did not engage in witch-hunts, in the persecution of dissidents, and in pinning labels on people—incidentally, all this also applies to radicals of the neo-Bolshevik stripe—then I personally would see more "pluses" than "minuses" in this type of opposition. Because like it or not the opposition—provided it remains within the framework of this process—is taking part, through its resistance, in starting up and operating the mechanism which is designed to stop us, now and in the future, from swinging from one extreme to the other; and in ensuring the conditions for a combination of reasonable stability with reasonable change and reforms as a permanent quality of society and of life as a whole.

Unfortunately, for the time being there is nothing to bear out that the neo-Stalinist opposition to perestroika and the other forces of extreme conservatism are willing and ready to remain within the framework of the democratic process. On the other hand there are indications of a diametrically opposed nature—of a mounting attack from this side primarily and specifically against the democrats who are still young, inexperienced, not very powerful, who often act clumsily, or worse still, are driven or led into errors. It is true that there are also all kinds of shortcomings and even intolerance on the radical wing of the current political spectrum. This deserves to be criticized.

But what is at issue now is something else. Forces are consolidating which are visibly and swiftly reverting to the formulas, labels, and practices of the past—of the worst periods and chapters of the past—which, you might think, have been denounced. An attempt is being made to pass and foist on the people an *a priori* sentence on the qualitative changes in society. Democracy is referred to exclusively in combination with the epithet "socialist," and the public is gradually being prepared for the rejection of all types of democratization, although in terms of its concept perestroika is primarily a democratic revolution. There are keen attempts to find a link between the democrats and the shadow economy which is allegedly being imported by the counterrevolution; some even see it as imperialism's revenge for 1917. Just imagine: The people's power is the revenge of imperialism! No, it is fear, ordinary fear in the face of the growing irreversibility of the transformations—but a dangerous fear capable of pulling us all down into the netherworld.

The problem and the question now are: Will we manage to stay within the framework of the democratic process and of political forms of struggle? While holding divergent views, will we be able to agree legal standards governing state and social life? Will we be able, and indeed willing, to subordinate emotions to reason, and to place the law above party, clan, group, ethnic, and other interests? If not, the result will be a nationwide tragedy.

The Problem of the New Authoritarianism

The new Soviet power, in laying claim to undivided power [monovlast], is frequently trying thoughtlessly to repeat an unsuccessful experiment of the past. In its time the party, proceeding from its social hypothesis, set about organizing life in line with this hypothesis. The costs, the dangers, and the risk of this course have in some measure now been analyzed. This has been done in the last few years.

Complaints are pouring in from all sides: "The laws are not working!" But a law is strong and effective only if it proceeds from life, if it is an expression of actually existing and functioning social relations. It places these relations within a specific framework and corrects them where necessary. The relationships are of primary importance here. It is they alone which determine the

forms of control, regulations, and restrictions. Unfortunately, as yet in our country the reverse is more often than not the case. The tone is set by the hope, the incorrect hope, that it is possible to form social relations on the basis of laws alone. Self-management is slow to take shape. Yet this is precisely the grassroots system of government by the people.

Is this not happening because the initiative and independence which have burst forth have again run into the same old hectoring, the same old attempts to issue orders, to administer by decree? Letters and complaints protesting the new authoritarianism, said sometimes to be more brutal than during the times of stagnation, are currently pouring in from many places, and in particular from a number of union republics. I do not intend to express concrete views on this. But I am certain, I am convinced that these messages make it necessary to assess this phenomenon as a whole, rather than just as individual situations.

What is characteristic and alarming? Once again intolerance is rearing its head, once again there is evidence of authoritarian and totalitarian behavior. And so, imperceptibly egging each other on, "winding each other up," passing the ball from region to region, and returning it each time with even greater thrust, with even greater animosity, it is very easy to come to blows, to reach neofascism. And it will not be important whether it comes from the "right" or the "left." This will do little to change its antipeople, antidemocratic essence.

The New Dogmatism

Does any of us ever stop to think about the meaning of concepts like "right-wing" and "left-wing," "democrat," "conservative," "radical," "extremist," and others? Are all the evident and nonevident opposites, which have already become the new stereotypes, always justified? The danger here is that clichés have again begun to take root in our consciousness, and we are using other people's assessments instead of using our own brains and hearts.

Currently there are as many stances as there are problems in society, and as many conjectures around them. The traditional political labels serve to further cloud awareness and make it even more difficult to understand the actual picture. Who is who? Rabid conservatives masquerade as radical democrats. Democrats display a truly authoritarian love of power. Stances and platforms which are clearly opposed to each other are vying for the right to describe themselves as left-wing. While, like garbage on the common dump, attempts are frequently made to lump together all undesirables now as left-wing now as right-wing.

It would be truly tragic if "right-wing" or "left-wing" demagoguery, verbiage, political posturing, or old or new dogmatism won the day, albeit in new packaging. For the time being there is more talk than real concern about all matters.

It is necessary to recall that the first attempts at democratic changes in our country in the 20th century—no need to look too far back in history—have ultimately failed precisely because the nascent democracy became too involved in political struggle and did pay much heed to the results of its practical work. Therefore it lost the people's interest. And when authoritarian forces of one kind or another put an end to the very existence of democratic institutions, their fate was of little if any interest to a large number of people.

Two Phenomena in Particular Bother Me

Social masochism—a danger about which I have already spoken in Lithuania more than two years ago. And claims to sovereignty if they are not underpinned by well-founded calculations or do not proceed from the priority of the sovereignty of the individual.

Social masochism, in my opinion, is expressed in the regurgitation ad infinitum of specific real or fictitious facts and problems. Around these problems passions are fomented, culprits are excitedly sought, public opinion is exalted, and society is polarized. But at the same time nothing sensible is proposed.

In conditions of society's progress toward its new quality the question of the essence, meaning, and nature of criticism is also being raised. All too often the arrows of criticism are more guided by emotion and rhetoric than by reason, logical thought, or the interests of the cause. Rather than at the problem, criticism everywhere is aimed at people, at personalities, at their ego, it seeks to humiliate them. Yet conflicts in which people's pride is wounded, in which their self-respect and their self-esteem is dented, are the most difficult conflicts to settle peacefully. And if ethnic or religious factors are involved, then this is really bad.

And what is even worse is that the desire to achieve repentance, debunking, and exposure as a result of a swiping blow has become a long-established practice. We do not bother to stop and think when and how this "tradition" was born, and what sparked it off. It dates back to Stalin's times, to the purges, to the meetings and trials "to unmask" people. It was then that it was deemed necessary to bring in the practice of morally crushing the individual, of breaking him psychologically in order to change people from individuals capable of independent thought into uncomplaining weak-willed creatures; from enterprising and sovereign individuals into automatons which would carry out instructions and orders. It was then that it was found necessary to create in society an atmosphere of all-pervasive suspicion and permanent readiness to expose anyone and everyone as the enemy, rather than an atmosphere of comradely cooperation and mutual respect; an atmosphere of hysteria, fanaticism, and denunciation. And all this was achieved not just by repressive means but also with the help of the specific ritual of "criticism and self-criticism."

And it must be admitted that it has worked. The ritual has become deeply ingrained in us. We use it habitually

today without noticing not just its glaring incongruity with the spirit and the essence of the new times, but also that following this Stalinist legacy today means that literally before our eyes society is being pumped full and saturated with conflicts, distrust, and hatred which need not have been there.

There Is No Other Hope

Naturally, the very words about war are a blasphemy in a country which is still trying to come round from the last terrible war. This does not mean that we should be closing our eyes to the dangers. These include, among others, the absence of civic peace. It is hardly possible, if we are honest, to describe as "civic peace" a situation wherein the persecution of dissidents is continuing, where freedom of thought and people's initiative are being suppressed. Hypothetically speaking it would be possible to impose outward calm and tranquillity in society by force, but this will not be a civic peace. It would merely cover up a latent seething of passions, a clash of interests, and the death throes of thought.

Whenever anyone's exclusiveness, their "right" to a special position in society is motivated by nationality, or skin color, we rightly reject and brand such encroachments as incompatible with elementary precepts of morality and humanity. But is this not essentially what we ourselves are witnessing when specific groups high-handedly try to arrogate the "right" to decide the fate, express the will, mood, and aspirations of all people, to be the only vehicle and judge of patriotism, justice, national character, or progress?

No matter how understandable and logical the historical causes which brought about such phenomena may be, the current and future internal life and policy of society desperately need their own "all-European process" and a truly common home, rather than Potemkin villages [imaginary concepts] of artificial consensus and a seeming, outward absence of conflict. There is no need to stress that in this situation people retain their views, convictions, and approaches. But they recognize the supremacy of law and legality and the authority of democratic institutions. And they approach rationally cooperation with others to resolve specific issues. That is to say they work in the common interest for the sake of preserving and renewing the country, in the interests of all humanly normal political forces and movements (because the collapse of democracy will sweep them all away). It is necessary now to seek to form as it were a Front of freedom and responsibility, law and competence, unity and real progress.

The democratic process is the main gain of perestroika to date. It gives dignity back to man and morality back to society. It enables us to see ourselves objectively, to understand the inner world which we have constructed for ourselves, to identify the nature and causes of our problems. It makes it possible to build all relationships openly and honestly: To clash and argue wherever necessary but by means which strengthen the social edifice

rather than blowing it up. It opens up the prospect of incorporating in the state and social system in the shape of laws all the necessary ties, linkages, balances, and guarantees.

And thus the democratic process is our only hope for the future, for renewal. Authoritarianism may still return, and may do so without the thunder of revolutions, without mass repressions and persecutions. It may even be gentle and enlightened in its own way. However, pure authoritarianism has always and everywhere, at all times and among all peoples, and irrespective of what gloves it was wearing, ultimately impeded social development. Why? Well, because authoritarianism cannot fail to create around itself the tyranny of some and the servility of others, the bureaucratism of management and the denial of the working people's rights, and the suppression of creativity; it cannot fail to violate reason, will, and the freedom of the individual.

Maintaining the course toward democratization means ensuring a worthy future for ourselves and our children.

'Hope Has Dawned' Following Gorbachev Accord With Republics

PM2904155591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

["Pertinent Commentary" by Gennadiy Yastrebtsov:
"Listening to One Another"]

[Text] For how long has the country known no peace! The working of plants, factories, construction sites, and mines has been disrupted. People have grown tired of the political confrontation, rally-inspired demands, and empty promises from rostrums. The country is sinking ever deeper into economic chaos. Production is dropping and national income is suffering a catastrophic decline.

In this highly serious situation there is no end to the strikes which are ruthlessly finishing off the economy, which it is high time to reform and raise to the level of civilized countries. But how are reforms to be implemented if every day brings more news of a blast furnace grinding to a halt in one area, a coking battery being destroyed in another, and a workshop or plant coming to a standstill?

In March alone coal extraction dropped by 13 percent and coking coal extraction by one-third. The reduction in economic output due directly to this in one month alone totaled almost 1.5 billion rubles [R]—more than R4 billion if you count related, connected sectors.

If the wave of strikes does not stop, we will lose tens of billions of rubles in the year. Just think of the figures—this is human labor, without which no country can survive! How long can you try the people's patience, hoping that the worse things are in the USSR, the better it is? For whom? Who stands to gain from self-inflicted damage?

Hope has dawned here: The country's president, M.S. Gorbachev, recently met with the presidents, Supreme Soviet chairmen, and government leaders of nine union republics. A joint statement was published acknowledging the restoration of constitutional order and rigorous observance of existing laws as an indispensable condition for the stabilization of the situation in society.

Better late than never, so to speak. The commitments made by Union organs and the republics and enshrined in the 1991 economic agreement have been confirmed. The need to put them into practice, primarily as regards budgets and shaping budget funds, has been acknowledged. The meeting's participants advocated introducing special working arrangements in fundamental industrial sectors, at enterprises producing consumer goods, and in railroad transport in order to stabilize the economic situation.

Speaking at the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission Joint Plenum 24 April, M.S. Gorbachev said that the republics' leaders had emphasized the need for steps to correct pricing policy, since the rapid rise in prices at the beginning of April dealt the bulk of the compensation a painful blow and the government's proposed compensation proved patently inadequate.

Appeals are still being heard in some areas for reforms to be slowed down and even for a return to administrative methods of economic management. That is destructive for the country. It is, on the contrary, necessary to create most rapidly a political situation promoting the further implementation of reforms and the transition to the market. With strong social protection for people and the formation of a rule-of-law state, without fail.

Economic reform is certainly very difficult and contradictory. There have been many blunders and mistakes. But that is no reason for panic or confusion. Exhausted by the "war of laws" and the endless confrontation between "right-wingers" and "left-wingers" society urgently needs mutual tolerance and normal work that would guarantee every family, every person confidence in the present and the future.

It is such a little thing to listen to one another. But it also means such a lot since listening means understanding. Understanding the main thing: We cannot go on living like this.

CP Plenum Events Analyzed

91UN1507A Kiev *MOLOD UKRAYINY* in Ukrainian
27 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by MOLOD UKRAYINY special correspondent Vitaliy Portnikov under the rubric "Hello, Moscow!": "Party Detective"]

[Text] The latest CPSU Central Committee Plenum was awaited with great impatience: After all, for several

weeks preceding it there were rumors about the possible removal of M.S. Gorbachev from the post of general secretary of the Central Committee and about an attempt at revanche. Nor were journalists or the public reassured by the words of V.A. Ivashko to the effect that this issue would not be the chief one at the plenum.

And it was as though the beginning of the plenum confirmed that the deputy general secretary was right. Even an attempt to introduce an accounting by Gorbachev into the agenda failed. Mikhail Sergeyevich proposed to the party leaders that work be postponed for 20 days in order to give him the opportunity to prepare himself, and at that time he would render his account. Apparently the members of the Central Committee decided that it would be better to avoid a postponement—the plenum continued operations without changes to the agenda, and the question of the resignation of Gorbachev almost did not arise. But seeing that the array of forces was not to their benefit, the participants of the plenum—or at least those who considered the removal of the general secretary from the post the best solution—changed their tactics. Such mass, severe criticism from comrades concerning the leadership of Gorbachev had hardly been heard during the entire preceding period of perestroika. "A certain number of Communists are getting the impression that the general secretary is ignoring the opinions and mood of the masses and that the president of the country is not taking serious measures to protect his party from brutal anti-communism," said S.I. Hurenko. "There is an opinion in the party that Comrade Gorbachev does not need it, that he has abandoned it, and that we need to immediately remove him from the position of general secretary," observed Anipkin, first secretary of the Volgograd Oblast party committee, but in any event he explained that he himself does not share such an opinion. (The usual tactic in such instances.) "How could you let the steering wheel slip from your hands?" asked Ivan Polozkov. It seems that the last straw was the speech of Zaytsev, the first secretary of the Kemerovo Oblast party committee, who stressed that "a president with a membership card in the party does not have the right to maneuver between capitalism and socialism." V.A. Ivashko had already announced a break when suddenly Gorbachev requested the floor, declaring that in this complex period he needs the support and trust of his party comrades, especially those who belong to the Central Committee; but if such trust does not exist, he would table the issue of his resignation from the position of general secretary. Then a break for an hour and a half was announced. The Politburo, which met during that break, decided not to consent to Gorbachev's proposal and to consider it dangerous for the party. At that very moment at the initiative of Volskiy, president of the scientific and industrial union, 75 signatures were collected at the bottom of a statement emphasizing that its authors—members of the Central Committee—would end their membership in the Central Committee if Gorbachev did not change his mind. But that step turned out to be unnecessary. Among 349 people, 322 supported the

decision of the Politburo. Only 13 were opposed, and 14 participants in the plenum abstained. Gorbachev returned to the hall, and the party forum continued to work in accordance with the agenda.

As a result, the first outbreak of party discord between members of the Central Committee and the leader of the party was eliminated almost as soon as it appeared. Was Gorbachev's action a sincere reaction to criticism, or was it a carefully thought out step, calculated to produce victory? Aleksandr Dzasokhov and Petr Luchinskiy, members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo who met with journalists after the plenum, were convinced of the sincerity of the general secretary. Nonetheless, many commentators did not agree with this point of view, declaring that Gorbachev managed in this fashion to demonstrate his strong position in the current party leadership—at a time when some saw a powerful opposition to his course. In either case, the president may be congratulated on a victory on the party front. But we probably have not seen the final attack on the president of the apparat's revanchist forces: It is no accident that some of his comrades-in-arms such as Yakovlev and Bakatin were subjected to serious criticism at the plenum. The interference of the supporters of "ideals" may force Mikhail Gorbachev to turn his gaze to the other end of the political spectrum. It is hardly accidental that Boris Yeltsin, who several days ago signed a joint statement with Gorbachev and the leaders of the republics, said during a visit to France, "We will not abandon a wounded Gorbachev on the field of battle."

New Stage of Political Development Studied

91U N15094 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian

16 May 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by L. Shevtsova, doctor of historical sciences: "Will to Power: The New Alignment of Political Forces and Their Influence and Confrontation"]

[Text] Soviet society has entered a new stage in its development. What will it become—a stage of stabilization or of continued disintegration? An intensification of crisis or revival? The establishment of dictatorship or... As far as democratic authority is concerned, even the greatest optimists are shaking their heads in doubt. But there are hardly any people making precise forecasts—everything is too confused. But practically everyone agrees on one thing: Things will, most likely, get even worse. But is it correct to judge merely by superficial characteristics or by part of the picture which has emerged? A certain logic is beginning to be manifested in the, at first sight, chaotic movement in which Soviet society finds itself. It would, perhaps, be a mistake to reduce all that is going on around us merely to disintegration and breakdown. Excruciatingly and with blood, perhaps, but a new reality is taking shape. And this being the case, should we be viewing what is happening as the end of the world? Is such an approach not paralyzing our will to survive?

Upon an analysis of the present situation it is important to find the determining factor. "Everyone is sick of politics," some people say. "The fate of society is decided in the sphere of economics." But the whole point is that here also nothing can happen until the question of power has been conclusively resolved. Consequently, the key lies, for all that, in politics. But what an oversimplification the attempts to link social processes exclusively with the activity of the present political structures appear. More often than not the life of these structures—irrespective of which forces call the tune in them—go their way, and social development, its own.

Perhaps it would be more correct to view everything through the actions of the president, considering the tremendous concentration in his hands of command authority? Another illusion. Yes, the president has more than enough authority. But the mechanisms to realize decisions are lacking. We should consider also the fact that events have long been out pacing the actions of the Union leader. For this reason "Gorbocentrism" is hardly an adequate reference point upon an evaluation of our development. The more so in that the "one-man performance" traditional for Soviet politics has given way to a stage on which a multitude of characters has appeared.

All of the present leaders, republic leaders included, have, come to that, limited freedom of maneuver. If only by virtue of the instability of the situation and the mobile correlation of forces and their immaturity. Under these conditions our leaders are dependent to a greater extent than their predecessors and politicians in the West on those around them. On the groupings which brought them to the surface. On the changeable public mood, finally. Therefore, let us not exaggerate either the role of the personal relations of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, which some people see as the source of this event or the other. Both are to a certain extent symbols of the current social demarcation, which no longer, for that matter, reflects its entire complexity. The attempts of certain analysts to guess at who will replace Gorbachev—Lukyanov, Pavlov, Yanayev—cause me to smile. Some "Mr. X," perhaps? We shall not wholly deny the role of the individual in history. But in our case it is far more important which forces might come to the fore, not who might personify them.

If, however, we are talking about the alignment of forces, our customary notion of dividing everyone into right and left, communists and anticommunists will no longer work. In a short space of time social life has become appreciably transformed. The line of demarcation of political forces has become not so much the problem of democracy and the market, the nationality issue and the future of the Union but also the attitude toward individual leaders, the search for new forms of power, the problem of harmony, strikes and so forth. New lines of division have appeared, and there has been a polarization of both flanks of social life. A regrouping of forces has intensified, and new alliances, from yesterday's adversaries at times, have begun to take shape.

The old signboards and organizational facing still have been preserved. Let them not confuse us, however. Any day now they will disappear and disintegrate. They will acquire new content, possibly. Those who believe, for example, that the Communist Party is absolutely the same as it was yesterday are wrong. No, the former all-Union monolith has disappeared completely.

The mere fact of the appearance of national Bolshevism merits a separate discussion, come to that. Following the withdrawal from the CPSU of the Democratic Platform, it seemed to many people that the Communist Party had become an out-and-out reactionary mass. Indeed, a conservative wave drowned out voices which were in the least way liberal. But it now turns out that stratification is intensifying beneath the party roof: those holding power, national communists, fundamentalists, the simply orthodox, populists and moderates.

The "Communists for Democracy" movement headed by A. Rutskiy [as published] has just announced its formation. The idea of the possible creation of a new party around A. Yakovlev, E. Shevardnadze, and V. Bakatin is being discussed increasingly actively... To what might such attempts lead? A reforming of out-moded structures? But this has not been successfully accomplished anywhere. To the emergence of leftist associations of a new type, perhaps? Time will tell.

It would be a mistake to underestimate also the alterations in the party appointments schedule. They have been the consequence of personnel changes which could be called the Gorbachev "cultural revolution." Initially there was a cleansing of the party's directive echelons of the Brezhnev elite. Then people of the "Andropov draft," of whom Ye. Ligachev was a representative, incidentally, came to be supplanted. A new appointments-schedule stratum has taken shape in the party. These are no longer, evidently, ideologized people steadfastly devoted to the old "choice." Many of them have moved into the soviets, and this is a reason why it is the party which today has become the main defender of the soviet system of power.

As far, however, as the hopes of certain party circles placed in presidential rule and emergency measures are concerned, extraordinary things also are possible here. Thus the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981 proved to be the final blow at the positions of the Communist Party. General Jaruzelski's local representatives simply supplanted the party committees. Would organs of presidential power, were they to be created, not do the same?

There is much that induces reflection on the historical limits of the existence of certain political organizations. What happened with the communist parties in Eastern Europe testifies to the existence of strict regularities of the transition from totalitarianism to democracy, which cannot, some "specifics" of ours being cited, be ignored. The transfer of party power, which is occurring in hidden fashion or openly, into different structures—political

and economic—would indicate that this is recognized in the Communist Party also. There is reason to conclude that not only will there be a change in the ideological and political character of the CPSU and an intensification of the demarcation in its ranks but its significance in political life will have become completely different in the very near future.

In this connection many people are turning their gaze toward the military-industrial complex, considering it the force which is destined to determine the country's future. Let us not rush to conclusions. First, in all countries and in ours also the military-industrial complex realizes its interests via particular political annexes. Even if the number of its representatives in the organs of power and the party authorities have increased, the assertions concerning its total independence are without foundation. Second, the view of the military-industrial complex as a monolith is a delusion also. It consists of different groupings with, besides common, particular aspirations as well. Some are too closely tied to the party structures. Others, however, are looking around in a search for new political backing.

Let us take if only the "directors' lobby"—the leaders of major enterprises of Union jurisdiction, the majority of which is connected with defense industry—which has given notice of itself. Some of them were in at the start of the formation of the Russian Communist Party. Others were involved in the coup attempts in the Baltic. Until recently they were all saying that the "directors' lobby" by no means burned with a desire to switch to market relations, which were upsetting for it, and they had a very distinctive view of democracy also. Quite recently even our directors were demanding of the president special measures in the spirit of "war communism." Now the situation is starting to change. Ever more enterprise leaders are coming to believe that the market is not the worst thing possible. This is the force which is seeking a new political roof.

Attention today is focused on the army also. In what direction will it move in a situation where the main forces are preoccupied with confrontation? A question troubling many people. And how much talk there has been and continues to be about the danger of a military coup and about a militarist junta which virtually has taken shape and is already prepared to take power! Some generals are tired of justifying themselves, saying that entering the Kremlin has not even crossed their minds.

Well, the army has, indeed, never been an independent force in Soviet society and has always been under party influence. But today, judging by certain indications, it is acquiring independence and beginning to dictate its political will. There are visible examples of increased pressure on the center on the part of the conservative army top brass. The independent move of the military with claims to power is, perhaps, entirely possible. It is true that the mere fact of the army's involvement in the

solution of questions of domestic political and interethnic struggle is increasing its politicization and also engendering lines of demarcation therein.

And what about the KGB? Could it be that those who are warning that under the conditions of the disintegration of all structures there is a danger that power will be seized by this force, which continues manageable, are indeed right? Intriguing conjectures have already appeared: All that is happening with us, perestroika itself even—all this is the work of the Committee. We will not, of course, underestimate the political and other possibilities of this shadowy force. But for an organization primordially coded for a different type of activity to come to power—this is unlikely. As new political elites are formed, its influence on the authorities will, most likely, gradually diminish.

As a whole, however, it would be entirely wrong to regard this institution of society or the other as a concentration of reactionaries alone. Incidentally, the democratic forces' lack of a differentiated approach to the institutions of the old system has facilitated considerably the offensive of the counter-reformation.

The appearance of one further force cannot fail to attract attention. We will call it provisionally the "modernizers." Their social base is primarily the industrial lobby and the engineering intelligentsia. The modernizers are manifestly for the market. They are united by an understanding of the terminal nature of the ideologized economy. What is their political program? It has yet to take shape conclusively. But, to judge by everything, the process of clarification of political reference points is moving very actively. The modernizers give pride of place to professionalism, competence and reforms, but with a strong executive authority. To judge by everything, some of them appeal to the "Asian idea" of development realized by Japan, South Korea, and certain other countries of this region, by an authoritarian path, what is more. But however debatable the views of some of our domestic modernizers, their very appearance is a step forward in our political development.

It is true that some people are saying: What do you mean, all these forces are merely contributing to a mimicry of the old system. Some of the newly formed forces are operating in this direction, endeavoring to preserve totalitarianism in a different casing. But other groupings, although by birth from the same place, are sufficiently pragmatic that they understand the terminal nature of any type of mutation of the old system.

Who will in the near future come to the fore—the party fundamentalists, moderates, those holding power, or the modernizers? This will depend to a considerable extent also on what happens "on the left."

We have to analyze in balanced and dispassionate manner why the democratic forces have not succeeded in halting the antireform counterrecoil. There have been objective factors which have complicated our transition to democracy: the absence of a civil society, political

culture and the economic foundations of democratism and the intensification of the economic and national crises.

But many of the blunders also have been made by the democrats themselves. They have been unable to opportunely propose a scientifically substantiated strategy of transition to new social relations. Such a program is still lacking, and no slogans will substitute for it. We must put among the weaknesses of our democrats their elite character and inadequate ties to the workers' associations and, most importantly, the youth. The democrats' entry into the old power structures also has proven a snare to a large extent. As a result they have had to bear the responsibility not only for their mistakes but also the activity of their opponents. Their simplistic perception of democracy as the solution of questions by majority and a mass-meeting approach has been reflected as well. Only now has there come to be an understanding that democratism is primarily professional administration on behalf of the majority.

The democratic movement today has entered a new period of development. Some people define it as a retreat. Others, evaluating particularly the fluctuations of the center and its repeated departure from realization of the power version which had been outlined, are even speaking about the victory of the democrats and believe that the time has come for them to put forward their conditions of Union power. Neither evaluation is correct, perhaps. On the one hand, the chances of a democratic alternative for Soviet society, even if not in pure form and only in individual republics, are not, for all that, exhausted.

Let us ask ourselves: Is it that necessary before embarking upon democracy to cross a long authoritarian corridor? If, of course, by democracy is understood the system of power which exists in West Europe or the United States, the road thereto would take the life of several generations. But there are in the world, after all, various forms of democratism, including that cultivated by underdeveloped states. Why do we not turn our gaze toward India or Bangladesh, which, since the dictatorship, has been creating institutions which appear more democratic than ours? "Only a strong executive authority can create a market," many people will take issue with me. No doubt. But why must such an authority necessarily be embodied in an authoritarian regime?

I would like to caution against one other delusion—reliance only on an analysis of the play of political forces. Under our conditions it does not always adequately reflect the processes occurring in society. This gap is serious and could serve up a mass of surprises. Thus, despite all our forecasts, it is not the political demarcation but the temperature of social emotions and the direction of their escape which could prove decisive. This escape could work both in favor of democratic transformations and also against them.

"But this is all beating about the bush," the reader will observe. "Can you simply say where things are headed?" It is easier, I believe, to list what will, most likely, not happen. There will be no military coup. Nor will there be civil war for the old authorities will not rouse the masses to their defense. There will be no going back and restoring the party-based state. Its erosion cannot be halted, and it is occurring not only thanks to the democrats but also as a consequence of the appearance of pragmatists within the old structures. Just as impossible is our return to a unitary state. Nor will the republics be driven under the roof of centrist federalism—development has broken out of its confines. But just as much an illusion is also the hope of some of them of being allowed to float freely... They cannot survive in isolation—an understanding of this dictated the joint declaration of the president and the leaders of nine republics creating a practical basis for the signing of the Union treaty. This declaration creates for the first time a fundamentally new situation, where practical steps pertaining to the creation of a qualitatively different statehood have become possible. And there is reason to suppose, what is more, that it will be of a multistory nature and incorporate federal and confederal relations. And some republics will cooperate with the Union on a basis of interstate relations. In the meantime, in any event.

The extreme and horrifying versions of the development of the Union are improbable. Let us not cause panic in and terrify the West. The prevalence of extremist political orientations of any persuasion is just as problematical also, in the main regions of the country, in any event. However acute the political clash, however strong the heat of emotions, the self-preservation instinct is already at work in society.

Much will depend on whether we rid ourselves of the vision of events exclusively in the black-and-white portrayal and the reduction of everything to the "either, or" alternative. Either socialism or capitalism. Either dictatorship or democracy. Either left or right. Of course, severing relations with the custodians of the old bastions is essential. But we have, after all, embarked on a transitional period, when neither of the principal social forces is capable of controlling the situation fully. Some no longer can, others cannot yet. Even were there to be an outward breakthrough in someone's favor, the victor would hardly acquire freedom of maneuver.

But this does not mean that some "third force," which would come to power, is in the offing. A far greater number of participants in political life is operating in our country even now. The question of power, however, and its base will be decided only via the formation of this bloc or the other and compromise. Open or backstage. This truth is recognized by the majority of political forces. It is with good reason that some have undertaken a search for allies and others have declared themselves the "center" and are calling for unification on the platform proper. Even if for some the conciliatory vocabulary is only a maneuver and ruse, we cannot fail

to observe that a new situation is beginning to take shape in our politics. Albert with the threat of disruption.

But how important it is, considering the latter point, to overcome the new illusions that have already appeared. One is connected with the attempt to create a center political movement. It is not even a question of its creation on a CPSU platform, as the president anticipates, being impossible. A coalition, as the cooperation in the exercise of power of independent political forces, is a far more practical thing. But there are hidden reefs here also. Take, say, the slogan concerning a public-trust coalition government. Given the present distrust of one-party government, such a slogan encounters society's support. But let us consider that we are talking about a coalition under the conditions of an as yet unshaped multiparty system. A whole number of questions therefore arises: Which parties to enlist in the formation of a coalition government? Are there in all of them impressive candidates for ministerial office? Nor can we offend the republics, which would want to have their representatives in the Union Government. One can only imagine what kind of struggle would develop around the main ministerial positions. And what would we obtain as a result? A composite orchestra in which everyone attempted to play his own tune.

Agreement on a public-trust government (which would by no means necessarily have to be a coalition government at this time), on the other hand, could be reached via the "roundtable" mechanism. The idea suggested by B. Yeltsin, but taken from the experience of the East European countries, is, apparently, acquiring a practical outline. Movement toward a "roundtable" has clearly been discerned, judging by a report which has caused a sensation: G. Yavlinskiy has drawn up and presented to M. Gorbachev a concept of a negotiating process in the country—"Social Accord." The birth of this document was preceded by G. Yavlinskiy's participation in the work of the council of the "Big Seven"—the leaders of seven of the world's industrially developed countries. Let us hope that for M. Gorbachev today a negotiating process in the name of social accord becomes more important than narrow party interests. In any event, he was the first to understand that the idea of joint action with a "Seven" prepared to render us serious economic assistance and the planned negotiations inside the country are interconnected, that they are a single whole.

And the final point. The time of the present systems of power in the Union is running out. Society is on the verge of a stage of cardinal political reforms—both in the center and locally. In places in the republics this process has already begun, and we will shortly be witnessing the appearance of a diversity of both political structures and regimes. In the center, as if by inertia, the completion of the bundling of bodies that are no longer any part of the new reality continues. Yet the impending signing of the Union treaty signifies also a need for the creation of new federal authorities with different powers. Of course, the

transformation of the old center will be a difficult process and will, possibly, give rise to a new confrontation of forces.

It is important in the forthcoming transformations, however, not to attempt to create structures—at the level of the republics or of the Union—for all time. Society and its interests and the correlation of forces are in

constant drift. It is therefore risky to consolidate its present transitional state. Formalizing it constitutionally, all the more. Tomorrow it will be necessary to break with a great deal and once more build from scratch. Would it not be better to take the path of concluding provisional agreements and shaping transitional forms not impeding development. And just for a year or two at that. No longer! Much could change in this time.

Baltics

Lithuania's Acting Foreign Minister Comments on Kremlin Talks

91UN1364A Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS
in Lithuanian 28 Feb 91-6 Mar 91 p 1

[Interview with Valdemaras Katkus, acting minister of foreign affairs of the Lithuanian Republic, by Vytautas Katilius: "The Kremlin Is Playing at Negotiating"]

[Text] [Katilius] In January we sorely felt a tie between Lithuania and events in faraway Kuwait. Now that the United States and its allies have rejected M. Gorbachev's peace plan and begun military actions in the desert, it is once again disconcerting: will there not be repercussions for us?

[Katkus] First of all, it was not a peace plan but the USSR's feeble attempt to maintain through Iraq and Hussein some influence in the region. We should be concerned about something else: in PRAVDA and other USSR communist newspapers verbal attacks have begun against the United States—the first signs of a cold war. If an open opposition occurs again between the USSR and the United States, if the iron curtain should fall once again, then there may be attempts to deal [harshly] with the Baltic States. Let us hope it does not come to this.

[Katilius] But perhaps a lack of success in foreign policy and the bankruptcy of Soviet arms and military strategy in Iraq will have the opposite effect, urging the Kremlin to sit down to negotiations with Lithuania?

[Katkus] Hardly. The Kremlin is only playing at negotiating so as to smooth talk the rest of the world. It will seriously come to the negotiating table only when it has no other alternative.

I will not even mention that if the Kremlin seriously seeks to negotiate it must immediately withdraw its army from occupied buildings in Vilnius. But let us keep in mind that negotiations have already taken place with a delegation headed by N. Ryzhkov. We had discussed many problems with it, even compromises (such as guaranteeing USSR defense interests, double boundaries, etc.). So does the Kremlin really want to throw all of that into the wastebasket and start from scratch? But then again do we have any guarantee that in the negotiations there will be no new slaughter, no more buildings taken over, and that afterwards a new negotiating committee will be formed, and once again we have to start from scratch?

[Katilius] Then perhaps ex-premiere K. Prunskiene was correct in saying that the best time for negotiations with the USSR has already passed, that Lithuania should have broken way together with the German Democratic Republic and only our internal politics precluded us from doing so?

[Katkus] No. Last summer the attention of the world was focused on German unification and the crumbling of communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe. On the other hand, let us not forget that in the West there is a tenacious inertia of thinking. There was still a lot that had to be proved and, unfortunately, not only in words.

[Katilius] There are great hopes for an agreement with Russia, as an alternative and as a lever on the Kremlin. But it still hasn't been signed. What is the problem?

[Katkus] Well, everything is proceeding normally. But in signing the agreement we are also adding some separate protocols, e.g., on Kaliningrad, on citizens. We are now finessing them, negotiating.

[Katilius] Won't we be too late? We are all aware of how much Russia's policy was determined by the Baltic countries and even rests on B. Yeltsin's personality. But it seems that he may have problems with Russia's parliament.

[Katkus] I would not view this so pessimistically. There will be a gigantic meeting on Sunday in Moscow to support B. Yeltsin. His turbulent reception in the Russian heartland—the non-developed agricultural areas—shows that the answer by no means was one-sided.

[Katilius] In having focused attention on negotiations with the USSR and with Russia, have we not neglected our closer neighbors?

[Katkus] Last week we delivered to the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Republic of Poland our proposals for common political, economic ties, for a packet on national minorities. I hope that in the near future we will sign a concrete document with Poland.

[Katilius] Thank you for the interview.

Lithuanian Paper Scores Shenin Vilnius Remarks

91UN1314A Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian
22 Feb 91 p 1

[Article by Vladas Kalnietis: "The Instructor's Vacation"]

[Text] Vilnius was visited once again by O. Shenin, special representative of the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party, who had agitated last autumn to have the local nomenklatura establish a puppet communist government supported by the USSR in East Lithuania-Jasiunai-Shachininkai. This time comrade Shenin addressed the activists in comrade Burokevich's organization, much of which was published in PRAVDA (February 19 of this year).

Trying to maintain the official Kremlin version of the "confrontation" within Lithuania (not between Lithuania and the USSR), Shenin nonetheless spread this reasoning by world standards and at the same time gave it a bolshevik dogmatic explanation. "Socialism" and "anti-socialism"; appropriately understanding the

fate of the Soviet order and party governing system (mentioning the word "democracy" if only in quotes); Soviet Union's Communist Party criticism as "anti-communism" and a campaign "against the party", as if it were the one and the same innocent one from October 1917 until January 1991. All this signals an otherwise obvious turn of the Soviet Union's Communist Party back to a Stalinist and autocratic mafiosa type of dictatorship.

The subjugation of the army to the partocracy was clothed in O. Shenin's speech by insinuations about some sort of broad plot—a "plan" to change the order and to weaken the empire, or at least its "centralized government." The local goal was to scare the Lithuanian inhabitants and blackmail the parliament with predictions about the possible tearing apart of the sovereign state territory. If the Stalinist "Soviet side" in 1943 had declared Klaipeda to be "a Slavic land forever," then it is now raised as an important argument which shows us very well how limited and impotent are the legal positions of the Kremlin leaders. Somewhere they declared that the moon belonged to their ancestors, after a while they could base it upon that. Such are the pathetic, pontifical letters to themselves, but which become dangerous when the same emboldened letters are waved by hard hatted generals.

Some of Shenin's observations are worth attention, as well as his conclusions and recommendations.

Lithuania "emerging from the structure of the USSR" will be deeply obliged to the USSR military defense. The Soviets would not allow a third country to operate from Lithuania against its (the Soviets') interests, etc.

These thoughts are similar to the beginning of a constructive dialogue and, doubtless, Lithuania could weigh these sorts of propositions positively. But at the same time this Shenin recommends further (for the time being) treating the Baltic countries as a "component part" of the Soviet Union. He demands a recall of the rightful governmental constitutional acts and decrees of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (as "unconstitutional"). The invitation to defend the "Baltic countries' communist life" sounds provocative and to "safeguard them from attack" somewhat less than serious.

Noteworthy recommendations from USSR representatives in Lithuania are the following: to repudiate (is it possible?) confrontations between political forces; to regroup and seek "constructive dialogue with the creative intelligentsia"; to strengthen ties with **leaders of enterprises and farms**; assuring also "assistance on the part of Soviet Union's organs"; to gather up from everywhere and return to Lithuania the **"basic national" party cadres**; to spread and strengthen the already mentioned communist party contacts with **disgruntled "deputies of various stature"**; to send groups of party propagandizers "to work with the republic's peasants".

These are very old methods: divide, slander, buy off. Just let in the tentacles and the poison spreads everywhere.

The astute Lithuanian society—all of the citizens of the nation—have been given the assignment to show, once again, that it will not work.

We can not travel the same road as the murderers of 13 January.

Chronology of Simenas Disappearance Detailed

91UN1359A Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS
in Lithuanian 7-13 Mar 91 pp 1,3

[Article by Algis Petrulis: "The Truth Will Die if It Keeps Quiet"]

[Text] On January 14, 1991. The mysterious and bloody Sunday is ending. At 11 o'clock on Monday morning, Albertas Simenas, having decided to continue controlling the executive, invites all ministers to gather for a meeting. Exhausted, having slept for barely an hour, some people do not understand: it seems that at 12:00 they were called to a meeting by the new leader of the executive, G. Vagnorius. Nevertheless, the ministers meet with A. Simenas. However, they guess that it is not an executive meeting but a discussion. Minister of Justice P. Kuris asks A. Simenas: "Did you hide by your own volition, or did someone force you to?" A. Simenas smiles sadly and says "By my own volition." P. Kuris will open wide his hands—what more is there to say? A. Simenas will ask "You mean, I have to resign?" But he no longer had to resign.

A. Simenas lies down in the neurological section of the Santariskiai Hospital. Certified depression.

The Wolves Go Out at Night

On the night of January 13, at about 2 am, shots ring out near the Vilnius TV tower. The first victims lie groaning. At 2:30 am the telephone rings at the government garage dispatcher. Dispatcher Stase recognizes the voice of Birute, secretary of the head of the government's leader. She demands that a car be sent immediately to the home of A. Simenas. But first of all the car must come to their building and pick up a guard.

A black "Volga" GAS-31 arrives at the Government building a few minutes later. Two young men are already waiting at the door. One goes back into the building. The other sits at the wheel. He says, "Turniskes 25." Not another word is spoken. After ten to fifteen minutes the "Volga" slowly arrives at the Turniskes villa. A light shines on the second floor. The guard knocks at the door. The light suddenly goes out. After some time the door opens and there are a few minutes of discussion. After a few more minutes A. Simenas comes out carrying suitcases and accompanied by the guard. Behind him, the prime minister's wife and three small children. As soon as they start the driver will ask A. Simenas where he should turn. A. Simenas will say it doesn't matter to him, but he has to make a telephone call (there is one in the car). They stop at a police station. Here they await a yellow "Zhiguli." A. Simenas presses the "Zhiguli"

driver's hand and turns quickly into the building of the post. In a little while everything from the "Volga" is transferred to the "Zhiguli," and the yellow car disappears into the night. The "Volga" is released from Turniskes only a half hour later. The driver of the "Volga" manages to note down the "Zhiguli's" color and license plate number. Later on, not one policeman will recall these.

On the eve of the bloody events, V. Landsbergis together with A. Simenas, arrive at a session of the cabinet. K. Prunskiene, although she had resigned, manages to sit in the Prime Minister's seat at the head of the table. A. Simenas has to be content to sit alongside. V. Landsbergis presents the new chairman of the Council of Ministers. A curious situation resolves itself only once V. Landsbergis and K. Prunskiene leave. A. Simenas takes his appropriate place. At the first session, A. Simenas had already asked, "Who categorically resigns from the new government?" Six ministers raised their hands. A few weeks later, P. Kuris, recalling that session, remarks, "I already had a feeling at that time that he was just an interim prime minister."

A. Simenas will ask M. Misiukonis and A. Brazauskas for their help and for them not to resign.

On the eve of the tragic events, A. Simenas was brought a new suit: the prime minister was being prepared to meet with M. Gorbachev. Today, most of the ministers cannot explain exactly why A. Simenas never went. It is known that those days Gorbachev was being evasive (trying to hide) in many ways.

One thing is clear. The Council of Ministers tried to take the initiative into their own hands, perhaps even tried to act independently. Was this not the desired signal for certain deputies to the Supreme Council. Perhaps this presumption establishes that K. Prunskiene, on the eve of the tragic events, tried to convince the ministers that they had to act independently, without consulting parliament. Could not the government's independence be considered by certain influential deputies as betrayal?

On the night of January 12 in the hall of the Council of Ministers, A. Simenas called a session of the government. The Prime Minister gives A. Saudargas a note. He gestures to the ceiling and the walls to indicate that he cannot speak out loud here. The Foreign Affairs Minister, having read the note, leaves shortly thereafter. By midnight, A. Saudargas was in Poland. All of the ministers knew about this. Later it becomes clear that only A. Simenas did not know. In closing the session, A. Simenas will say that there is no reason to meet tomorrow since everyone is so tired. They need to rest. A. Simenas will mention that he has not slept in six nights. Late that evening, A. Simenas will meet with the representatives of various parties and organizations. The last delegation to visit A. Simenas was the Tautininkai. At about midnight, A. Simenas is driven to Turniskes. His wife and three young children had just moved here the day before. The Prime Minister no longer guarded by security (not

including the security around Turniskes itself). Before moving to their new apartment, the bodyguards had told his wife that "The Prime Minister said that you do not need to be guarded anymore." This made a deep impression on A. Simenas. At a closed session of the Supreme Council in a stream of incoherent words he will state this as one of his reasons for leaving Vilnius.

Secret Carnival

Shots are heard in Vilnius. The Lithuanian radio broadcasts its last news. The first to get to the Government's hall is A. Nasvytis, the minister of construction and urban planning. A little bit later, R. Ozolas and D. Kuolys show up. Little by little, all of the ministers gather. The ministers are stunned to see a total outsider in the Prime Minister's place, G. Songaila. D. Kuolys asks who sent him there. He responds, V. Cepaitis (he is the deputy of V. Cepaitis, head of the Independence party). R. Ozolas tried to get more of an explanation. G. Songaila explains that he maintains direct contact with the brother of V. Cepaitis who sits in his office. Was it a necessity to have G. Songaila come to the hall of the Council of Ministers? After all, P. Dzikaras, the advisor to the Head of the Council of Ministers, was here all night.

A. Simenas still does not show up. D. Kuolys goes to V. Landsbergis and the Supreme Council to let them know that A. Simenas has disappeared. The chairman of the Supreme Council is told that the government is in control of the situation which is the reason for the Council of Ministers' ignoring. This was still until V. Landsbergis' final broadcast of Lithuanian TV. Perhaps the earlier moves by the government had forced the leadership of the Supreme Council to look distrustfully upon the work of the government. Did the defense council created by the Supreme Council that night await only an attack by the landing-forces soldiers? Apparently, they also expected treason among their own.

Just before 4, V. Landsbergis calls, "Romualdas, where is Simenas?" R. Ozolas promises to find out right away. The dispatcher is interrogated, the driver, the security policemen at Turniskes. The last to have spoken that night with A. Simenas was A. Merkulov, the police lieutenant on guard. On January 15 he will write a report about it. The last sentences of this report will read, "A. Simenas stepped from a 'Volga,' came to me, and said: 'I do not know the driver of the "Volga," so my friend will drive me and my family.' Having taken me aside, A. Simenas said, 'Don't let the "Volga" leave Turniskes for 20-30 minutes.' He transferred with his family to his friend's 'Zhiguli' and drove away at 3:10. I released the 'Volga' a half hour later, as I had been told."

In the morning, K. Prunskiene comes to the Council of Ministers. He attempts to take the initiative into her own hands. When the ministers got word that a new chairman of the Council of Ministers had been elected, K. Prunskiene and A. Brazauskas went to Parliament.

Still in the morning, A. Paulauskas, the attorney general for Lithuania, comes to the Supreme Council. He has found out from deputy Jarasiunas that A. Simenas had disappeared, and orders his deputy, G. Norkunas, to raise a case. The owner of the "Zhiguli" is exposed. He is Romualdas K., A. Simenas's friend, G. Norkunas, together with S. Indriunas, chief criminal investigator, go to Romualdas K.'s apartment. This was about 2:00 pm. A. Simenas's friend says little, does not respond to most questions, indicating, that he does not have A. Simenas's authorization to discuss these matters. He says, "About 7:00 am, as I had been directed, I called the deputies (three or four of them) whom A. Simenas had told me to, as let them know that A. Simenas is in a safe place." When asked the names of the deputies, Romualdas K. repeated once more, "I am not authorized to say." So no one will ever know their names. There will be no attempt to find out whether these deputies were informed by A. Simenas's entrustee before or after there was a new chairman of the Council of Ministers.

While they are still talking, Romualdas K.'s wife knocks at the door and announces that she has heard over the radio that A. Simenas has returned.

The next day, S. Indriunas meets with A. Simenas in the neurological department of Santariskiai. In truth, the doctor warned the investigator that "A. Simenas's condition is not especially good." A. Simenas himself very much wanted to meet with the investigator. A. Simenas said that that night they drove to a small village beyond Druskininkai. Another friend had been invited to Turniskes that night (according to A. Simenas, as a fall back measure). He returned by private taxi which was arranged by acquaintances in Druskininkai. He returned, having found out that a new chairman of the Council of Ministers had been elected.

That same night, most of the ministers were concerned with the question: Why was A. Simenas sent a guard he did not know? (That was Audrius P. of Kaunas). As it became clear later, A. Simenas will ask him certain questions to be convinced that he is, as he alleges, from V. Landsbergis' security. Perhaps this unwariness caused the difficult situation. However, why did the guard leave without reason? One thing is clear. He was supposed to protect Simenas. But from whom? From the automatic weapons of landing forces? Or to protect A. Simenas himself from undesirable actions?

A. Simenas showed up at the hall of the Supreme Council at about 3:00 pm. Most people called out, "Hurrah, A. Simenas." A. Simenas appeared strong, responded to the greetings. He was led to V. Landsbergis. He was in the chairman's apartment for one hour and twenty minutes. He appeared in the Hall of Parliament a totally different person. This was no longer that Simenas whom most deputies had known. A closed session takes place. Space prevents us from being able to cite everything A. Simenas said. I would like to stress a few moments

A. Simenas (in the stenographer's report of the closed session): "If Saudargas has not crossed the border, then I will stay here, the unknown, but the chairman, following how everything will end, and then either I will remain underground or I will cross the border and will represent the Lithuanian government."

"I was not able to leave my family because all kinds of things would start happening, so I evacuated my family."

"I repeat once more: I told that person to quickly inform the chairman, as quickly as possible, and give me a decision, whether to show up or not." (sic)

The stenographer's report of the closed session leads one to believe that A. Simenas' departure was not an act of panic.

A few days ago I met with the man who drove A. Simenas that night, Romualdas K. He told me nothing. Having seen his eyes, I irksomely did not ask him questions. In parting he said, "If the conclusions of the Parliamentary commission are incorrect, then we will talk."

Simenas' having returned, the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Council meets. A. Simenas gets into an argument with G. Vagnorius, who should conduct the meeting. V. Landsbergis intervenes.

A Baker's Dozen

The radio equipment in the hall of the Supreme Council was tuned to military wavelengths. The shootings near the TV tower had ended. The radio and television building and tank leaders reported their successful attack and preparedness for the final storming. A few minutes later an order was heard not to attack the building of the Supreme Council. Someone else still tried to argue for the necessity of destroying the last bastion of nationalism. The same voice repeated: "There are many people by that building—there will be a great loss of life."

Dementejus, the USSR President's charge d'affaires, is supposed to come to Lithuania right away. The representatives of the government are already prepared to meet the delegation. A few of the ministers hurry to meet the USSR parliamentarians. At the same time, there is an attempt to convince the Supreme Council that it is not worthwhile to meet with the deputies since the USSR military has murdered our people. After long arguments, only K. Uoka hurries out to the airport. The representatives of the government await the arrival of the plane. A disembarking ladder is brought in. After a while the news is received unexpectedly: the plane landed a long time ago and has been towed far from the main gates. Having jumped into a "Chaika," the ministers find the plane a good kilometer and a half later. They are not allowed into the plane. V. Antanaitis shows his USSR people's deputy identification. This helps. In the airplane sit unknown people already talking with the parliamentarians. V. Antanaitis is successful in convincing them to include him. A few weeks later I asked V. Antanaitis if he

does not see a connection between certain deputy's not wanting to meet the USSR president's agent and the attempt to hide the plan. The minister replied, "There might be." I will not reveal the names of these deputies. They know who they are.

Parliamentary intrigues are a natural expression in almost every democratic country. K. Prunskiene's resignation was the logical end of a political battle. We understood, that A. Simenas as well is but a transitional figure in a complex political battle. Perhaps A. Simenas became independent too quickly? Perhaps he paid too much attention to interests of "others." The fear of losing influence chooses its own methods.

The political games go on. Does Lithuania need them? Previous attempts to pit the parliament against the government were successful. This was professionally exploited against the very idea of independence. To no avail V. Landsbergis tries to convince the warring throngs that this was not the Supreme Council's place. Has a mine of programmed conflict been placed at the foundation of independence? It is as if the moral and judicial chaos which took place in January is still hanging like the sword of Damocles just awaiting the right moment.

Perhaps I have spoken too soon. However, wouldn't a few months or even a year from now be too late? I felt that, unbelievably, fear is creeping back into our lives. In gathering this material, many recalled the fear of losing employment, health, children. There was even talk of dynamite. Have we really come this far? Let us not forget: freedom dies only in fear.

RSFSR

Ryzhkov Preelection Meeting Reported

91UN15804 Moscow TRUD in Russian 24 May 91 p 2

[Article by Yu. Ursov: "'I Did Everything I Could'—Meetings With Voters Have Started for Official Candidates for RSFSR President"]

[Text] Immediately after N. Ryzhkov was officially acknowledged to be a candidate for the presidency of the RSFSR at the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies, he began to meet with the voters.

The first meeting in the preelection competition is always the most important. At least, in the United States the candidates for president arrange their "first appearance" before the voters in a very well-thought-out and thorough way, preparing some effective surprises beforehand.

There were none Wednesday at a meeting between N. Ryzhkov and RSFSR people's deputies, members of the Agrarian Union, and the USSR Soviet of Kolkhozes who, together with two million Russians, support his candidacy. And it is not just that N. Ryzhkov is rather well-known and his positions—we will give him his due—were always rather predictable and principled and

not dependent on the situation of the moment. In the words of N. Ryzhkov, additional work is being done on the preelection program, which encompasses all spheres of Russian activity—from the economy to problems of the army—and for that reason there was no discussion of fundamentally new proposals. It is to be hoped that this is for the time being.

Nevertheless N. Ryzhkov talked in considerable detail about some of the most important principles of his future program. In degree of importance, he placed problems of the agroindustrial complex in first place, which, together with other important branches, it is necessary to take under "state protection." And specifically to guarantee priorities in material-technical supplies, "until the market stands fast," to determine a mechanism of equivalent exchange between the village and industry, and to develop processing branches...

N. Ryzhkov emphasized especially that he is not an enemy of the market. But a market that is regulated by the state with the help of a "real plan," but not its distorted administrative-command version: "The market has to be approached in a considered way." N. Ryzhkov also came out for a multistructured system and equality in all forms of economic management in land, but it must not be a purchase-sell object.

In a word, all of the theses are familiar. And undoubtedly it is difficult to argue with them. One is put on guard, it is true, by the fact that N. Ryzhkov's speech is abundant with the words "we must form," "it is necessary to develop," etc. But how specifically, for example, is the optimal correlation to be determined between prices for industrial products for the village and purchase prices in industry? Where will the additional money be obtained for the development of the agrarian sector in the closely related articles of a budget that is full of holes? And the main thing is why this could not have been done earlier? However, the penchant for general phrases, it seems, is by no means typical of N. Ryzhkov alone.

The "pluses," so to speak, of the "draft" of N. Ryzhkov's program were set forth clearly: orientation on the social protection of the population, adherence to a "smooth" transition to a market without any particular "shocks," striving for fairness in income distribution ("difficult to establish, but it is much more difficult to distribute").

But the vulnerable spots are also apparent. Even with a rather superficial familiarity, it is clear that the weakest spot in the program is its economic part. For the time being, it is quite vague as to how N. Ryzhkov will convince the voters that he is capable of leading the economy of Russia out of the crisis. Especially because well-known government programs are still fresh in memory, which, of course, also were not allowed to be implemented. The reasons for the failures in the economy, which opponents attribute to N. Ryzhkov, are associated by the candidate to "the general decline in production," the "strikes," and also to natural disasters. In this situation, the chairman of the USSR Council of

Ministers did "everything I could, although not everything succeeded." Rather frequently, in N. Ryzhkov's words, at meetings of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, and later at the President's Council, he expressed an opinion which differed from the position of M. Gorbachev. In particular, on the question of privatization of housing, and also in connection with the intention of the USSR president last autumn to fully reject mentioning the government program in the summary document on leading the country out of the economic crisis: There was only a reference in it, as N. Ryzhkov said, to the "500 days program." There are no casual reservations among people who have gone through the corridors of higher authority. From N. Ryzhkov's intonations and individual rejoinders, it was clear that he is rather critical of the present leadership of the Union ("neither senior nor junior advisers called on me for advice"), and to the leadership of the RSFSR ("The Russian Government is extremely weak.").

Well, everyone can criticize. N. Ryzhkov incidentally, in my opinion, less than others. Will he be able to propose something more attractive and economically adjusted than the already well-known versions of getting out of the crisis and strengthening authority, and besides the declared desires: "Are discipline and order needed in the country?" It will be possible to reach final conclusions after the proclamation of the program by the candidate for RSFSR president.

Deputy Views Opposition to Presidency Law

91UN16004 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 21, 29 May 91 p 2

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent for Rostov Oblast Vladimir Fomin, RSFSR people's deputy, under the rubric: "Point of View: Those Who Are Losing Power Will Show Themselves"]

[Text] A strange congress, and it leaves a strange impression—unspectacular and slack. Yes, outwardly everything flowed smoothly at the congress, and in the end the most radical laws were passed by an overwhelming majority of votes. But the whole time a sense of uneasiness about some kind of approaching misfortune did not leave me. It seemed that something should be on the verge of happening, and that the law "On the President of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]," which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet, would be rejected (it needs two-thirds of the votes), and that contrary to the results of the national referendum it would not get into the republic constitution and then what—dissolve the congress which did not express the will of the people? Establish a provisional government or a committee of national salvation? But who would establish them? Yeltsin? General Makashov? Zhirnovskiy? Which path should we take? Should we return, as one of the people's deputies openly summoned, to the status before 1985, or should we move farther into the stream of democratic processes?

Thank God, the fear of a crisis has passed, but let no one try to convince me that it passed because there was a display of goodwill by all of the political forces in parliament. Two hundred and thirty-five deputies voted against ratification as a whole of the law: "On the President of the RSFSR" in the form in which it was adopted by the Supreme Soviet, a number that is quite sufficient to block the inclusion of the law in the constitution. Using my own Rostov deputation as an example, I judge that basically these were representatives of the "Communists of Russia" bloc. Its most outstanding representatives are I.K. Polozkov, G.V. Sayenko, and B.G. Kibirev—as can be seen from the results of the roll call vote, they even objected to the adoption of a resolution in this regard.

But how was the law emasculated? A provision was removed from Article 8 which gave the president the right to suspend decisions of the organs of executive authority, if they contradict the constitution and laws of the RSFSR. In this way, the heart of the law was removed, and the idea of a president as a strong executive authority evaporated. And once again—who voted against? Representatives of the party apparatus and administrative structures who orally fight to strengthen discipline and law and order. O.V. Kazarov, chairman of the Ulyanovsk Oblispolkom [oblast executive committee], complained in vain that the instinct of self-preservation has disappeared among the USSR and RSFSR deputies and that they obediently press the button "for." In this category—it did not disappear.

The fact that the law on the president, even though in an abbreviated form, became part of the constitution, and that elections for the president of Russia will be held on 12 June, and not in the fall, and that this day will be a holiday, is a great achievement of the congress. The will of the people has to be taken into account, especially when the vote is by roll call and a law is adopted on procedures for recalling a people's deputy.

But let us call things by their real names. Those who are ready to return to the status before 1985, did not become more compliant and better. They are simply weaker. The open recommendations to the people's deputies on what people and what principles to defend, which were expressed by such newspapers as SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and GLASNOST, did not help, and neither did the copies of amendments with pluses and minuses inserted beforehand on how to vote that were carefully distributed to its members by the "Communists of Russia" faction. They did not help.

Public opinion is reducing their ranks. At the same time, the present congress, as no previous one in my opinion, showed what path they are willing to take just to retain the former arrangements, themselves, and the system. For Zhirnovskiy—477 votes(!) For Makashov—applause(!) If they could only, in their words, stop Yeltsin, and in fact the democratic processes of the revival of Russia

"They are for independence—it is necessary to give it to them. And then, as if as a lesson to all other people of the Soviet Union, Georgia and Armenia, which are independent of their own external enemies, will perish." This is Zhirinovskiy.

"Restore Soviet authority through the election of deputies in labor collectives." This is Makashov.

Knowing who is supporting the general, it is necessary to thank him for the fact that unlike many of his kindred spirits, he frankly says what he thinks.

In the last hours of the work of the congress, a statement of the deputy group "Russia" was distributed as an official document to the people's deputies. The mass media did not give it much attention. But it is a pity. It deserves it. If you brush aside the now usual accusations against the "supporters of democracy of the Western model" and even against "home-grown conservatives from among the new and old party apparatchiks," the gist of the document comes down to the fact that the deputy group "Russia" has rejected official participation in the elections for RSFSR president. Things did not go our way so we will leave, at least slamming the door...

I remain troubled at heart. The presidential campaign, especially in remote areas, will clarify and show a lot of what was latently sensed at the just concluded congress. I am convinced that those who are losing power will show themselves again.

Shakhray Comments on Presidency Law

91UN1576D Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 24 May 91 p 1

[Interview with S. Shakhray, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent A. Kozhakhmetova; place and date not given; published under the rubric: "At the Fourth Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies: The President Should Not Engage in Commerce"]

[Text] Having adopted the Law on the RSFSR President, the congress has begun discussion of constitutional amendments regulating the operation of the future president. S. Shakhray, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, commented on this law and the nature of the amendments in an interview given to our correspondent A. Kozhakhmetova.

[Kozhakhmetova] Does the new law include democratic checks on presidential power?

[Shakhray] In principle, due to a fear of dictatorship, we are now creating something of a semipresident because the powers that are being confirmed now are very insignificant. There are only two serious powers: First, to personally form the Cabinet of Ministers and to appoint the prime minister with the consent of the parliament;

second, to remove lower-ranking officials from their positions; after all, the president is head of the executive power.

The congress has taken all other powers away. After all, what is the foundation for the force of presidential power? The right to veto laws. We have not given the president such a right. In addition, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet offered the congress a triangular arrangement: the parliament—the president—the Constitutional Court. In keeping with this principle, the parliament would not be able to remove the president without an opinion of the Constitutional Court; likewise, the president would not be able to somehow influence the parliament. So, the congress upset the proposed balance in favor of the parliament. Well, this might be better than in favor of the president.

[Kozhakhmetova] Should the president be a party member?

[Shakhray] I believe that he should be a nonparty member. There is no need to quit a party to this end, but merely suspend one's membership for the duration of discharging the responsibilities of president. Therefore, this is not any "ban on professions." Incidentally, the Law on the RSFSR President which says that the president may not be a party member is at present in conflict with the RSFSR Constitution, which does not have such an article at all.

[Kozhakhmetova] May the president engage in commerce?

[Shakhray] I agree with the deputies entirely—the president should not engage in any entrepreneurial activities. Moreover, an income declaration is mandatory for him, incidentally, as well as for deputies.

Deputy Baburin Assesses RSFSR Congress

91UN1587A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 28 May 91 First Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Sergey Baburin by N. Garifullina; place and date not given: "President. Soviets. Union."]

[Text] We have been hearing continually of late the sacramental: "There is no alternative to our leader!" Is it the servile mentality transmitted in the genes from generation to generation or the customary blinkered condition which is preventing recognition that there is an alternative, for all that, and more than just one! A whole pleiad of young, gifted and highly promising politicians has confidently made its presence felt in the Russian parliament. But Sergey Baburin, a 32-year-old legal scholar from Omsk, could not pass unnoticed even among these bright personalities. An Afghan veteran, brilliantly educated, erudite and a true Russian intellectual, he possesses one further quality which is very rare in many present-day politicians: Sergey Baburin is profoundly decent and honest. His opinion in the Supreme Soviet is ponderable and authoritative.

[begin bold]We talked shortly before the closure of the congress.[end bold]

[Garifullina] Sergey Nikolayevich, so yet another congress of people's deputies is coming to an end. To the detached observer, it was quite smooth and unexpectedly tranquil. But how did it seem to you from the inside?

[Baburin] As a whole, to speak of my personal impression, this congress, as distinct from the previous ones, has been qualitatively new. It has been a congress in which the trend toward authoritarianism has gained undivided sway. The same trend which has persisted in the depths of the CPSU and which has now fashioned a new comfortable nest in the depths of "Democratic Russia." And it has come to dominate the congress. It is not fortuitous that it has been apathetic. True, some people may say that this is consensus. But I believe that those who investigated the atmosphere of the congress and relations between the groups of deputies would define it more accurately: It is indifference and weariness. And, perhaps, disenchantment added to lack of confidence in the possibility of there being a change in anything. Added to this also is the fact that this aspiration to a strong personality, to a strong hand, which has matured in the depths of the mass consciousness, has united both the far right and the far left. The center has proven incapable of resisting this.

No one today will deny that the representative bodies which have been in existence the past two years have been drowned in idle talk. However we might say that throughout this time truly very important decisions and laws at both Union and RSFSR level have been adopted, the authorities have, on the whole, been unable to accomplish the tasks entrusted to them or to put decisions, even good ones, into practice. It was necessary to strengthen the executive authority—the congress did so. Without reflection and lengthy discussion, unfortunately, I am convinced that we could have made the figure of the president stronger and at the same time more balanced with the judiciary and legislature. We could have, had we pondered whom we need—a vice president or a chairman of the Council of Ministers. For in the United States there is a vice president, not a head of government. The president is the head of the executive. And in France, say, there is a premier, but no vice president. That is, here, unfortunately, we have agreed to a dualism of executive authority, which, I believe, will not last for long but will impede that very executive authority which we wish to strengthen. And in this respect we could look at the example of the Union and see how the ill-considered nature of reforms leads to their being delayed.

This is the case if we are speaking about the laws altering the Constitution which have been enacted by our congress. Plus we have inserted very serious, fundamentally

important laws—I am calling each article laws, naturally—in the Constitution in respect to local self-government and local organs of power and administration. And now an opportunity has been afforded for a reforming of the local authorities. For the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet approved in principle the Local Self-Government Act in its first reading, and I hope that it will be submitted as soon as possible for examination by the broadest circles of both the scientific community and the local soviets and will be adopted. Because without a strengthening of this local component of power all reforms are pointless. The act will now be adopted on the basis of changes to the Constitution.

[Garifullina] But some deputies, Sergey Nikolayevich, believe that the revisions and additions to the Constitution adopted by the congress considerably limit the rights of the local soviets, and one deputy, moreover, regretfully told me: "At this congress we have buried the soviets." Is this the case or not?

[Baburin] I believe that in some cases substitution for the term "soviets of people's deputies" of, simply, "soviets," just like the endeavor in the draft law on local self-government to switch to traditional terms in a number of territories, does not cancel out the meaning of the representative authorities. But I am convinced that the soviets must be preserved today and at the same time undergo qualitative changes. Their role and efficiency cannot be enhanced without a change in their functions and the nature of their work. So that those who are predicting the collapse of the soviets are, I believe, wrong. That we have on many issues moved away from the unchecked absolutization of collective bodies and are tending toward a strengthening of executive authority and the personal responsibility of leaders, primarily in the executive structure, I consider normal. The main thing is that we not rush to the other extreme and that leaders of local administrations—as they will hence forward be called—not become uncontrollable. We have tried, as far as possible, to embody in the Constitution the control of the soviets and the preservation of their decisive role.

[Garifullina] And how do the new statutes correspond to sovereignty? Exactly a year ago we were hearing in this same hall stunning novelties concerning out-and-out sovereignization, right down to that of rayon, rural and community soviets....

[Baburin] I believe that we are already starting to get the better of this disease of ours. The republics and the Soviet Union, as the state as a whole, should be looking into sovereignty, come to that. It needs to be determined what and which questions will be decided how and at which level. I assign the Union treaty, of course, a very big role here.

[Garifullina] But Ruslan Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, speaking in the congress, let slip words to the effect that the assertions that

the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and its leadership would oppose the signing of the Union treaty and thereby loosen the Union (I paraphrase his thoughts freely here, you understand) are incorrect....

[Baburin] I would say that this viewpoint is both correct and incorrect at the same time. I would not venture to say that we in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and its leadership have not contributed our fair share to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. We have! And to deny this would be simply to close our eyes to what is happening and the consequences of many of our decisions. But at the same time I am convinced that the draft Union treaty which exists today and which it is proposed to sign as soon as possible, with regard for the celebrated declaration of the president and the leaders of nine republics included—this draft Union treaty cannot be signed. I do not know what guided the president but I am sure that this is a step toward the destruction of the Soviet Union as a federal state. A union state! And transition to a confederation.

Whatever we may say here and by whatever democratic slogans we are guided, we need to recognize that the basic law today is the USSR Constitution and that it may be changed only as provided for therein. There is, doubtless, a second alternative—this is revolution, but then let us call things by their name. **A Union treaty may only be a joint legislative initiative of the Union republics, which, having signed this treaty, would submit it to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.** Whether we like this institution or not, it is, according to the Constitution, the highest organ of state power of the Soviet Union. To deny this means to embark on an antistate path. And the congress should undoubtedly examine this joint legislative initiative and make amendments to the Constitution—amendments, precisely, and to the current Constitution, precisely! Or, if it so decides, adopt a new one, but under no circumstances create some document which would operate simultaneously or apart from the USSR Constitution. And after this, I am convinced, we need to make to the USSR Constitution an amendment on ratification and then ratify these amendments also by the Union republics. We can no longer exist without the principle of ratification of constitutional amendments by a majority of republics. This is an elementary demand of the present day. Any other version, were we to sign the Union treaty and consider that it replaced the Constitution, is unacceptable. In this event we would have to expect a recurrence of the sovereignty parade. When within the Russian Federation representatives of republics within the RSFSR and krais and oblasts would get together and sign the federal treaty and say that the RSFSR Constitution was no longer operative for them. Or when on an oblast scale rayons and cities would get together, sign an agreement between them and say that they were now their own masters.

A paradox? But we should anticipate such a course of events also. If, however, we wish to renew the state, we must do so on a **constitutional** basis.

[Garifullina] The congress has rejected the law on a constitutional court. The deputies acted surprisingly concertedly and vigorously. What united their positions?

[Baburin] I regret that we were unable to adopt at this congress the RSFSR Constitutional Court Act. Although I myself, for example, voted against its ratification. But it is to me no mystery why we did not adopt it. We did not do so for the simple and, I would say, primitive reason that any normal deputy had to have been horrified by the proposal of the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in respect to the composition of the constitutional court. And, just imagine, this body was chosen **for life**, and it was proposed that we accept it **without discussion**. Although the deputies do not know at least half of it! I, for example, know only a few persons on this court, for whom I would vote unreservedly. But many are completely unknown to me. But we were to have elected them **for life** in order for them to stand **over** the congress and **over** the Supreme Soviet and the president and to revoke their decisions! Can you imagine this?

[Garifullina] And how in these cases do civilized countries, to which our "democrats" so like to refer, behave?

[Baburin] There is nothing of the sort in any of them! The rejection of specific proposals led us to refuse to enact the law. We could, of course, have enacted it, but for this it would have been necessary to extend the work of the congress. I would have unconditionally voted for the enactment of the law at this congress prior to the election of a president, but only after the insertion and serious examination at the congress of amendments. After all, it had been adopted in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in just 20 minutes, and the discussion was in fact wound up and greatly abbreviated even here. Such matters, if you will excuse my saying so, should be decided seriously. Evidently, immediately following the presidential election, the leadership of the Supreme Soviet will convene the congress and define its position because a constitutional court in our present-day life is simply essential. I, for example, am convinced that many decisions of both the congress and the Supreme Soviet need to be reversed as being in conflict with the Constitution. I am afraid that there will be such decisions also on the part of the future president, whoever is elected.

[Garifullina] Sergey Nikolayevich, let us return once more to the Union treaty. How, from a legal scholar's viewpoint, do you evaluate the union of "Nine Plus One?" After all, these leaders have essentially canceled the decision of the Union referendum. We voted for a renewed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with all the ensuing consequences. But we are suddenly told that there will be a union of sovereign states....

[Baburin] I would like to voice the idea, quite unpopular for cautious people, that it is, after all, not a question of terms but of **what** will lie behind them. I, for example, back at the First Congress of People's Deputies, when we adopted the declaration, voted for the concept of a union

of sovereign states, but as a federal state. And, moreover, I believe that it would even be justified now were we to rename our state and preserve as the official name "Soviet Union." So there be no argument—union of republics or states. Simply the Soviet Union as a federal state.

If, however, we are speaking about the declaration of "Nine Plus One," this is for me a very contradictory document. I was satisfied by its appearance, but do not doubt for a second that fulfilling this document is impossible. Even now the problem is that of who will be the first to violate it. Either the violation will come from the side of the RSFSR leadership, which is more likely, or from the president. Because it contains mutually exclusive propositions. The declaration has already been violated since it was signed, for that matter—right away, when Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin set off for the Kuzbass and told the striking miners that political strikes were their problem and were a matter for their discretion. But the declaration had contained an entirely opposite thought! Today any politician thinking of the fate of his people must recognize that ultimatums, aimed at the disintegration of the economy even more, lead to the abyss. But destroying the state and the economy for the sake of removing the president is the height of irresponsibility.

Now, of course, much will depend on how the realization of the propositions of this document proceeds. But I would not want the leaders of the republics headed by the president of the USSR to recall by such declarations a group of conspirators or some monarchs gathered at a "round table" and deciding peoples' fate in accordance with their wishes. All these leaders have, for that matter, representative organs of power elected by the peoples of the republics, and not to confer with them... Well, you know, I do not consider this the height of democracy.

[Garifullina] Nor I, incidentally.

[Baburin] But I would, for all that, emphasize once again that, on the whole, this declaration, as an aspiration to solving problems democratically, has, of course, played and should play a positive part. The main thing is that time is now on the side of the supporters of common sense. Recklessness is failing. The sole danger is that recklessness will hang on longer than the Soviet economy. The latter could out pace it and fail earlier.

[Garifullina] This is a bitter prophesy.... But hope springs eternal. Sergey Nikolayevich, the deputies are departing when the struggle for the presidency is gaining momentum. Which candidate will your group of deputies support?

[Baburin] You see, our group distributed at the congress its statement on the election of a president of the RSFSR, which spoke of a situation unprecedented in world political history: it is proposed to elect the president of a state 150 million strong in three weeks. To the continuous discussion in the press about some confrontation and struggle between groups and such like which

allegedly exists among the deputies, the most radical laws pass with an almost 90-percent vote in favor. And we concluded, perhaps colleagues from both sides will refute it. I don't know that the Communists of Russia group, under the fire of total criticism, has abandoned an independent political line, while representatives of the Democratic Russia bloc are joyfully renouncing democratic principles which they declared even recently, themselves counting, obviously, on acquiring a monopoly of power in our society. And under the conditions we, as a group of deputies, do not consider it possible to take part officially in the election of a president of the RSFSR. The "Rossiya" deputies will support some presidential candidate not on behalf of the group but as individuals.

In principle the group's sympathies have been shared among three candidates—Ryzhkov, Bakatin and Tuleyev. And the rest we know either very inadequately or too well.

[Garifullina] You will not venture a forecast of the outcome of the struggle?

[Baburin] Alas, predicting the results of this obviously unequal marathon is a thankless exercise. The position of our group of deputies is unequivocal: "The conversion of the presidential election into an outright farce, when people will be voting not for a live person but his newspaper and television image, we consider not simply an offensive against democracy but its actual curtailment...."

FNPR Platform for RSFSR Election

91UN1561A Moscow TRUD in Russian 18 May 91 p 2

["Platform of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RSFSR for the Russian Presidential Election"]

[Text] **The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RSFSR considers it its duty to formulate its position for the upcoming elections, basing it on the needs, demands, and hopes of its trade union members.**

The FNPR [Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RSFSR] sees as its main task the defense of the people's vitally important interests and the immediate creation of an effective mechanism of social protection.

Proceeding from this, the FNPR advocates:

In the Sphere of the Citizens' Social Protection:

the lifting of the restrictions on the enterprise consumption fund and the unfreezing of wages on the basis of the principle: "market wages for market prices";

the introduction in practice of the conclusion of wage-rate (general schedule) agreements between associations (unions) of entrepreneur-owners of the means of production on the one hand and professional associations of wage workers (trade unions) on the other, in which to

determine the amounts of the wages and other payments and the procedure of their increase and establish the lower limit of wages, proceeding from the value of the subsistence minimum;

the monthly publication in the mass media of the figures on the cost of living brought about by price increases and compensation for additional expenditure in accordance with the actual rate of inflation;

a doubling (as a minimum) of the amount of the compensatory payments in connection with the inadequacy to the price rises of the 60 ruble compensation;

the formation of a Russian employment fund and economic stabilization fund as a single whole, a pension fund, and a social insurance fund in amounts sufficient for the assurance of social safeguards for any citizen thanks to a 37 percent insurance rate and also the proceeds connected with the privatization of state property, a reduction in military and managerial expenditure, and economies in budget resources;

the immediate development of an extensive network of employment offices and personnel retraining centers with their provision with the necessary equipment and material and financial resources, the elaboration and implementation of goal-oriented programs for the creation of new jobs, the development of a system of public works, and the establishment of allowances to interest people in moving to areas of a labor shortage;

the preservation of the guarantees for the acquisition of state-owned housing for all persons who have a recognized need and who have been on the waiting list for an improvement in housing conditions for a long time; the granting of young families preferential credit for the independent erection of housing and allocation of the requisite material resources for this purpose;

the creation of a mechanism of social assistance for large families, retirees, and invalids;

the legislative enshrinement of a set of allowances for students and trainee youth (concessionary fares, compensation for expenditure on the leasing of accommodations, meal subsidies, and others);

the legislative enshrinement of supplementary benefits and guarantees for working women, primarily those employed in agriculture and also in difficult or harmful industries and on night shifts;

the enactment of a law on the North and the unconditional fulfillment of the measures outlined in accordance with the results of interregional trade union conferences on problems of the North providing for an improvement in the northerners' working and social conditions;

the preservation of guarantees for qualified medical assistance and sanatorium-resort treatment and also of the procedure of temporary disability payments;

the elaboration and implementation of special protective measures guaranteeing the protection of mother and child under market conditions and supplementary assistance for families with invalid children;

the creation of the necessary social and everyday conditions for servicemen and their families stationed on the territory of the Russian Federation and also for Army contingents returning from overseas and a guarantee of employment for young people demobilized following Army service;

the enactment of a law on the protection of labor and the environment and fulfillment in full of the adopted program for elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident;

an increase in budget financing of culture and sport and state support for the corresponding institutions under the jurisdiction of the trade unions for the purpose of preventing the commercialization of the spiritual sphere and preserving the possibility of the enjoyment of the services of these institutions by the working masses at large and their families;

the fuller use of the spiritual potential of the Russian intelligentsia, protection of the right of intellectual property and prevention of a "brain drain" from Russia and the Union.

The FNPR insists on the organizational differentiation of employers and wage workers by way of the creation of regional, sectoral, and all-Russian entrepreneurs' unions and the legislative enshrinement for them of their authority and principles of interaction with the unions of working people, whose rights also should be guaranteed by law.

The FNPR advocates a transition from administrative-command methods of management to methods of market regulation.

But by virtue of objective factors, accomplishing this process instantaneously is impossible. Quite a lengthy transitional period awaits Russia and the country, in the course of which legal foundations are to be created, economic mechanisms of transition to the market activated, personnel trained, and the social consciousness and production relations between people changed

In this connection the FNPR supports:

In the Economic Sphere:

the enactment of a body of laws providing for the transition to a socially oriented market economy;

legislative guarantees of the functioning of diverse forms of ownership, including private, providing for the economic freedom of the producers and entrepreneurs;

the impermissibility of the denationalization and privatization of all-state property behind the backs of the

working people and without the participation of the trade unions representing their interests;

the creation of a credit and financial system corresponding to market relations and the involvement in circulation of the monetary resources and personal savings of the citizens through the share- capitalization of property and the formation of a securities market;

the gradual freeing of prices under the conditions of the effect of economic regulation mechanisms;

a revision of tax and investment policy in the interests of a stimulation of a profound structural reorganization of the economy and a transition to predominantly credit forms of financing;

the creation under the supervision of the state and the unions of a civilized labor market preventing the monopolism of the employer and the spontaneous growth of unemployment, provision for the training of manpower and its retraining, and the regulation of employment;

assurance of the genuine priority of questions of agrarian policy, the development of various forms of ownership of the land, and the creation of the necessary conditions for the unrestricted realization by the producer and the working man of all the fruits of their labor.

The basic guiding principle of the FNPR is defense of the working people's socioeconomic interests and nonparticipation in the confrontation and opposition of various political groups and forces.

But in the present crisis situation a solution of the main socioeconomic problems is impossible without the speediest resolution of a number of political questions. Proceeding from this, the FNPR advocates:

In the Political Sphere:

practical realization of the declaration on the state sovereignty of the RSFSR and the introduction of the institution of a president;

the adoption of a new RSFSR Constitution with the enshrinement in it of the principles of the interaction of the president and the administrative authorities locally with the legislative and representative bodies of the working people;

the conclusion of a Union treaty based on the "Declaration of the 10" of 23 April 1991 and the creation of a renewed union of sovereign states;

the adoption of urgent measures pertaining to national reconciliation, a strengthening of trust and harmony between the peoples of multinational Russia, and the development of their statehood, language, culture, spiritual values, and traditions within the framework of a united state;

governments of public trust and national accord at the republic and Union levels.

The FNPR appeals to the members of trade unions and all working people of Russia to perform their civic duty and participate on 12 June 1991 in the elections for president of the republic.

The FNPR will in the course of the election campaign call for the correct choice and support for the candidate for president of the RSFSR who shares the positions of this platform.

Tatarstan Citizens Protest RSFSR Vote Decision

LD2705083191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0700 GMT 27 May 91

[Text] The Tatarstan Supreme Soviet resumed its work today. A sharp political struggle was unleashed against the decision to carry out the elections for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Presidency on the territory of Tataria. A multithousand meeting was staged last night in Kazan, the participants of which adopted a resolution not to carry out the election of the head of Russia's state on the territory of sovereign Tatarstan. The Supreme Soviet building continues to be picketed this morning with the same slogans. The people's deputies, on their way to the session, will have to pass through ranks of people who began a political hunger strike, in connection with the coming election, two weeks ago.

Western Republics

Belorussian Supreme Soviet Agenda

91UN1471A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 19 Apr 91 p 1

[“Ukase of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on Convening the Fourth Session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet of the 12th Term”]

[Text] The Presidium of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet decrees:

To convene the fourth session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on 21 May 1991 in the city of Minsk.

[Signed] Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet N. Dementey

16 April 1991, city of Minsk

Proposed Issues for the Agenda of the Fourth Session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet

1. On the program of the Belorussian SSR Government to stabilize the economy of the republic.

2. On the main elements of denationalization and privatization in the Belorussian SSR.

3. On emergency measures to implement the Belorussian SSR budget in the second half of 1991.

4. On confirming the members of the Belorussian SSR Government.

5. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Main Law) of the Belorussian SSR in Conjunction With Laws of the Belorussian SSR on the Main Principles of People's Power, on Local Self-Government and Local Economy, and Others.

6. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on the Redistribution of Powers Between the Supreme State Organs of the Belorussian SSR for Ensuring Stabilization in the Process of Switching to a Market Economy.

7. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on Entrepreneurship in the Belorussian SSR.

8. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on Investment Operations.

9. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on Foreign Investment in the Territory of the Belorussian SSR.

10. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on the Priority Socioeconomic Development of the Countryside and the Agro-Industrial Complex.

11. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on Economic Insolvency and Bankruptcy.

12. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on the Employment of the Belorussian SSR Populace.

13. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on the Popular Vote (Referendum) in the Belorussian SSR.

14. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on Culture in the Belorussian SSR.

15. On the draft Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on Procedures for Allocating and Confiscating Land.

16. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on the Status of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR Local Soviets of People's Deputies.

17. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on Procedures for Recalling People's Deputies in the Belorussian SSR.

18. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on the Legal Regimen of a State of Emergency.

19. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on Procedures for Signing, Executing, and Repudiating International Treaties of the Belorussian SSR.

20. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on Education.

21. On the draft Belorussian SSR Law on the Economic Court in the Belorussian SSR.

22. On the draft Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on Procedures for Rehabilitating the Victims of Political Repressions in the Belorussian SSR in the 1920's Through the 1950's.

23. On the draft Code of Economic Procedure of the Belorussian SSR.

24. On amendments and additions to certain legislative acts of the Belorussian SSR.

25. On the draft Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Resolution on Putting in Order Preferences to Citizens in the Belorussian SSR.

26. On the draft Union treaty.

27. Confirmation of the estimate of outlays entailed by the operations of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet and its organs, as well as the people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR.

28. Formation of the Commission of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet on Issues of Defense and National Security of the Belorussian SSR.

29. On the confirmation of judges.

All Factories Function in Minsk 23 May

*OW 2405071891 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0930 GMT 23 May 91*

[Text] According to IF's [INTERFAX] reporter, all industries in Minsk function normally today. There was a walkout at some plants on Wednesday demanding that the current session of the Belorussian parliament discuss the closure of party cells at all government offices and state owned factories in the republic as well as an end to the persecution of the organizers of the April strikes in Belorussia.

The parliamentary session is discussing the main item on the agenda: ways to stabilize the republic's economy and guarantee the social security of working people. Spokesmen for the strike committee might address the session today.

Anticommunist Moods in Belorussia Pondered

*PM 2405130191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 May 91 Second Edition p. 2*

[Correspondent O. Stepanenko, report: "Freedom for Tyranny?"]

[Text] Minsk—These days, Belorussia is living in a state of uneasy anticipation of the opening of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet session. It is well known that the strike committee set up in Minsk has issued an ultimatum demanding that parliament use this session to adopt a decision on depoliticizing administrative bodies, departyizing production collectives, and nationalizing party property. Attempts to remove Communists from the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet and other organs of power, strip them of their material base, and ban party committees at enterprises reflect the desire of certain forces to remove the Belorussian Communist Party from the republic's sociopolitical life and outlaw it.

The above is from a Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee statement assessing the nature of the anti-Communist hysteria being whipped up in the republic.

The situation is being aggravated by the fact that, since the April strike, sundry initiative groups have stepped up their activities—encouraged by antisocialist forces. They are working on public opinion and organizing "referendums" in collectives, thereby fueling the atmosphere of confrontation and intolerance. Your correspondent met a group of working people at the Minsk Computer Production Association and asked them to share their opinions on the situation.

E. Romanenko, mechanic and member of the CPSU:

It is a difficult situation, of course. What worries me most of all? Well, as someone who has lived 50 years, I know for sure that there is nothing in life more terrifying than lawlessness and tyranny. They always start with some specific incident. Then the situation snowballs. Like an avalanche that destroys people's lives, they are hurled into an abyss of hatred and violence.

After all, what do departyization and depoliticization mean? As a Communist, you do not have the right to work in organs of power, state service, the public prosecutor's office, or the law courts, or serve in the Army. If you are a Communist, you do not have the right to form your own organization at an enterprise. This is nothing but a most blatant, direct infringement of human rights! I am no legal expert, but even as a mechanic I can understand the legal experts' warnings: It is violence against the individual and an attempt to deprive him of freedom of belief.

It pains me to have to say this, but some workers support these demands. What is going on? The reason, as far as I can see, is that departyization agitators have succeeded in confusing people and distracting them from the heart of the problem. They have simply given them something else to talk about. They have exploited the complexities and difficulties in our life and reduced everything to one primitive idea: The party is to blame for all our problems.

Surely anyone can see that those selfsame forces which call themselves democratic have pushed us into many of our mistakes and problems? As far as I understand it, I am in favor of a market economy. A sensible economy, free of anarchy and uncontrolled elements. Obviously I wonder why the "democrats" have forced our leadership to demolish its planning system and break off economic ties. After all, it is under pressure from them that the destruction of sensible planning initiatives has accelerated. And the result? Chaos.

A. Ushchenchik, engineer and member of the CPSU:

I agree with Eduard Afanasyevich. I will just add that they want to conduct lawlessness "legally," through a parliamentary decision. They are using every means to

achieve this end. And another point: Legal experts have reminded us that the demand for departyization and depoliticization is at variance not only with Soviet laws and the USSR Constitution but also with the norms of international law.

It seems to me that Communists and party committees themselves have helped to complicate the situation recently. If you ask a non-party person say, on the shop floor, whether party committees are needed at enterprises, he will say: What difference does it make? They do not do anything anyway. Take assistance for rural areas for example. The party committee organized this in the past and workers always took part in the harvest. What a harvest there was last autumn—but plants did not help, they did not save it. I think that Communists and party organizations should shake themselves out of their torpor.

But we Communists need support from the highest party authorities. The latter must take the complexity of the situation into account first and foremost and not make ill-considered moves.

I think Communists and party organizations are right to demand that the CPSU Central Committee general secretary use the force of his presidential authority to prevent tyranny and lawlessness and ensure full compliance with the Constitution. Surely we cannot have a situation where property created with Communists' labor payments is taken away from the party?

E. Tyshkevich, mechanic with no party affiliation:

The party's fate is in its own hands. It should take a more active stand to protect working people. Then we will support it. I, for example, sympathize with the attitude of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, which has condemned the scale of price rises and urged Communists to do their utmost to give people social protection.

I. Mazhey, party committee deputy secretary:

It is certainly no accident that plant party committees are being dealt a blow. They are caught up in a tight knot of problems—economic problems, social problems, and the problems of day-to-day life.... I agree that party committees are not fulfilling their main role and that the party's prestige is not very high. I accept all the criticism. But is it only up to the party committees? To an increasing extent, we are becoming hostages to the policies created by the men at the top. Take our enterprise, for example. Goods and components worth almost 200 million rubles that are ready for dispatch have accumulated in the plant's yards and are lying there unsold. Can you imagine what a blow this is to the collective? But the collective is not to blame: This is the cost of having a flawed planning system.

As we can see, the situation in the republic is serious. The question is perfectly clear—either the law or lawlessness will triumph. If we open the way to tyranny, nothing will be able to save us from the abyss of hatred and violence.

Moldovan Supreme Soviet Agenda Outlined

91UN1525A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 20, 18 May 91 p 2

[Article by SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent V. Letov: "To Be or Not To Be"]

[Text] Kishinev—"Let us look into the future," suggested Moldovan SSR President Mircea Snegur in a report at the sixth session of the Republic Supreme Soviet which just convened. It began on Tuesday and the preliminary agenda included 37 issues—from improvement of executive power to the draft law on the Moldovan archive fund.

But even this range turned out to be inadequate to reflect all the fervor surrounding the concerns raised before the deputies and their constituents. A number of deputies spoke of the need to return to the question of signing the Union treaty. Others, on the contrary, demanded that the session discuss the question of nationalization of property, the Communist Party, and tasks for separating Moldova from the Union. These issues, however, did not draw the necessary number of votes. The question of separating Moldova and renaming it as the Republic of Moldova has come up since the republic referendum. But in the meantime, the chairman of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet Aleksandr Moshanu, when listing those attending the session, called staff correspondents from the central newspapers representatives of the foreign press.

The report of Republic President M. Snegur was calm on the whole. He discussed mainly the emergence from the economic and political crisis, which is being felt much more painfully here than it is in the country as a whole. There is only one path: through immediate conclusion of economic agreements "with a group of republics or with all the other 14 republics."

It would seem that the parliament as a whole is beginning to learn parliamentary procedure. One of the leaders of the People's Front, George Gimpu, suggested creating a conciliatory deputy group Suverenitate (Sovereignty): "...in order to avoid a split in the parliament and a possible impasse."

Moldovan Supreme Soviet Session Disrupted

91UN1570A Moscow TRUD in Russian 23 May 91 p 1

[Article by P. Rashkov: "More Disturbances in Moldova"]

[Text] On Tuesday evening in Kishinev there were clashes between supporters of republic Prime Minister M. Druk and the Moldovan police forces. According to reports from

Moldovan Minister of Internal Affairs I. Kotash, about 30 policemen were hurt. None of the civilians officially asked for medical aid.

The occasion for the conflict was the situation in parliament, particularly the results of the debates surrounding the question of whether or not to hold a secret vote on the government proposed by republic President M. Snegur. Then members of the People's Front in parliament and members of the "Sovereignty" club—about 60 people—left the hall. And after a while there was a conflict in the street. Incidentally, Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Moshanu placed responsibility for it on the deputies who left the hall. And this was done at a time when the proceedings were being broadcast directly on radio throughout the entire republic. Which, of course, did not contribute to dampening passions outside the parliament. But they managed to localize the conflict quickly, and the prime minister's supporters held a rally on the city's central square. The meeting of parliament had to be interrupted, considering the situation and the late hour. But it did not resume at 1000 the next day as it was supposed to.

The session finally began at 1200. Republic President M. Snegur made a statement. He swept aside the accusations of betraying the interests of the Moldovan people which deputies from the People's Front had made against him at the spontaneous, unsanctioned rally, and announced that, taking into account the situation that had developed and in order not to aggravate it since it was already strained, he would take back his list of members of the government with the exception of M. Druk. As for the prime minister, who was actually the cause of the outbreak of the parliamentary crisis, on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan SSR, its chairman, A. Moshanu, introduced a proposal to express a lack of confidence in M. Druk. By a majority of votes the parliament decided to bring this proposal to a vote. At the same time it was decided to introduce amendments to the law on the government of the Moldovan SSR, according to which a lack of confidence in individual members of the government can be introduced by a simple majority of votes—previously this required no less than two-thirds. After this the deputies began to take a secret vote on the question of no confidence in the prime minister.

'Militant' Activities of Moldovan People's Front Described

91UN1394A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 8,
20 Feb 91 p 10

[Article by Svetlana Gamova, SOYUZ staff correspondent in Kishinev, under the rubric "Political Analysis": "Moldova: The People's Front and Its 'Militant' Activities"]

[Text] The People's Front has reached age three, the most "childish age" there is. However, we live in so rapidly changing and troubled a time that the "child" has grown

swiftly into a political prodigy before our eyes. Having gained self-confidence, the public movement is showing its strength ever more often. The people, as everyone knows, often do not put an equal value on strength and intellect. So the People's Front, remaining popular in politics, is now beginning to lose its supporters, particularly among the creative intelligentsia, the one that has always been its bulwark, its mainspring, and...its brain center. The symptom is serious.

Boris Maryan, the poet and former dissident who was close to the sources of this movement, is now making public accusations against it. Why? I ask. "The fanaticism of the 'Front's' present leaders, and the methods they use, are frightening. When 'the street' begins to dictate, and to take the place of the parliament—do not expect anything good. The use of force has never been a method for the normal solution of problems...."

Georgiy Gimpu, one of the Front's former leaders who was considered extremely dedicated and uncompromising, even announced the termination of his membership at a regular NF [People's Front] congress. Together with the "Front," he overcame the most difficult stretch on the way to the republic's obtaining its independence, and achieved the NF's entry into the parliament and power. This was a strong politician. Here are his words, spoken at a People's Front rally in July 1989: "...I want to put the matter thus: If our pain is not going to be felt, and if the laws enacted at the session are not the ones we need, we must be prepared for a general strike. However, if even this does not help, the People's Front will be forced to consider the problem of the advisability of our republic's remaining within the USSR's composition." Now he talks about his former like-minded associates with the very same unrelenting directness, accusing them of having dictatorial inclinations and assuming the right to speak and act in the people's name with the intention of imposing their will alone on everyone, regardless of the people's needs and desires. And nothing, not even the offer of a "comfortable position" in a fine office and a significant portfolio, kept him in the People's Front.

One after another, its dedicated people—the leaders and activists, those who started it all, and who are faithful as before to the ideas established as the movement's base—are now leaving the NF's ranks. They give various reasons, but the one that was revealed at a Moldovan Writers' Union plenum is given more and more often—the People's Front is acquiring the distinct appearances of a dictatorship.

The Optimistic Beginning

The so-called Literature and Music Club (meni Mateyevich (the well-known Moldovan literary figure) appeared in Kishinev in 1988. At first there were meetings, and then there were rallies. The club talked about the rebirth of the Moldovan culture, language, and national traditions. It formed classes that acquainted young people, primarily rural, with the Moldovan people's history. At the same time, it began to teach...the

methods of propaganda and organizational work. Soon thereafter, the club, and all who had joined it, announced the founding of the Moldovan People's Front. The objectives of its first program were the Moldovan language's state status, the republic's sovereignty, and the adoption of national emblems. The parliament later would give these demands the form of laws. And it would have been proper to give the undeniable services of the People's Front their due had there not been one "but...."

In the NF's depths, along with national self-awareness, nationalism was building up a dark, blind force. I remember the multitudinous street meetings, which acquired the name of Great National Meetings in the republic, when thousands and thousands jointly reviewed the drafts of laws written at NF dictation. In the faces—gladness, passion, rejoicing. I understood the importance and significance of what was taking place, but at the same time I sensed something chillingly alarming: The cry "Zhos!" ("Down/Out with [something or someone]!") was accompanied by the same passion. Later, the street would take up other slogans: "Out with the occupiers! Russians—get out; we are in our own homeland!" The atmosphere of impatience grew, turning into what B. Maryan would call the national idea, embodied as an absolute and as fanaticism. The nation—above all.

Looking at the faces of the children, whom youthful exuberance and a yen to express protest and win a victory for justice drew to the square, and listening to the older people, worried by serious transgressions, and demanding the creation of legal guarantees that will not permit their repetition, I too was in accord with them, shared their feelings, and also, like them, wanted the guarantees. However, I do not trust passions that turn into vigorous actions. And nobody is going to convince me that it is now permissible to fight against the transgression of 1937 with the methods of those years [sic]—pressure, outright coercion, rudeness and blackmail, and, especially, deception. A rule-of-law state will never "grow" in that field.

The ideas of the nation's precedence, patiently and purposefully being inculcated in the native population by the NF, have begun to turn into specific legal standards that infringe the rights of national minorities. It has not been so difficult to push these through the parliament by skillfully using incontestable facts: the expenditures of Stalinist totalitarianism, the mistakes in nationality policy, and the underdevelopment of the republic and the country as a whole.

And in the future, the plot will thicken: The guilty parties must be punished. For an incomprehensible reason, people who have absolutely nothing to do with either Bessarabia's entry into Russia's composition—the events of 1812 are being greatly exaggerated in the parliament now—or even the 1940 "occupation"—so Moldavia's annexation to the USSR is described—are being added to these. Based on the prompting of the People's Front, those who have lived in this territory

[kray] for decades, and even centuries, have turned out to be among the guilty parties. They now have been denied the right to call themselves the people. In an appearance on TsT [Central Television], Oezu Nantoy, a former NF leader and now leader of the Social Democrats, remarked: "...On the Dniester's left bank there lives, not the people, but a population." In this sentence lies the essence of the conflict between the right and left banks, a conflict that has taken the form of separatist attitudes on the part of Transdniestrian [Pridnestrovye] residents, the overwhelming majority of which is not Moldovans.

The Power of the Leaders and the Leaders of the Power

When the NF's power over minds was transformed into parliamentary power, a generous dispensation of offices began. It was according to merit. Having won a brilliant victory in the elections, Ion Khadyrke, the NF executive committee's former chairman, became Moldova's vice president. In the first wave, when the "fronters'" influence was strikingly high with the ordinary Moldovan citizen, the poets Grigoriy Viyeru and Leonido Lari (Yorga), as well as the active NF supporters—Moshnyaga and Oborok—became USSR People's Deputies. The last was soon appointed republic deputy prime minister. NF members and their like-minded associates, those who appeared actively at rallies and national meetings, openly and amiably knocking their opponents, became chairmen of the parliament's committees and commissions—all of them.

However, unity no longer existed, either in the NF itself, or in the new government mainly composed of its prominent figures. First G. Viyeru and L. Lari announced their break with the "front," which, in their opinion was laying claim to supreme power just like the Communist Party. And soon thereafter, the Moldovan writers, who had assembled for their congress, compared the government with the party oligarchy now being severely criticized. Such serious accusations also were heard from the mouths of I. Drutse and E. Lotyanu, well-known to the whole republic. In Moldova, they have begun to speak of the People's Front more and more often as a movement with a fascistic hue.

What does the NF want today, and to what does it call the people? The next target is the "United Romania" issue. In the parliament building, I had occasion to speak of this with V. Matey, NF executive committee member and chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission on Glasnost, the author of a declaration calling for secession from the Union and orientation on sisterly Romania.

"I am against the referendum declared by the USSR president. If it takes place, however, only the native Moldovan population should participate in it. The others do not have a right to decide Moldova's fate."

At the session which discussed this issue, Deputy Slabu expanded the list: "Moldova, within its old borders, stretches even beyond the Prut River, and into Romania.

If the referendum is going to occur, the Moldovans from beyond the Prut also should participate in it."

The idea is not new, and versions of it go even farther: "We need not seek justice of those who violated all our rights in 1940...we must support the idea of a single, united people and one nation—the Romanian. Let us reunite, Romanian brothers!"—so ring out the calls, beginning in 1989.

Both Moldova's Prime Minister M. Druk and Vice President I. Khadyrke, addressing a Great National Meeting, spoke of confederation with Romania.... President M. Snegur also mentioned this during a recent visit to Romania, in a somewhat different context, it is true: concerning the need for cultural confederation. And, although the ties already are rather close—especially between the creative unions—there is talk of the two Ministers of Culture's coordination according to a "base-branch" scheme. Kishinev has also announced its intention to promote the Moldovan Church's separation from the Russian Church and incorporation in the Romanian.

God grant, as they say, if the people want this. However, the point is that the People's Front now decides for them—in everything.

"We cannot resort to a referendum," Myndykanu, one of the NF's ideologists, declared in the parliament, "because the Moldovan people have been deceived by the party autocracy [partokratiya] for 70 years, and do not even understand that we are not Moldovans, we are Romanians."

Oh? The people do understand, and do not want a return to the past; moreover, they fear it. An old Kishinev resident [a lady] recently told me about the times of the Royal Romanian Administration, when a clearly visible white stripe—the national aristocratic district's boundary line—divided the city's center. It was unthinkable that a Bessarabian peasant might dare to step across the line. And now elderly Moldovans in the villages are asking the question "What are you people there in Kishinev doing?" because they well remember how they were considered second-class people in their own land. The familiar pretext "the people do not understand" is being heard today from other mouths, fighting for democracy, but preparing a new assault on the minds of the common people.

Fading Opportunely into the Background

It is said in the republic: "A new power has arrived, and with it, a new regime, the regime of the People's Front." Too strongly stated perhaps? After all, we are talking about a lawful power elected by the people.

"The regime of the People's Front is a regime of state terrorism. Terror was the most important factor at the critical moment when the leadership of the republic Supreme Soviet and the Kishinev City Soviet was elected. To achieve the desired result, People's Front activists used verbal pressure, intimidation, and beatings

on the deputies. Key figures of the republic's ruling elite maintain ties with the militants [boyeviki], connive with them, and direct their activities against their own political opponents."

Where does this come from? From the report of Moldovan SSR People's Deputy V. Solonar at the international conference on "Democracy and Human Rights" held last November at Timisoara in Romania. The People's Front, having filled the "halls of power," absolutely slammed the doors shut to those whom it disdainfully calls a "population," and particularly to the "mankurty"—so they call the local Russians here—that is, those who do not remember their roots. The rally slogan "The nation—above all" has successfully migrated from the squares and streets to the parliament. It is an ideology.

"The People's Front regime," continues V. Solonar, "is nationalistic and ethnocentric to the highest degree. An ideology of priority of the native people's rights is officially declared. In its light, the laws on languages are viewed as cause for discrimination based on the nationality trait. A tremendous wave of firings on this basis is gathering strength in the republic. Moreover, the example was set by the Supreme Soviet itself, which made the criterion of nationality membership the most important one in its appointments. Thus, of the presidium's 25 members, only four are non-Moldovan. Of the 18 ministers—one is Russian! And this at the same time that Moldovans constitute 64.5 percent of the republic's population."

How has it happened that a movement, originally humanistic in its goals, and having taken power from the people into its hands, has so quickly forgotten the demands, advanced by itself, that touched the hearts of the people who trusted it—for the protection and the guarantees of every person's rights. What do those who trusted, and were deceived, think about this? Simply put, the people who do not have a chance to go to the forum of an international conference and those who have remained in opposition, even to the new power, express themselves with the utmost clarity: "The power has suddenly gone across the road." The point is that the Moldovan CP Central Committee building is located right across the street from the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Many of those who are working in the republic's parliamentary apparatus today were, in the recent past—workers of the Central Committee apparatus. They are inherited apparatchiks. And there are many former party figures in the Supreme Soviet leadership itself, and in the government. Having given up their party cards, these now profess the ideology of the People's Front, which has mounted an active anticommunist campaign. They are also active "in the mainstream," supporting the defamation of Communists, the destruction of "their" party's raykoms [rayon committees], and the intimidation and blackmail of former comrades.

The methods are as old as human society. Does the end, however, perhaps justify the means in this case? After all,

the People's Front has proclaimed the Moldovan people's protection its goal. An old acquaintance of mine, a Moldovan citizen, has sadly objected that all these political games have no relation at all to the Moldovan people. I shall sadly add that more and more people incline toward this opinion lately. And, looking at the stores' empty shelves, the public dining rooms closed because of the lack of food products, and the factories standing idle without raw materials, one involuntarily thinks: Is it possible that they, the "dissenters," both native and "of the second class," are right? After all, they are all people.

In all ages, it has been much easier for politicians to spur the people to the barricades than to feed them and make them free. "Feeding" the people is not working out for the People's Front. It is also having a hard time with the freedoms: After splitting the republic into "its own" and "aliens," it now wants to fade into the background, having put the blame for its own national policy on the governments of the "separatists"—the Gagauz and the Left Bank. Not coping with the recalcitrant, and stubbornly not wanting to admit its own miscalculations, it is calling for a new adventure—"United Romania." And if people want to remain in a "united USSR"? How is it possible to deny them the right to express their opinion?

However, a referendum will be held in any event. The deputies of the Gagauz and Transdnister [Pridnestrovskiy] regions, as well as some of the agriculturist deputies, have announced this at a Moldovan Supreme Soviet session. What will it be, a local referendum? Then this is an absolute crisis for the new power. It is easy to predict the actions of the People's Front: It has mastered pressure methods much better than management methods. But on whom will it try to put the blame then?

Kravchuk: Union Treaty Should Combine Confederation, Federation

91UN1445A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 30 Mar 91 p 3

[V. Dolganov report on news conference given by L.M. Kravchuk in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet; date not given: "We Do Not Have Good Luck With Leaders"]

[Text] These words, which came as a shock to some people, were heard by journalists at a news conference in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet from the lips of L.M. Kravchuk himself.

Although Leonid Makarovich immediately attempted to gloss over the bombshell effect, specifying that he did not mean the present ones. But:

"They also, together with us, have contrived to get up to so much..."

The wheel has been reinvented to the point where the politician, in Kravchuk's opinion, has to count two moves ahead. It is this that the majority of leaders lack.

As you can see, the discussion with Leonid Makarovich proved quite sharp-edged. The chairman has already, it would seem, cultivated his own style of communication with the press. He declined opening remarks and did not set the tone of the general discussion. Although A.N. Voytovich, head of the Supreme Soviet Press Center, had initially designated the subject of the news conference, at this point he specified that its content would depend on the questions of the correspondents.

We also put our questions to Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk:

[Question] PRAVDA UKRAINY recently published a letter from USSR people's deputies from the Ukraine which criticizes your assertion that only the republic Supreme Soviet is the spokesman for the wishes of the people of the Ukraine (your interview with KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA was cited). This was not the first attack on the leaders of the republic parliament. Does it not seem to you that some organs championing the ideas of a "renewed federation" have initiated a plan-oriented campaign to discredit the leaders of the republic Supreme Soviet?

[Kravchuk] You know, I read this appeal. I believe that if these deputies who signed the appeal had taken a look at our declaration on state sovereignty, they would never have signed this. It is written there (I quote): "The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet has the exclusive right to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian people. No political grouping, public organization, or other grouping or individual may speak on behalf of the Ukrainian people." This is elementary. No people's deputy, group of deputies even, all USSR people's deputies elected from the Ukraine even, may speak on behalf of the Ukrainian people because they are not, even all together, an organ of power but are a part of the organ which they represent; of the USSR Supreme Soviet and of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies; of an oblast also. Deputies of Lvov, Chernovtsy, Chernigov, and Sumy Oblasts, for example, may not represent only their regions in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. They represent the supreme authority of the Ukraine and the entire people of the Ukraine. The interests of the oblast are represented by the local soviets. This is a rudimentary feature of the political structure of any society, and I very much regret the fact that these rudiments are not known by deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet. I simply regret this.

As far as the attempts to discredit are concerned, I do not believe that these are such. This is, it seems to me, ignorance, not a campaign. In this situation, when people have become confused under the pressure of life's circumstances, political passions, uncertainty, and calls for the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, they take even just propositions very painfully and see behind everything someone or other encroaching on them. I have never encroached and am not now encroaching on the rights of the USSR people's deputies. I do not need them and their rights. We have a Supreme Soviet, which has all rights and all political and legal authority and which

represents the interests of the people of the Ukraine. Although now is a very difficult time, and each individual should give out to the people political and other propositions in very balanced fashion because they may be interpreted variously.

Continuing the subject initiated by the correspondents of KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA, a representative of Radio Liberty put his question:

[Question] Addressing a meeting of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, People's Deputy S.I. Gurenko accused the Presidium and the leadership of the Supreme Soviet of contributing to the conversion of the Supreme Soviet platform into an anticommunist platform. Thus attempts are being made to attack individuals of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, you included. Is all this not connected with the increase in your political approval rating, not only in the Ukraine but in foreign countries also?

[Kravchuk] I do not believe it is. We are now faced with the choice of whether to build a sovereign state, and in the Union it will be precisely a state, or whether the Ukraine will remain in the Union a republic deprived of legal powers with more autonomous rights. Positions are divided here. Some people understand sovereignty one way, some, another. This needs to be treated with understanding. But I am sure that everyone will arrive at the idea of sovereignty, and whoever does not will quit the arena. There is no other way. I do not believe that there are attempts to discredit me as chairman of the Supreme Soviet, what we have is a political struggle. It by no means signifies hostility. In a normal democratic society people may freely defend their positions, regardless of whether some people like this or not. Reading all this, I am calmly disposed toward it. But inhumane methods may not be employed in political struggle. We have always found a common language with representatives of all political forces. Stanislav Ivanovich was expressing his viewpoints at the session. He said that the position of the leaders of the Supreme Soviet was incomprehensible. I believe that he meant that the parliamentary tribune should not become a place for political brawls.

And one further question from KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA:

[Question] We have studied closely your observations on and additions to the draft Union treaty. We cannot fail to note that in the first section it is a question of the contradiction between the Union as a state and the republics as states. Can you say firmly today that it is inexpedient in the treaty to call the Union a state. In this connection it is a question in Section 5 of a delineation of authority. Here also you propose removal of the part that speaks of the authority only of the Union and you speak of joint management and the several participation of the republic-states....

[Kravchuk] To go by the classical outline, a union of states does not presuppose any central state, but some

coordinating body, some coordinating center, is essential. We should not today be praying for a federation or, equally, a confederation. In history there has always been a transitional period, and every state has to go through it. We should today have a Union that has elements of both a federation and confederation. I am opposed to the "renewed Union" concept. When did it become "renewed"? Did it start renewal in 1985? We have acquired its "renewal"! We see it! If this is called "renewal," God preserve me from such renewal.

The Union Treaty should unite elements of federation and confederation, this is why at this time a central state with limited functions, with limited authority, and with the switch of the signals toward the statehood of the republics is necessary. This is not to be feared. A perfectly normal process is under way. And other possibilities will open up subsequently. We are currently climbing into a multistructural economy and different forms of ownership. We recently declared in parliament that collective and private and other forms of ownership have a right to exist. We must not be disciples of dogmatic approaches. Richard Nixon asked me whether my position was not a retreat from Marxism-Leninism. Yes, if Marxism-Leninism is perceived as the Stalin period. Nowhere do the classics of Marxism say that private property is a misfortune for the people. They were speaking about a distant prospect, as an ultimate goal.... When there is a flow of wealth. But what is flowing now....

Leonid Makarovich touched on the "Moscow problem" also. He said:

[Kravchuk] We have people meeting in the Kremlin and adopting documents, and the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia has upped and suspended them. So you have the war of documents beginning again, who beats whom. Things are exceptionally complicated. A politician needs to think through his decisions, otherwise he is not a politician but an ignoramus. And this did not happen in this case.

Responding to a question from a KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent as to what he would do were tanks to roll down Kreshchatik, Kravchuk said that he, as chairman, would endeavor to ensure that this not happen. If, God forbid, it did, all of parliament and he personally, as a politician, would not be worth a dime.

The leader of the republic once again opposed the "renewed federation" concept.

Compilers of Ukrainian Constitution Concept

91UN1501B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
6 May 91 p 2

[**"Scientific associates participating in the development of the Concept of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Ukrainian SSR": passages between slantlines published in boldface**]

[Text] Scientific associates participating in the development of the Concept of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Ukrainian SSR:

The Institute of State and Law of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences imeni V.M. Koretskiy: G.A. Murashin, deputy director of the institute, candidate of jurisprudence; V.N. Denisov, head of the department of international law and foreign political activity of the Ukrainian SSR, doctor of jurisprudence; Ye.Ya. Kravets, scientific associate of the department of constitutional law and Soviet construction, candidate of jurisprudence

The Ukrainian Juridical Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy: V.Ya. Tatsiy, rector of the academy, doctor of jurisprudence, professor; S.A. Alpert, head of the criminal procedure department, professor; M.I. Bazhanov, professor of the criminal law faculty, doctor of jurisprudence; Yu.P. Bityak, head of the administrative law department, candidate of jurisprudence, docent; N.P. Voronov, head of the faculty of Soviet construction and financial law, candidate of jurisprudence, docent; V.D. Goncharenko, docent on the faculty of history of state and law, candidate of jurisprudence; V.M. Gorshenev, professor on the faculty of the theory of state and law, doctor of jurisprudence; Yu.M. Groshevoy, head of the faculty of justice and procuratorial oversight, doctor of jurisprudence, professor; P.B. Yevgrafov, docent on the faculty of theory of state and law, candidate of jurisprudence; V.V. Komarov, prorector for training work, professor; I.Ye. Marochkin, docent on the faculty of justice and procuratorial oversight, candidate of jurisprudence; N.I. Panov, prorector for scientific work, doctor of jurisprudence, professor; N.A. Pridvorov, head of the faculty of theory of state and law, doctor of jurisprudence, professor; A.I. Rogozhin, head of the faculty of history of state and law, doctor of jurisprudence, professor; V.S. Semenov, docent on the faculty of international law, candidate of jurisprudence; V.V. Stashis, first prorector, professor; V.P. Tikhii, professor on the faculty of criminal law, doctor of jurisprudence; Yu.N. Todika, professor on the faculty of theory of state and law, doctor of jurisprudence; M.V. Tsvik, professor on the faculty of the theory of state and law, doctor of jurisprudence; V.D. Yavorskiy, docent on the faculty of Soviet construction and financial law, candidate of jurisprudence; M.V. Yanovskiy, head of the faculty of international law, doctor of jurisprudence, professor.

V.F. Pogorilko, head of the faculty of the Kiev Institute of Political Science and Social Administration, doctor of jurisprudence;

V.V. Kopeychikov, professor at the Kiev Higher School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, doctor of jurisprudence;

A.S. Popovich, head of the department of humanitarian problems of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of the Ukraine, candidate of physical-mathematical sciences, S.A. Yerokhin, sector chief of this same department, candidate of jurisprudence

I.Kh. Demidovskiy, deputy department head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine for ties with soviets and political and social organizations.

G.K. Kryuchkov, USSR people's deputy

Differences Over Constitution Highlighted

91UN15434 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
13 May 91 pp 1, 2

[Article by Aleksandr Sokol, PRAVDA UKRAINY parliamentary correspondent: "Debates about the Constitution": "The Issue Being Decided Was What Kind of State the Ukrainian People Are To Live In"]

[Text] The concept of a new Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Constitution is being submitted for review by the Supreme Soviet of the republic. This issue was planned for December of last year, but it is only now being decided. Apparently, not accidentally: A step that is fateful for the people of the Ukraine is in prospect. A lot of unusually responsible work was required

It has been concentrated in the Constitutional Commission, formed by the Supreme Soviet. Draft concepts—there were six of them—came here, to the commission, from collectives and individual persons, discussions took place here in the commission. The debates, incidentally, were always sharp, interesting, and professional. This was helped in many ways by the fact that both theoreticians and practitioners were represented on the commission, and primarily—various political forces of parliament. The final meeting was perhaps the most revealing. Here is why

The day before, I.M. Kravchuk, chairman of the commission and head of the Supreme Soviet, disclosed within the halls of parliament that the concept of a new Constitution is in the final stage. This was stated during the opening of the meeting of the commission. But this was not sensed when the debates got under way. The extent of disagreement among the speakers was such that agreement on a final document was not in sight. To understand what was being argued, it is necessary to analyze the subject of the debate—the concept that was being considered

It was being proposed by a working group of the commission, which consisted of deputies, but what is more, of lawyer-academics. The gist of the concept could be set forth this way: The Ukraine is a democratic state. Political and economic pluralism, a multiparty system, and self-government form the basis of its social and state structure

The concept is based on the fact that—and its authors continually emphasize this—the individual, his life, dignity, and personal inviolability, is of the highest social value. In addition to the well-known human rights, it is proposed to include in it such rights that previously were not proclaimed constitutionally. Among them, the right to a proper living standard for each individual and family, to individual private enterprise, to go abroad and return, and to information and its free and uncensored dissemination, and a whole set of ecological rights: to a clean environment and the same kind of food products, to ecologically harmless working conditions, to safe commodities for everyday living.

The social structure is not defined in the concept. A civil society is proposed. A supplement names its definitive features: the priority of the individual over everything; the diversity and inviolability of all forms of property; the economic freedom of citizens and associations, and noninterference by the state and parties in economic activity; the freedom to choose work activity on the basis of the labor market; an effective system of social protection of the population; and ideological and political freedom.

The presidential republic is the form of state government that is proposed. The president and vice president are elected by all the people for four to six years, and not more than two terms in succession. The president will execute his functions and authority with the help of a Cabinet of Ministers and state administration. The latter provides for a system of local government. Its essence: Soviets of people's deputies operate in villages, settlements, and rayons which, within the limits of the law and their own material-technical base, by themselves and independently decide all questions of local life. But at the oblast level an administration designated by the president governs; oblast soviets are eliminated.

It is proposed that legislative authority, that is, the Supreme Soviet, be organized into two permanently functioning chambers—a People's Chamber and a Chamber of Representatives. The first is elected (on an alternative basis) from territorial election districts, and the second, from the oblasts, the Crimean autonomy, and the capital of the republic (three representatives each on a multi-mandate basis). The reasoning behind such a structure is that it makes it possible to raise parliament's professionalism and takes the interests of the regions into account. With this aim, in addition to general jurisdiction, the chambers are given a special jurisdiction. The People's Chamber, for example, as the more representative one, is given priority in the resolution of legislative questions and determination of the budget; the Chamber of Representatives, in the appointment of higher officials and judges of the republic and making them answerable. By virtue of the different assignments of the chambers, a law is proposed for candidates to the Chamber of Representatives (as the more professional one) which establishes specific requirements, relative to education, experience, etc.

The concept also contains other innovations. In this category, in particular, is the idea of a free deputy mandate and an imperative one. The first of these does not contemplate electors' mandates and their right to recall. This is used only by the people's deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the republic, whose duty it is to represent the interests of all the people. The imperative mandate is for deputies of local soviets. Inasmuch as they decide regional tasks, the voters place specific demands on them, and if these demands are not fulfilled, they recall the deputies.

...That, then, is the draft. It proposes a constitution that turns the life of the republic around. Moreover, it is proposed that many things be started, as they say, with a clean slate. What is the reaction to the Constitutional Commission's draft? Some have approved the concept, and, moreover, praised it, emphasizing that it has absorbed world experience. Others have criticized it sharply. Indignant questions could be heard: "Where is the socialist choice?" "Why are we changing the system of soviets?!"

Some of the commission members proposed adopting the concept as a basis and submitting it for review by the Supreme Soviet, and others called for not confirming it. Representatives of the parliamentary minority were "for," and the majority, "against." A categorical proposal was also made to wait for the forthcoming scientific-practical conference, create a working group after it, and develop a new concept. The chair was compelled to mention that this must be done by the commission that was established by the Supreme Soviet, and no one else.

A compromise saved the situation. It was proposed to adopt the submitted concept as a basis, presenting the debatable positions in alternative versions. All members of the commission who were present agreed to this, with the exception of two. Voting against were deputies S.I. Doroguntsov and V.R. Marchenko.

The republic scientific-practical conference continued work. Participating in it were more than 100 eminent scientists and specialists of the republic, and representatives of scientific centers of the Union and of higher state organs of the Russian Federation, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Those who had assembled worked in sections and at plenary meetings, which took place within the walls of the Supreme Soviet along with the deputies. The intellectual potential of the whole republic was involved in the development of the new constitution.

The floor for the report was given to all those who submitted their own draft to the Constitutional Commission. The concept of the commission's working group was presented by commission member L.P. Yuzkov, a professor at Kiev State University; the concept of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, by S.I. Gurenko, a member of the Constitutional Commission and first secretary of the Central Committee; the concept of the Institute of State and Law of the Ukrainian SSR

Academy of Sciences, by Yu.S. Shemshuchenko, a member of the Constitutional Commission and director of the aforementioned institute. Speaking for their own concepts were members of the Constitutional Commission A.P. Kotsyuba, candidate of juridical sciences, and N.M. Artemenko, academician at the Ukrainian Academy of Agrarian Sciences; and I.A. Timchenko, candidate of juridical sciences. In addition to the conceptual reports there were reports on problems and scientific reports that summarized information given by the leaders of the sections.

The speakers, as a rule, expounded a personal point of view, and introduced their own proposals. Evaluations were also given. They concerned basically the concept that was presented by the working group of the Constitutional Commission. S.I. Gurenko described specific provisions in detail.

Noting the provisions on which views coincide, he dwelt in detail on those that are subject to sharp discussions. Most of all, this concerns so-called de-ideologization. Under cover of it the definition of the social structure is not simply avoided but a change in it is legally and constitutionally fixed. In the final analysis, S.I. Gurenko emphasized, this denotes a rejection of the choice made by our people in 1917 and confirmed in the struggle with fascism, and leads to a regime that is typical of a bourgeois society.

S.I. Gurenko laid out the important propositions of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee concept (published in PRAVDA UKRAINY on 6 May 1991). He noted the dubiousness of the principle of consolidating in the constitution preference for the rights of one, in particular, native population and, in this connection, cited the concept adopted by the Constitutional Commission as a basis. The leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party did not agree with the proposal to renounce the soviet form of democracy, and revealed the future of the Ukraine in a renewed Union—in a federation of sovereign states.

Conference participants held discussions on many questions. The problem of the presidency was also raised. In this respect, an irony could also be heard: First place in the world in the number of presidents, it is said. Many believe that presidential authority is a form of governing that facilitates the inculcation of a clear system of the division of power into legislative, executive, and judicial. Fears were also expressed that a presidency will lead to an unwarranted large concentration of authority in the same hands, but we have already seen what this is. It was proposed to leave the Supreme Soviet as it is, only transform it into a professional body.

The problem of governing at the oblast level is tied in with the presidency. There were various opinions. Some tried to show that a representative president in an oblast is precisely what we need very much: a commanding authority. Others remarked skeptically that there already have been governors. The third saw in this step

encroachment on the system of soviets. The authors of the concept, true, brushed such accusations aside, reporting at the conference that the chairman of a local soviet (he is the chairman of an executive committee) can simultaneously be a representative of the president.

There was a wide-ranging discussion of the two-chamber structure of the Supreme Soviet. It was said that this structure is farfetched, and that, given the existing level of political culture, conflicts are possible between the chambers, as a result of which an already complicated parliamentary situation will become difficult. It was noted that it responds not only to modern democracy but also to age-old Ukrainian tradition—to the large and small Cossack councils.

Consequently, the Supreme Soviet will say which version should be decided on. It will decide which proposals to consider. But the conference came forth with a lot of them. These are the kind that invite attention. With the aim of preventing the separatism of local authorities, grant the Supreme Soviet or the president the right to dissolve a local soviet that violates the law of the republic. And, second, introduce a chapter into the constitution on the mechanism for implementing its ideas.

Many of the most prestigious speakers emphasized: The new constitution must serve for centuries. But there was also talk of a constitution for a transitional period—there was such, they say, in France. But the most convincing of all was this thought: It is necessary to create a stable Basic Law, and, when necessary, make amendments to it.

There were many differences, and on many positions. But there is also a common opinion: The new constitution should provide a reliable legal basis for the proposition of the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine. Opening the conference, L.M. Kravchuk emphasized that it was after the proclamation of the declaration that it became extremely important to determine the path of the Ukraine to its own statehood, and to determine the nature of our development, economic and legal principles, and our position relative to the sovereignty of the Ukraine in the all-European and world process.

The discussions on the concept of a new constitution in the commission and the scientific-practical conference brought out material and ideas that make it possible to move forward.

Fokin Explains Proposed Reform of Ukrainian Administration

91UN1421A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
23 Apr 91 pp 1, 3

[Report by UKRINFORM parliamentary correspondents A. Litvinov and M. Melnik on 18 April Ukrainian

Supreme Soviet session under the rubric: "News From the Parliament": "Reform of the Structures of State Administration"]

[Text] A cardinal change in the structure of the state executive authority in the Ukraine is long overdue. And at the morning plenary sitting of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on 18 April V.P. Fokin, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, presented a new structure of state administration in the republic. He emphasized here that the concept of administration which was being submitted for the deputies' examination was not only his personal viewpoint. A large group of scientists and specialists had worked on it. It had been examined in detail at a meeting of the republic Council of Ministers and its Presidium and had earned unanimous support. The proposals concerning the new structure had been set forth at a meeting of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

V.P. Fokin then dwelt on certain most important features.

First, concerning the purpose of reorganization of the government. The new system of state executive authority, he emphasized, is designed to ensure the socially just development and unswerving progress of the people of the Ukraine. The means of achieving this should be on the one hand a sovereign democratic state based on the rule of law and, on the other, a market economy enabling society to emancipate to the maximum its productive forces and production relations.

World experience shows that this can best be done through the **conversion of the Council of Ministers into a cabinet of ministers** providing for an exclusively functional type of executive authority. Even the possibility of preserving the administrative command leadership, which is today even the breakwater against which market relations are being smashed to smithereens, is hereby precluded. It is the republic cabinet which will afford an opportunity for the creation of a government which really will respond fully to the demands of the market and which will be capable of pursuing a strong social and economic policy, which our people sorely need.

What system-forming principles have been made the basis of the new structure of executive power?

The **first and most important** is adequacy to the requirements of the sovereign state and also the requirements of the market economy.

Of course, evaluations and opinions in respect of this structure may vary, may even be polar-opposites, the speaker observed. But if it is viewed impartially, it has to be seen that for 100-percent conformity with the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine it lacks one, just one (!), small cell. This is the cell named Ministry of Defense. But we should not have this today. After all, the majority of the people of the Ukraine have advocated the creation of a new Union, to which we

propose delegating a limited number of functions, among which will be defense also.

Nonetheless, we are not detaching ourselves from this sphere. State regulation on the part of the republic government will be exercised here by a **minister of state for national security and emergencies and a State Committee for Relations With the USSR Defense Ministry.**

The **second principle** is functionality, which eliminates the possibility to a certain extent and for a certain period of time of the use of administrative command and, particularly, sectoral methods of management.

The **third** is stability. It is to ensure the requisite degree of steadiness of the structure of the state executive authority not only for the period of transition to the market but also following the establishment of a market economy.

And **fourth** and finally. The elasticity of the organs of state administration which are not a part of the new cabinet. It is to secure for the sectoral organs of state administration, which are converted into state committees, an opportunity to realize their main function: facilitating the creation of nongovernmental economic structures—associations, concerns, consortia, and other forms of the voluntary amalgamation of economically independent enterprises. And this, in turn, will preclude the possibility of substituting the "diktat of Kiev" for the "diktat of Moscow."

Describing the structure of the cabinet, V.P. Fokin announced that it was anticipated having two **vice premiers**, including one first vice premier. As distinct from the present deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers, they would not be responsible for one group of questions or sectors or another but would exercise operational leadership of all cabinet business.

For practical realization of the system-forming principle it is proposed to make a new institution of top-level leaders—**ministers of state of the Ukrainian SSR**—a part of the government. Their principal task will be assurance of the comprehensive solution of problems, to whichever ministry's jurisdiction one matter or another pertains notwithstanding.

It is proposed to create in the cabinet also such a new structure as the **State Council for Economic Policy headed by the prime minister.** This is fundamentally important since it is this which will to a decisive extent shape the cabinet's economic strategy. It is proposed to make a number of highly skilled specialists and scientists a part of it also, in addition to the leaders of the economic ministries and departments. Moreover, the republic head of government observed, I intend to propose to certain people's deputies and economists in a particular field that they also join the State Council. It is also proposed to have a group of state counselors, a kind of Council of Elders made up of the best qualified and most authoritative specialists. They are to be absolutely independent of leaders of any level and party and any

factions or groupings. It is proposed to staff the State Council on a contract basis. In the future such an approach will also be the basis of the formation of the staff of the cabinet headed by a **state secretary.**

And one further new collegial, important body which it is proposed to create under the auspices of the cabinet—the **Council for State Science and Technology Policy.** It will be headed by the first prime minister.

The chairman of the Council of Ministers revealed the internal structure of the cabinet, which might provisionally be divided into **four functional blocks: economic, resource and production, socio-cultural, and functional.**

Essential disagreements arose during discussion in the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of the first, that is, the economic, block. The point was that in the initial version of the cabinet structure we had proposed, in place of the traditional departments—the State Committee for the Economy, the Gosnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], the Ministry of Trade, the Prices Committee and even a separate body for foreign economic activity, whose appearance many people were expecting—the creation of a single Ministry for Economics and Trade. But a majority of members of the Presidium did not support this proposal. Thus there appeared in the outline distributed to the deputies two **separate bodies: a Ministry of Economics and a Ministry of Trade.**

Under the conditions of market relations the economic bodies, the speaker continued, are primarily to ensure the comprehensive accomplishment of a dual task: The shaping of the socially necessary market environment and the exercise of state regulation of this process.

Without renunciation of the exclusively administrative functions and without abolishing the direct influence of the cabinet on the economic structures it is hardly possible to talk seriously about the formation of a market, freedom of entrepreneurial activity, denationalization of property, and other mandatory attributes of a market economy. It is also impossible to pose the task of developing a market environment until the requisite degree of freedom has been accorded the market infrastructure, the management of which is currently centralized.

Systems of government contracts and state support for enterprise, a pricing mechanism, and a quantitative regulation mechanism should be the regulators of economic development. Mechanisms of state protectionism in the most important areas of long-term investment and other types of activity connected with the economic and social problems of the people of the Ukraine pertain to the economic regulators also.

It is planned to create a **Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and Tourism.** The new committee will, given the help of economic regulators, taxes, abatements, quotas, and so forth, provide for the development of

foreign economic relations along a socially useful trajectory. All this should enhance the efficiency of foreign trade transactions and contribute to the receipt of foreign currency which the republic sorely needs. Another significant source of currency proceeds is tourism. It is this which dictates the logic of amalgamating the two areas of activity within the framework of one committee.

Also new as part of the government is the **Ministry for the Denationalization of Property and the Demonopolization of Production** incorporating the State Property Fund. It is this ministry which will act on behalf of the state as the disposer of state property, which will pursue a policy of demonopolization and denationalization. After all, it is contemplated, with the development of market relations, to create on the basis of this ministry a State Anti-Trust Committee.

It is also proposed to make certain changes to the ministries which exist currently. Specifically, to create under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture the **corresponding committee**, which will deal with problems of the spiritual development of the national groups living in the Ukraine. A **Committee for Relations With Ukrainians** living outside the Ukraine will be formed as part of the **Foreign Ministry**.

V.P. Fokin proposed that, as a whole, the **cabinet consist of 32 persons** (there are 45 persons in the present Council of Ministers). **It will include a premier, two vice premiers, a state secretary, eight ministers of state and 20 ministers.**

The chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers then described the central organs of state administration, which are either of a sectoral nature or whose fields of activity are not a part of the functions of the cabinet directly. We designed them in such a way, he emphasized, as to exclude even the possibility of these structures counteracting the processes of denationalization of property, the development of enterprise and the formation of diverse market forms of management. I believe that in the future, not-too-distant future, what is more, by the end of next year approximately, the need for the existence of considerable numbers of state committees connected with the management of production will have disappeared. And then we will create in their place a single functional Ministry for Industry.

In accordance with the proposal of certain people's deputies, a **Patent Fund and State Committee for the Social Development of the Countryside** will be formed, and the name **State Committee for Architecture, Construction and Protection of the Historical Environment** was formulated.

The head of the republic government insistently requested that the deputies leave the **State Bank of the Ukraine** under the jurisdiction of the cabinet. The point being, he observed, that we cannot today take the path of the Union and detach the State Bank from the sphere of government influence, that is, make it independent. And we cannot for just one reason—we lack the institution of a presidency. Otherwise the cabinet would find itself

unarmed in the present crisis situation and could counterpose nothing meaningful to a collapse of the financial system.

Speaking of prospects, V.P. Fokin observed: The actual conditions will have matured and the need for an appreciable expansion of the system of intrinsic Ukrainian state funds as corresponding departments will have arisen no later than the end of next year, I believe. We are talking about the formation of **Reserve, Pension, Insurance, and Food Funds**. Today all managerial activity pertaining to the formation of state funds and regulation of their use is concentrated in the center, in the USSR Cabinet. I am convinced that this should be the prerogative of the republic government, except merely for the part thereof which we, the republic parliament, voluntarily delegate to the Union.

In conclusion the chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers said that the new structure of the republic cabinet would simultaneously be also a very important component of the program of special measures to stabilize the economy and a necessary, indispensable condition of its successful realization. We intend primarily not to declare but to ensure real economic freedom for all enterprises, regardless of forms of ownership. While ensuring the equality of all forms of ownership and stimulating the processes of denationalization and privatization, we will, nonetheless, firmly advocate the preservation of the state sector on the requisite scale and, in addition, the strengthening of it. The essential economic prerequisites will be created for this. We are also for a preponderance of collective forms of ownership in industry. The principles of equal starting opportunities and social justice will be employed as the main ones. Simultaneously with implementation of the stabilization program the system of social support of the populace will be upgraded constantly also.

V.P. Fokin answered numerous questions put by the deputies.

During discussion of the report various viewpoints were expressed on the structure of the state organs of administration proposed by the chairman of the Council of Ministers. But the biggest arguments were evoked by the following questions: whether or not to give the government the right to direct the national bank; whether there should or should not be ministries of trade, information and foreign economic relations; whether to split the Ministry of Education or not; and also to whom the ministries of interior and state security should be subordinate—the government or the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, as recorded in the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine.

It was decided to vote for the structure, having excluded the said questions here. The deputies confirmed by a constitutional majority the new structure of state administration of the republic.

The session revised the Ukrainian SSR Constitution.

L.M. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, proposed confirmation of V.P. Fokin as prime minister of the republic. He was confirmed by majority vote. He was entrusted with forming a cabinet and submitting the proposals pertaining to its composition.

In connection with the formation of the cabinet the deputies instructed the standing commissions to submit proposals concerning additions to and revisions of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and the granting of additional authority to the Supreme Soviet chairman in respect of regulation of relations with the cabinet and control thereof.

Then Deputy I.Yu. Valenya, member of the parliamentary commission, presented information on the progress of negotiations with representatives of the striking miners.

A.V. Kolomyets, member of the Donetsk City strike committee, was called to speak on behalf of the miners.

Deputy G.O. Altunyan delivered a statement on behalf of the People's Council.

At the end of the evening plenary sitting L.M. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, addressing the miners, appealed to them not to succumb to the provocations of destructive forces and to decide all questions through negotiations. He gave the assurance that there would be no persecution of the miners for the strike.

Text of Ukraine-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Treaty

91UN14444 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
9 Apr 91 pp 1, 3

["Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation Between the Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, subsequently called the High Contracting Parties,

- confirming the right of the peoples to dispose of their own destiny,
- taking as a basis the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Ukraine, dated 16 June 1990, and the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, dated 15 December 1990,
- aspiring to the consolidation and development of the long-standing economic and cultural ties and a strengthening of relations of friendship and mutually profitable cooperation corresponding to the national interests of the peoples of the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan,

—guided by an endeavor to contribute in every possible way to the creation and development on a voluntary basis of a union of sovereign states,

—intent on developing their relations on the basis of the principles of sovereign equality, noninterference in one another's internal affairs, the settlement of contentious problems by means of conciliation and other generally recognized principles and rules of international law,

—confirming their devotion to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter for a New Europe, and other documents pertaining to security and cooperation in Europe and Asia and

—undertaking to abide by the generally recognized international human rights provisions,

—have agreed on what is set forth hereunder:

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties recognize one another as sovereign states and undertake to refrain from actions which could be detrimental to their state sovereignty.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties guarantee their citizens, regardless of their nationality or other distinctions, equal rights and liberties.

The parties guarantee citizens of the USSR resident on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, following the parties' enactment of laws on citizenship, the right to preserve the citizenship of the party on whose territory they reside.

Questions of the acquisition of the citizenship of one party by persons residing on the territory of the other party will be settled by a special agreement in accordance with the parties' citizenship legislation.

Article 3

Each High Contracting Party guarantees citizens of the other party and also stateless persons residing on its territory, regardless of their national affiliation, religious belief or other differences, civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights and liberties in accordance with the generally recognized international human rights provisions.

Each party defends the rights of its citizens residing on the territory of the other party and renders them the utmost assistance and support in accordance with the parties' legislation and the rules of international law.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties recognize and respect the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan within the borders which exist at this time.

Article 5

The Ukrainian SSR and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan will display concern for satisfaction of the linguistic and other national-cultural and spiritual requirements of, respectively, Ukrainians residing in Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyz resident on the territory of the Ukraine. Each High Contracting Party will within the framework of current laws provide for the possibility of and facilitate for the other party assistance to such persons and their organizations.

The parties will facilitate the expression, preservation, and development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious distinctiveness of the national minorities and the evolved unique ethno-cultural regions.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties will develop on an equal basis the mutually profitable cooperation of their peoples and states in the sphere of policy, economy, culture, health care, ecology, science, technology, and trade and in the humanitarian and other spheres, promote extensive information exchange, and comply conscientiously and unswervingly with mutual commitments.

The parties will render one another assistance in the instruction of representatives of the youth of the Ukraine in higher, secondary specialized and vocational-technical educational institutions of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, and of representatives of the youth of Kyrgyzstan in the corresponding educational institutions of the Ukrainian SSR based on special agreements.

The parties deem it necessary to conclude the corresponding agreements on cooperation in the other spheres specified in part one of this article also.

Article 7

The High Contracting Parties recognize each other's right to independently determine the types and forms of ownership on their territory.

The legal conditions of state property and the property of bodies corporate and the citizens of one party located on the territory of the other party are regulated by the corresponding agreements.

The parties agree that all questions in respect to facilities categorized as all-Union property are subject to regulation on the basis of particular agreements with the participation of the parties concerned.

Article 8

The High Contracting Parties recognize that the following pertain to the sphere of their joint activity realized on an equal basis via common coordinating institutions:

—questions of the safeguarding and defense of human rights;

—interaction in foreign policy and foreign economic activity;

—cooperation in the shaping and development of a common economic space and the all-European and Eurasian markets and in the sphere of customs policy;

—management of power engineering, transport, information science, and communications systems, including satellite communications and telecommunications;

—cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection, participation in the creation of an all-embracing international system of environmental safety, and mutual assistance at a time of special circumstances;

—questions of migration policy;

—the fight against crime.

Article 9

The High Contracting Parties agree that they will help one another in the implementation and development of the international relations of each party in the political, economic, humanitarian, and other spheres based on particular agreements between them.

Article 10

The High Contracting Parties will practice economic, organizational, technical, and other cooperation to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station].

Article 11

The economic relations of the High Contracting Parties are regulated by agreements with the granting of most-favored-nation status.

The parties will provide for the development of economic, trade, and S&T relations at the levels of:

—organs of state power and administration;

—banks and the financial system;

—enterprises, associations, organizations, and establishments, including joint Ukrainian-Kyrgyz and Kyrgyz-Ukrainian, based on all forms of ownership;

—individual entrepreneurs.

The parties agree that the actual mechanisms of inter-farm relations, the joint use of natural resources, trade exchange, and all types of communications and transportation, and also questions of economic and information cooperation will be regulated by intergovernmental agreements.

The parties undertake to prevent the use of destabilizing economic measures harmful to one another.

Article 12

The High Contracting Parties will conclude intergovernmental agreements on reciprocal supplies and services.

payments, prices, and the movement of securities. This list of agreements is not exhaustive.

The parties undertake to adopt measures to coordinate price policy.

Article 13

The High Contracting Parties will provide for transit transport operations through sea, river, and air ports and via the railroad and highways networks on their territories.

The conditions and procedure of transit transport operations will be determined by special agreements of the parties.

Article 14

The High Contracting Parties reserve the right to conclude cooperation treaties or agreements in all other spheres of interstate relations.

Article 15

The High Contracting Parties deem essential an exchange of authorized missions.

The procedure of the exchange of missions and their status will be regulated by special agreements.

Article 16

Disputes concerning the interpretation and application of this treaty are to be resolved by way of negotiation.

Article 17

This treaty does not affect the commitments of the High Contracting Parties in respect to third states and their rights to the conclusion of treaties with third parties concerning their participation in a sphere of the parties' joint activity determined by the treaty.

Article 18

The High Contracting Parties will conduct regular bilateral consultations and negotiations on questions of the realization of this treaty at the level of their supreme soviets and governments.

Article 19

Each High Contracting Party reserves the right to initiate within the framework of consultations negotiations on the expediency of the continuation of this treaty or individual articles thereof.

The provisions of this treaty may be supplemented or revised per the parties' mutual consent.

Article 20

This treaty is subject to ratification.

The instruments of ratification will be exchanged in the city of Kiev.

This treaty will take effect the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Article 21

This treaty is concluded for a term of 10 years. The treaty will be extended for a subsequent 10-year term unless either High Contracting Party declares its desire to denounce it by way of notification in writing not later than six months prior to the expiration of the term of the treaty.

Prepared in the city of Bishkek on 2 April 1991, in two copies, each in Ukrainian, Kyrgyz, and Russian. All three versions are equally valid.

Article 22

This treaty will after it has taken effect be forwarded to the UN Secretariat for registration and publication.

For the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet

For the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, A. Akayev, president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan

Caucasus

Roundtable on Armenian Sovereignty, Legal System

91US05024 Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
2 Apr 91 p 2

[Roundtable discussion conducted and prepared for publication by GOLOS ARMENII propaganda department: "Democracy and Legality"]

[Text] There is a law of mechanics: The greater the degree of freedom of an object, the more difficult it is to find its point of balance. Certain freedoms our society has gained in recent years have really driven it out of its state of balance. And it is no accident that the old slogans have been replaced with new ones such as "Democracy is not permissiveness" and "Everything is permitted that is not prohibited."

What is democracy? This question can be answered only theoretically, for another fact is plain to see: What we have today can hardly be called democracy. The power of the law and the law of power, you will agree, are incompatible. In this sense, the subject of our roundtable discussion was somewhat abstract, and one of its participants even made this remark: "Do you really think we have the thing we are gathered here to talk about? So many times I have been made to see the truth of the old saying: 'Nothing generates such confusion in a state as innovations that have been introduced.'"

But still our discussion took place. Participating in the work of the roundtable were Flora NAKHSHKARYAN, deputy editor in chief of GOLOS ARMENII; Mikael

GRIGORYAN, first deputy procurator of the republic; Docent Samvel MURADYAN and Armen ARUTYUNYAN, candidates of jurisprudence and instructors of the department of state, international, and administrative law of the law faculty of Yerevan State University; and Kim BALAYAN, acting chairman of the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet permanent commission for legal questions.

The roundtable discussion was led by an editor of the newspaper GOLOS ARMENII, Boris MKRTCHYAN.

[B. Mkrtchyan] We have several blocks of questions around which we would like to center today's discussion.

Politically the most important is the first block: two powers, two laws, one country. This includes questions of the republic's sovereignty and legislation.

[K. Balayan] I think the republics began their struggle for independence incorrectly. For example, our Constitution contains an article which says that the Supreme Soviet has the right to ratify the Union treaty and the changes that are made in it. Based on this article, we had to proclaim. Since the Union did not meet its contractual commitments with respect to our republic (and this really is the case) we are invalidating this treaty.

This would have served as a constitutional basis for subsequent legislative activity. But we have limited ourselves to proclaiming sovereignty, that is, we did not take the legal path. Hence the confusion and nihilism in the laws.

[S. Muradyan] We could not have proceeded along the legal path. First of all, we had to take into account that we were dealing with a state that arose with the help of force (revolution) and is based on force. It is only since the end of the 19th century that Russia has begun to develop democratic institutions, and they still have not taken root.

On the other hand, the cult of force has put down deep roots in Russia and violence has become an integral part of the public consciousness. It should be noted that, although force is one of the components of law, that is, the law is backed up by state coercion, the Soviet state has frequently used it to violate the legal norms it itself has adopted. As concerns sovereignty, the federative structure completely rules out the possibility of the sovereignty of its members.

[B. Mkrtchyan] You are trying to say that we cannot have complete sovereignty...

[S. Muradyan] Yes. Complete sovereignty is possible only under the conditions of a confederation. A war of laws is a game, which results either in compromise or in force applied by the center. Thus we declared that Karabakh was to be a part of Armenia. We could declare with equal success (if the reader will forgive me) that any other country had joined to us. **If the law is not backed up by coercion, this will be nothing more than a declaration.**

But this is already a certain stage that has been passed through.

[B. Mkrtchyan] A question arises here. Were we authorized to make this decision?

[K. Balayan] Karabakh adopted a constitutional decision at a session of its oblast soviet and appealed to the supreme soviets of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the USSR. Everything was legal and based on the free expression of the will of the people. But from the very beginning it was clear that our decision to annex it could not be carried out.

[A. Arutyunyan] Of course, it is preferable to take the legal path. But frequently the law itself leads to an impasse. And then the path that is selected is not regulated by the law. Hence, in my view, comes the war of laws. All-Union laws do not have the social conditions which would give the republic the necessary outlet in actions.

As concerns the NKAO [Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], it has expressed its opinion constitutionally and we, in turn, have agreed to its annexation. Recall how the situation was at that time—both emotional and political. In a certain sense we were forced to adopt this decision. But we had to very flexible: We had to limit ourselves to the demand for the separation of the NKAO from Azerbaijan as the only possibility of protecting human rights in the oblast. And there would have been no accusations of territorial ambitions at that time. What would have come to the fore would have been the protection of the rights of the Armenian population of the oblast—a demand of human and not national significance.

[S. Muradyan] In our country the law has traditionally supported an ideology. Politics plays a greater role than law. And the Constitution is not only a legal document but also a political one. Whatever the legal consciousness, whatever the legal ideology of the state may be, such is the law. We now have legal nihilism in society and for some reason all the blame is heaped on the lawyers. But if there were no more lawyers tomorrow, the function of the law would still remain!

[F. Nakhshkaryan] Having the constitutions of the USSR and the republics, as well as the Union ukases which contradict, on the one hand, the Constitution and, on the other, the republic laws, what is our point of reference? Will the failure to carry out one ukase or another not serve as a cause for intervention by the center in the affairs of our republic, as has already been the case in Lithuania and Latvia...

[A. Arutyunyan] We should be more flexible and not allow the problem of the war of laws to make any incidents possible. Remember what Prime Minister Vazgen Manukyan said about the ukase concerning monetary units: "We do not agree with this ukase but, whether we like it or not, we must meet its requirements."

[K. Balayan] This ukase is a clear example of a violation of the law "from above." I am speaking about the freezing of deposits in savings banks. For before this there actually was an agreement between the citizen and the savings bank, that is, the citizen kept his savings in the bank and the bank gave them back to the citizen at his first request. The new ukase violates this agreement, which is essentially an encroachment on the rights of citizens.

[A. Arutyunyan] Yes, this ukase does indeed run counter to the law. But at the same time, until it is abolished we are meeting the requirements of this law. This is a manifestation of the sense of measure which we need at the level of political demands as well.

[F. Nakhshkaryan] Incidentally, why are we not ratifying the amendments to the Law on Speculation?

[K. Balayan] We are frequently guided by Union laws even if they have not been ratified here in our republic. I am speaking about the laws which are at the basis of the republic's interests. We on the commission receive numerous inquiries about the Law on Speculation. Indeed, what are we to do with it? Our commission does not have the right to comment upon the law. Of course, the Supreme Soviet must make this issue clear.

We all know that we must be guided by the law. **The law is the expression of the will of the people which is sanctioned by the supreme power organ. But, after all, it is plain to everyone that the law frequently expresses the will of the top individual in the state.** After Gorbachev became president, he published an ukase on the inviolability of the person of the president.

Having been granted unlimited rights, at the same time he had to bear responsibility under the law for failure to fulfill his obligations. That is if you take the path of a rule-of-law state. But this principle is not in effect in a totalitarian system. Just take the civil rights proclaimed in the Constitution. The right to housing, for example, is not reinforced anywhere or in any way. If there are so many "blunders" in the basic law, can one really be surprised that the laws "do not work?"

[B. Mkrtchyan] There is no mechanism of guarantees.

[K. Balayan] I agree that the jurist should think conservatively and rely only on the force of the law. For example, nobody has any doubt that from 1 through 7 January the curfew should have been suspended. It is understandable that this is the time of New Year and Christmas. But who abolished it? The executive organ, the Council of Ministers, while the state of emergency was declared by the Supreme Soviet. This kind of inconsistency is nothing other than a violation of the law, and on a very high level.

[B. Mkrtchyan] Let us return to the Law on Speculation. The slogan about the development of the market contributes to no small degree to the fact that speculators in

physical goods are beginning to feel quite free. They count themselves among those who are creating the market.

[M. Grigoryan] There is no clear cut delimitation of the competence of the USSR and the Union republics in the area of legislation. As a result of this, national, territorial, and sometimes even group interests are taking the upper hand. One manifestation of this is the adoption of the amendments to the Law on Speculation. The Union organs made a decision to increase liability for speculation.

There is the criminal-legal concept of speculation. Speculation is flourishing in our republic, as well, and in an atmosphere of permissiveness. Here I wish to draw attention, on the one hand, to the helplessness of the law enforcement organs and, on the other, to the fact that I still do not accept the Union law because the Union organs have taken a wrong path. It is impossible to eliminate the phenomenon with legal bans. Such methods have never proved effective. Systematic approaches are needed to fight crime. Temporary campaigns do not lead to good results.

Another negative aspect of such laws is that there is the Union law and there is the criminal code of the republic, and since the Supreme Soviet has not ratified the Union law, the people are not sure what to obey. Again we have legal nihilism. Therefore, the final word should go to the republic Supreme Soviet.

The legislative war inevitably carries over into social relations as well, which is absolutely inadmissible. I think this: If the Union remains, we must generate new forms of Union acts and certain new normative principles. And then, in order to fight crime successfully, it is necessary to restore the authority of the structures that deal with this.

[K. Balayan] I would like to say something about these structures. The Supreme Soviet has created a commission which is to present the concept of the reform of law enforcement organs. And that is what it was called: The Commission for the Development of Principles of the Activity of Law Enforcement Organs.

[F. Nakhshkaryan] The USSR general procurator, writing in the newspaper IZVESTIYA, speaks clearly of the delimitation of the rights of the Union and republic procurators. Yet when speaking of the role of the Procurator he degrades it to the level of protection and suggests eliminating procuratorial supervision of court activity.

[K. Balayan] All these issues are important, of course. The durability of the existing structure lies in the fact that all power is concentrated in the hands of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: investigation, expert evaluation, preliminary investigation, and also the function of reeducation of those who are convicted. It is necessary to separate investigation from the procurator's work and to abolish procuratorial supervision of investigation.

[B. Mkrtchyan] I always compare the rights enjoyed by law enforcement organs in America with ours. Our laws do not frighten anyone; the militia have no rights. We have not worked out a system of fines. And the laws... Can we, say, go beyond the Union law; I have in mind "in severity?"

[M. Grigoryan] As I understand it, you are speaking about republic initiative in the area of legislation. Actually there are quite a few examples of strictness of Western laws. In England, incidentally, parking an automobile incorrectly is considered an administrative violation in one case and a crime in another.

But you cannot achieve success in fighting crime merely by making the laws stricter. That is trivial. It is necessary to create laws that will work. Jurists should be enlisted in this work. And we must not separate jurists into practical workers and theoreticians. Jurisprudence is a science which makes it possible to be both a practitioner and a theoretician.

I am far from the idea of advocating anything to the parliament. But we must think about why the laws are not working. In my view, the main reason is the violation of the basic rule of legislation—that it must be socially conditioned... This factor must be considered in two aspects. In the first place, newly adopted laws must be based on real and not imaginary or presumed conditions of the social, economic, and political life of society, on the real social relations that have actually developed. In the second place, these laws must have the **perspective of future action**. Otherwise they are doomed from the moment they are adopted.

For example, an article was introduced into criminal legislation about illegal karate training supposedly because these classes could cause harm to the individual. But the groups have existed for many years and nobody has been sued. This argument could be used to prohibit a good half of all the kinds of sports. So this article turned out to be "artificial."

This same legislation includes another article—about the liability for concealing one's income. As far as I know (I have especially studied this problem), in the republic there is not a single precedent in this area. Since we have no practical experience, we introduced an article which is essentially unnecessary.

Another reason for the ineffectiveness of the laws is the lack of a clearly developed mechanism for their application.

[A. Arutyunyan] The law, as the nucleus of the legal system, reflects the stage and level of achievement of the society. This includes the level of legal awareness and legal culture.

There is a distorted idea of democracy which says that if you permit everything that was prohibited previously you will have democracy. **But the law must not proceed according to the principle of permissiveness, rather it**

must stimulate the selection of the optimal variant of behavior. It is at this juncture that the state and the individual or the legal persons cooperate. When there is a particular conflict this cooperation may be augmented by coercion as well.

I think we have two problems: the need to reorganize the structure of law enforcement organs and to stabilize economic relations (the old structures no longer work and the new ones are not working yet). And these problems must be resolved together. And we must not forget that the range of the effect of the law is very broad and is not limited to the national framework.

[S. Muradyan] The law has three functions: norm setting, law enforcement, and execution of the law. We need good laws and high-quality legal norms. But they are possible when the necessary economic conditions exist. Otherwise we end up with nothing but declarations. Take our Constitution. How are we to realize the rights that are written into it, even the most elementary one: the right to housing?

[F. Nakhshkaryan] And on this plane, what about the problem of refugees? Life dictates the need to solve it, but there is neither a legislative nor a practical possibility of doing so.

[S. Muradyan] Sometimes we must abandon humane principles of law. From my viewpoint, national interests must prevail over general human ones. Why not publish an ukase and use force to keep refugees from settling in the empty villages? One cannot always abide by falsely humane principles.

[K. Balayan] One time Deputy Kh. Stamboltsyan made the suggestion that we do not force the refugees to move out of the apartments they had taken over illegally. But if we were to take this path we would be giving preference not to the law but to someone's will.

And when adopting laws we must proceed from reality. As for refugees, we must legally, and also on the basis of national interests, motivate them to live in villages. And not only them but also the indigenous residents of the mountain and foothill regions of the republic. With respect both to refugees and to other problems, the state must bear responsibility.

[M. Grigoryan] Here is where we see the idea of the rule-of-law state. **The state, like all members of society, is responsible before the law.** Why is it called that? Because basically the state must be ruled by the law.

[S. Muradyan] I am very fond of a statement by Montesquieu: "The law is a spider web which the largest insects can jump over, but midges are caught in it." The strong get around the law. Our state is the main violator of the law.

[M. Grigoryan] I will give an example: A citizen signs a work contract with the state. Ideally this means that if a person has work he can provide a certain standard of living for himself. In our country, unfortunately, this is

far from always the case. That is, the state does not fulfill its commitments to the citizens.

[A. Arutyunyan] We are speaking about the category of social exchange in which, depending on the creation of social values, the state guarantees the individual a certain standard of living. Actually, we are dealing with a violation of the law in this area as well. It should be clear that **legality cannot triumph without a democratic regime, while at the same time democracy cannot exist without a stable background of legality.** Here it is appropriate to recall the words of Adam Mickiewicz: "In order for the state to live, the law must live."

[B. Mkrtchyan] All that is true but now I would like to turn our conversation into a somewhat different channel. Let us speak about procuratorial supervision of the court.

[M. Grigoryan] Recently not only scholars but also practical workers have been discussing this subject. Some of them basically deny the need for procuratorial supervision of the court, supporting this with the argument about the independence of the court. **It seems to me that the court, like any other organ, should not be beyond supervision.** To be sure, procuratorial supervision should not be of the nature of intervention which violates the independence of the court. I envision it as support for the court in observance of legality, a reminder of legality and certain procedural rules and provisions... This requires the development of scientific forms and methods for this supervision. On this plane judicial reform is also needed.

[B. Mkrtchyan] Now the procurator actively intervenes in the judicial process. But what if we stop this and closely coordinate the work our barristers with that of the Procuracy? Let us say that the barristers write an appeal—why not turn this appeal over to the Procuracy? But how is the procurator to write an appeal of an incorrect decision of the court; after all, it, this decision, was essentially formulated by that same procurator (under the condition that the defense wins)...

[M. Grigoryan] If an investigation is conducted by workers of the Procuracy, they actually are obliged to support the state complainant. But if we were to create an independent investigatory committee, then the procurator could perform the functions of a supervisor of the investigation.

[B. Mkrtchyan] What about the election of judges? For example, in certain countries judges are elected for life...

[M. Grigoryan] It seems to me that our legal practice has not developed to the point where we can follow their example. But 10 years is a long enough term.

[B. Mkrtchyan] And the procedure itself for electing judges? Why not take advantage of the mechanism by which deputies are elected to parliament?

[M. Grigoryan] I would say that is an ideal path. The mechanism itself is democratic.

[B. Mkrtchyan] Must a judge necessarily be a lawyer?

[M. Grigoryan] Under modern conditions I think it is mandatory.

[B. Mkrtchyan] Even if there is a jury?

[M. Grigoryan] About a jury trial... I have studied the practice of Anglosaxon countries. In America, for example, the significance of jury trials for civil cases is declining and, conversely, for criminal cases it is increasing. The same thing can be observed in England.

We can adopt an institution of juries for certain categories of cases. But in any case, the defendant should have the right to be judged by a jury. That would be fair and humane.

[B. Mkrtchyan] The jury trial has been used extensively in Russia and rich experience has been accumulated abroad. The institution of juries has justified itself. So why are we so slow in resolving this issue?

[M. Grigoryan] Yes, it is a democratic institution that has proved itself in many countries. But we need not blindly copy someone else's experience; everything should conform to our conditions. And, as we know, we have legal nihilism, a low level of legal development, and a lack of respect for laws in general. These are the stumbling blocks that are holding things up.

[S. Muradyan] I agree with our colleague M. Grigoryan: A judge must be a professional, a lawyer. The professional level of the jurors is not important.

[M. Grigoryan] There are purely legal questions which nonprofessional jurors could not figure out. Therefore it might also be difficult to select jurors for certain cases. And then the concept of honesty—the principle for selecting them—is relative.

The question of jurors must be approached from two sides. Of course, no judicial system is insured against mistakes, but our task is to reduce them to a minimum.

[F. Nakhshkaryan] In recent years the entire country has been speaking about corruption and the mafia... There is practically no mention of this in our republic. Does this mean that we do not have such things?

[B. Mkrtchyan] Our activity in the area of maintaining public order and fighting crime, in my view, has been somewhat botched up. The difficulties in the republic, the interethnic problems, the fight for independence, Karabakh, and the refugees have somehow taken our attention away from these problems.

Yet under the conditions of the emerging market economy the problem of organized crime will grow and gather force. I am surprised that our parliament has not devoted any attention to this problem yet.

All these corrupt people and mafiosi are protected by the nature of the new production relations and consider

themselves pioneers of the new economic and, consequently, legal order. Everything is permitted.

How do we react to these things? After all, it is all politics. There is also the moral side of the problem. The problem of speculation and excessive incomes... these are still tearing the nation apart! And a powerful process of social stratification is indeed starting here.

The poor will be considerably worse off and the rich will be considerably richer. But this is already a national catastrophe! And in a couple of years Armenia, which now takes solace in the fact that we have no social-class contradictions but have national unity, is becoming a region where fairly strong social conflicts will occur.

[M. Grigoryan: **We cannot place the crime fighting policy outside the area of general policy**, since crime is a phenomenon which impedes our development. That is elementary. We take cover under all kinds of phrases and actions but this is no longer policy, or, rather, it is a different kind of policy, a policy of permissiveness, which can lead to nothing good.

[B. Mkrtchyan] When the upper echelons of power do not notice this and the parliament does not adopt the corresponding laws, clearly the subject begins to take a different attitude toward his obligations. Here is what bothers me. Taking into account the tendencies that have already developed, I am afraid Armenia will be transformed into a republic of free shop keepers.

What lies behind privatization on the broad plane? After all, along with these phenomena the mafia grows and gathers strength! We are quite ready to become a "banana" republic.

[S. Muradyan] What is wrong with a "banana" republic? **I want to live like a human being, and ideology does not interest me at all.** I think our natural environment is private property. Our 70 years of the socialist way of life have distorted the nation. **Why can our compatriot in California live well, and I cannot live well here?!**

[B. Mkrtchyan] There are two models of the Armenian experience here—western and eastern. It is in Eastern Armenia, which has always been strongly linked to Russian capital, that business and industrial production—everything has been in the hands of Armenians. The traditional opinion that all Armenians are shop keepers is wrong. God willing, we will become a highly developed industrial republic, but this does not mean putting economic, management, and, hence, political life in the hands of the mafia.

[A. Arutyunyan] If we take the path of universal privatization, we might jump to vulgar capitalism, which is in no way better than the Stalinist model of socialism, which also ultimately presupposes the establishment of a dictatorship, but in the interests of different groups of people. For there is no legal regulation of relations. Even now, indeed, time is slipping away from us. And then it

is very difficult to distinguish, to find the boundary between so-called earned and unearned incomes.

This does not mean that we have no desire to fight crime. But this requires a strategy. We need our own national economic system based on our capabilities, which will include social protection of citizens, social equality, and a certain economic level. And which system we have—capitalism or socialism—is not important.

[S. Muradyan] Private ownership will not tolerate anarchy. The first laws originated with the appearance of private property.

[B. Mkrtchyan] But we must not forget about evolution and the favorable influence of the evolutionary process. We will not have this evolution. Evolution in the process of the development of any structure or system casts out anything that impedes development. There is a process of natural selection. But if we now sell complete enterprises to private individuals, what mechanism can guarantee that in the future all industry will not be concentrated in the hands of mafia clans? We must provide the necessary conditions so that each worker at a privatized enterprise has his share of the dividends.

[S. Muradyan] The jurists must undoubtedly keep a certain distance ahead of the economists. But I think we must proceed from the fact that no society can develop without private property.

[B. Mkrtchyan] We have touched upon some very important questions in today's discussion. And I think it is impossible to obtain exhaustive answers to them in just one meeting. I hope the cooperation with the newspaper will continue.

Thank you all for participating in the roundtable discussion.

Central Asia

Uzbek President on Union Treaty, Ethnic Issues

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[Address of Uzbek SSR President I.A. Karimov to the 4th Uzbek CP Central Committee Plenum: "On Practical Measures for the Realization of the Uzbek CP Action Program"]

[Text] Comrades!

The second phase of the 22nd Congress summed up the difficult search for new paths toward resolving the problems we face. It adopted the Action Program and the Uzbek CP Charter, in which are expressed with the utmost clarity the political position of communists, our program goals that realistically consider and express the fundamental interests of workers and all the population of the republic, and that respond to the demands for stabilization of the situation and consolidation of the

healthy forces of society. We have completed the congress and firmly intend to execute our duty to the people, and justify its trust in the Communist Party and its policy with concrete actions.

The past three months are quite a sufficient period to evaluate how this multi-plan job has begun, whether in all areas it is being conducted as persistently and expediently as needed. Apparently, there is also a need to adjust our positions.

The headlong development of the country's political situation also obliges us to do this. The public crisis has reached a dangerous point beyond which destructive social consequences are possible.

The polarization of social forces, their opposition, has become a reality. The country is enduring a period of active attacks by anticommunist forces. These are specifically anticommunist, no matter what "democratic" masks they cover themselves with. Their intention is clear—to plunge the country into chaos and anarchy, to remove from power supporters of socialism, and by riding this wave break into power themselves.

January through March of this year are marked by an acute increase in the activity of the opposition, headed by the interregional group, and its transition to offensive actions in the struggle for power.

Under the conditions of the worsening economic situation, the decline in the population's standard of living, and the growth in tension in society associated with this, the citizen's uncertainty in tomorrow, this group thought that it had a real chance this year to put the power issue on the agenda and resolve the matter in its favor.

Through the so-called "free and democratic press," rallies with many thousands are being organized in Moscow and in other large cities; public opinion is being worked on intensively, and appeals for political strikes and other mass acts of civil disobedience resound. Active attempts to derange the 17 March referendum are being undertaken, to defame the draft of the union treaty recently published in the press.

The matter has gotten to the point where B.N. Yeltsin, the leader of the Russian parliament, called his supporters to an open struggle in his 9 March 1991 address at the Moscow House of Cinema, to the forcible removal of the union organs of power.

I will say directly that we have our own point of view on the sociopolitical situation. The country has already gotten right up to the dangerous verge of civil war. A further intensification of the confrontation, at which the irresponsible actions of a number of the "democratic" leaders, if you allow me, are directed, is leading straight toward transforming this danger into cruel reality. Ultimately, it is time for everyone to understand that this would entail not only the collapse of the state, but even more terrifying, would threaten the lives and safety of hundreds of thousands.

The Central Committee Buro, the leadership of the republic decisively condemn the destructive activity of the newly-proclaimed "democrats." The development of events in the country once again convinces us of the correctness of the conclusions drawn at the 22 Congress, that for the realization of any sort of political and economic reforms, and reforms are the goals of perestroika, the priorities are a stable sociopolitical situation, civil peace and national harmony, discipline and order in all spheres of our life. And we consider it our main achievement that this is the sort of atmosphere which is being established in Uzbekistan.

This political course we are conducting has its direct echo in the conclusions and assessments of the unified Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and TsKK [Central Control Committee] on the restoration of leadership and organizational-political administration of the party.

Therefore, the main task today is to unfold the ubiquitous energetic and single-minded work for the realization of our Action Program, and to implement consistently its most important statutes, relying upon an actual majority in the soviets of all levels, strengthening the authority and expanding the influence of communists in labor collectives and among the population.

I.

One of the principal issues of our policy is the issue of the relation to the **Union Treaty**. The Action Program precisely determines that the Uzbek CP favors the new Union Treaty of equal sovereign states, the fundamental principles of which are equality and the defense of the interests of each person, all nations and nationalities, and the voluntary expression of their will in state self-determination.

I must say immediately that the most auspicious moment for signing the Union Treaty has been lost. No one heeded the voices of those who raised this issue as early as two years ago. Stubbornly clinging to the 1922 treaty, the center did not accept sensible suggestions, and hampered the matter.

And if at that time, having contemplated the future, they had rejected the policy of the unitary state, the command-administrative style and methods of leadership, and granted legal rights and independence to republics and local authorities, in many ways we would have avoided today's difficult situation, the acute exacerbation of social and interethnic tension. Ineffective laws would not have appeared; there would not have been contradictions among the laws published by the center and the republics. On the contrary, they would have supplemented one another.

Taking into consideration all the circumstances coming into place, what is our position on this issue today?

The following must be called to our attention first and foremost. The republic's economic situation is extremely

grave: more than a few unsolved problems have accumulated. The low standard of living, the social and consumer provision of the population, the one-sided, non-comprehensive development of production forces, the extremely hypertrophied economy, its great dependence upon other regions, reflected above all in the fact that the majority of foodstuffs and industrial goods are imported from other regions beyond the border, and primarily raw materials are exported from the republic. Despite all the measures being taken, the large army of people without jobs, the lack of work spaces is being reduced extraordinarily slowly. And we add to this the ecological crisis, the shortage of irrigated land and potable water.

Industrial enterprises and the nonproduction sphere are in an extremely neglected state. Great resources are needed to recreate them or to get them up to the level of current demands.

In addition, our national economy is linked with the Union enterprises by thousands of threads. Breaking these links means stopping many production lines, throwing people out on the street. One thing that is clear is that Uzbekistan today cannot deal alone with the problems it faces. Relying upon the cooperation and aid of other regions and the center, we must set for ourselves the task of securing first and foremost the republic's economic independence at the cost of the complete and effective utilization of our sufficient mineral, raw material, agricultural, and labor resources. We should direct our efforts above all to the construction of small, compact, modern enterprises to turn out finished products oriented toward people's residences, involving in this the leading domestic and foreign technology. We must find the necessary sources for the development of the spheres of culture, education, and people's everyday lives.

And, of course, to resolve the priority problem of training and retraining our cadres, our young men and women. Naturally, all of this will require time and great resources.

One of our principal conditions for reaching the goal set is to reach a state in which all the republic's riches and all the created production, scientific and technological potential must be the exclusive property of the republic. We must have an independent policy in the area of economic, social, and political links with foreign countries, coordinating the strategy of our actions with other republics and the Union as a whole. At the same time, based upon sensible ideas and contractual agreements, branches such as defense, space, nuclear research, communications, rail transportation, the air fleet and others obviously must be managed in conjunction with other republics or transferred to the management of the center.

There are also more than a few other principal issues on which we must make collective decisions. There have been noted today concrete movements toward a version of a document that would be most responsive toward the tasks of achieving the sovereignty of Uzbekistan within

the framework of the renewed federation. The generalized result of the joint work of the union and autonomous republics has been published in the press.

Our task is to conduct comprehensive explanatory work in order that each person residing in Uzbekistan, possessing full knowledge of the matter, have his own position in this issue of such fateful import to Uzbekistan.

Now, in view of the published draft treaty, everyone who votes on the referendum on 17 March can execute his duty of a citizen having a clearer concept of the Union on which he is going to vote. I have no doubt that the overwhelming majority of our population will express itself for the preservation of the Union.

For the purposes of preserving a precise and clear understanding of the essence of this issue, the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decided to introduce a supplemental ballot along with the confirmation of the union organs, in which the question was phrased thus: "Do you agree that Uzbekistan remain in the body of a renewed Union (Federation) as a sovereign, equal republic?"

That is exactly how the question stands today, as clearly and simply as possible.

Speaking of the referendum, there is just one question I would like to ask of those who are trying to agitate against it: "Do you have an alternative to what is proposed in the referendum ballot? Do you have something to offer the people today? Do you yourself understand the losses, destruction, collapse, opposition, blood, and human grief to which you summon people?"

All those trying to bring disturbance to people's consciences have in their own lives neither seen nor experienced anything, know neither economy nor politics, nor how the peasant [dekhkanin] nor worker lives today, but are prepared for the sake of their ambitions to sacrifice people's peace and calm, security, prosperity, and the future of our families and children.

Republic party committees and organizations must focus all their efforts on affirming in people's consciences the idea that a positive response to the referendum question constitutes perhaps the only chance to overcome interethnic strife and territorial claims, to ensure the defense of the rights and freedoms of each citizen, to resolve jointly the socioeconomic problems that are not within the power of each subject of the federation taken individually.

It must be convincingly explained that the destruction of the Union signifies a threat of legal chaos, the first manifestations of which we are already perceiving as the result of separatist aspirations, violations of economic and management relations. It is the renewed Union of sovereign independent republics that is the condition and guarantor of the free development of each of them.

I think it correct for us to adopt at the plenum today the Appeal to Communists, to the entirety of the republic's populace. We have expressed our position on this fundamental issue of today's political life. We have called upon everyone to make his choice on referendum day with the full awareness of the responsibility for the fate of the multiethnic state.

II.

We are right to ask ourselves today: What has been done over the past period to implement the directions of the Action Program adopted at the 22nd Congress?

The Supreme Soviet has adopted, and there are being realized republic laws on property, enterprises, entrepreneurship, on banks and banking activity, taxation and tax inspection. The system of higher executive power has been radically altered. Eight large national economic complexes have been organized; a number of republic ministries and departments have been recreated on a new basis; new concerns and associations have been created. A decree on new approaches to material technical supply has recently been adopted.

The USSR Gosbank Division has been transformed into the Uzbek SSR Central Bank, which together with the other republic banks will build its relations with banks of the union and other republics on a contractual basis. Commercial and shareholding banks will also be developed.

We have taken a firm course toward economic diversification, that is, toward a state where together with the republic state property, which must apply to the natural resources and base branches of the national economy, collective, stockholder, and private property must receive equal development.

Leasing relations in the majority of branches of the national economy and cooperatives have received further development. In stock breeding, today there number 6,200 peasant farms; 80 percent of those occupied in crop growing work under a leasing or family system.

While supporting and developing the idea of diversity within the economy of the APK [agro-industrial complex], we still feel that kolkhozes and sovkhoses remain the fundamental link of the agrarian sector at this moment. By transformation into alliances of lessors and stockholding societies, such economic conditions must be created as would manifest their potential opportunities to the utmost degree.

We propose that under Uzbekistan's conditions small, petty private enterprises under state control and operating within the framework of the law can assist in saturating the consumer market with goods and service, in involving the unemployed able-bodied population in social production. Under such conditions, not only would they not undermine social foundations, but on the contrary, would be genuinely assisting in the extrication from the economic crisis.

Unfortunately, even here, very little has been accomplished yet, except for the republic Ministry of Local Industry, which has developed a wide network of rayon industrial combines, branches, and shops. Why is this experience not being introduced in the Ministry of Light Industry (Comrade A.S. Ikramov) and other ministries, departments, and oblasts?

Presently, for the time being only 76 retail trade enterprises, 54 food enterprises, and 1,100 household services enterprises in the republic have been determined for privatization. In other words, it has become clear that the problem of privatization will not be solved forthwith. Ahead is serious work on the mechanism of its regulation. Strict state, worker, and peasant [dekhkanin] control is necessary in order for people of labor to receive the means of production.

As far as joint enterprises are concerned, even though their number and product output volume have doubled, they have had practically no effect on the republic's economy. The production output was R170 million. Out of 14 enterprises, approximately 90 percent of the production output volume went to the joint enterprises "Sovplastital," "Variant," and "Tashinterm." In all, the overwhelming volume of export remains, as previously, raw goods and materials.

A typical deficiency in the foreign economic activity of many enterprises and organization is the conclusion of contracts without analysis of market forecasts, pre-contract workups for studying similar proposals of competing firms and expert evaluation, and squandering hard currency. As a result, the purchase of equipment, technology, and other goods is frequently being done at inflated prices, without well-reasoned design and construction decisions, leading to the ineffective utilization of the purchases.

The main task today is to develop a well-reasoned strategy, relying upon the principal theses of our Action Program, and to consistently build up efforts to eliminate the disproportions that have come about, and the structural perestroika of the economy, having as its ultimate goal a move up to a qualitatively new level of production that ensures the output of competitive, well-finished products with maximal satisfaction of the demands of the republic's national economy and population.

We are aware that it is possible to move ahead in this direction only under conditions of high discipline, order, and stability in all spheres of our life. And the summations for 1990 show the correctness of putting the question this way.

Unlike many other regions, the growth of produced national income is preserved here. According to cost indexes, the republic fulfilled 98.5 percent of its obligations, while the Union, in relation to us, did so by 57-58 percent. Last year, in 1990, R7.3 billion of capital investments was assimilated along all sources of

financing, new major production capacities were introduced in the heat and energy, chemicals and timber, agro-industrial complexes and machine building.

There were no crop losses; it was harvested in optimal time periods. For the first time, it was not necessary to bring thousands of students and schoolchildren to the fields. The harvest was practically on the level of previous years, with a noticeable reduction of the cotton area.

Despite serious difficulties, we managed to resolve an entire range of issues of actually improving people's lives. The republic government has investigated the opportunity and directed toward the population's urgent social needs an additional R460 million from republic and local budgets. According to incomplete data, last year approximately 500,000 people got work; the per capita consumption levels for basic foodstuffs, meat, and milk grew.

Of course, all these figures are familiar to plenum participants; I cite them only to show once again what has been done to fulfill the pre-election platform of the Uzbek CP, the realization of its Action Program. The republic's communists are prepared to do their all so that words and deeds do not diverge, so that advancement be made on the path to economic sovereignty.

In summarizing the results of the analysis of the republic's socioeconomic situation, it should be noted that in Uzbekistan, even though individual signs of the economy's recovery have been noted, the effects of negative tendencies that have intensified during the 11th five-year-plan have not been completely overcome all the same. During the last year alone, basic funds of over R1 billion were not introduced. Out of 86 sites with a production designation, only 40 were introduced, and this means that we were missing a large quantity of planned new work spaces, and, as the calculations indicate, because of the disruption in the introduction of new capacities within the planned deadlines, we will have a shortfall in the national income of almost R500 million. As you can see, these are substantial losses!

And over the past year, the proportion of industry in oblasts with insufficient industrial development such as Surkhan Darya, Syr Darya, Namangan, Khorezm oblasts and the Karakalpak ASSR has not increased.

But after all, it is in these very regions that there are free labor resources, and a relatively low standard of living is observed among the population.

The situation is complicated by the store shelves that are becoming empty, and by the price increase. Against this backdrop, there are incidents of bribery and speculation taking place in the republic; all sorts of shadow dealers and racketeers have become active.

Naturally, more than a few objective reasons can be cited to explain this situation. It can be covered by the fact that this is how things are everywhere in the country

today; production relations are practically not functioning, material supply is incredibly bad, as are discipline and order in all echelons of the national economy. Yet that does not make it any easier for anyone, above all, for the people. For too long we have fed the people on promises, various plans and long-term prospects. Today we must all learn for certain that everything here is on the edge, it's just about to be lost. The only thing that will save the situation is the people's patience, its faith that we are controlling the situation, that we can see in the long term and that we are progressing consistently toward it, and that concern for people is our foremost task.

We have currently concluded intergovernmental economic accords with 12 republics, which will make possible direct provision for Uzbekistan's requirements in grain, lumber products, metal, consumer goods, and other products. The volume of deliveries and resources to the republic will be R9.8 billion in 1991. An export volume of approximately R9 billion is anticipated. The role of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan as suppliers of many types of products and resources will increase; their share in the import volume will increase from 25.8 percent to 36.6 percent in 1991. This is only one example of how it is possible to resolve concrete questions the economy's development. Contracts with brotherly republics will guarantee delivery of bread, meat, sugar, and other products. We will try not to allow a reduction in consumption during the current year.

Under modern conditions, with the general destabilization of the situation in the country, when, by all appearances, the peak of the crisis has not yet passed, there is no more important task for us than to not permit a sharp decline in the people's standard of living, nor social stratification of society.

It has been frequently stated that a special place is held by an increase in personal farm plots as a rapidly effective means of resolving a range of the most acute social problems—improving families' self-provision, market saturation, providing the unemployed segment of the population with earnings, and accelerating the realization of the housing problem. By reducing the area sown to cotton, over 180,000 hectares have been allocated to rural residents. Over 580,000 families have received farm plots; 932,000 families have expanded their strips. The large-scale sale of young livestock, poultry, and feed to the population has been organized.

Thanks to these measures, even in 1990, by comparison to the previous year, the gross production in the individual sector has increased by almost R300 million. By increasing the number and size of strips, a significant number of people have become involved in active labor activity, first and foremost in rural areas.

The expansion of personal farm plots is one of the most effective forms of development of independent peasant farms and the realization of the law on land reform.

under the conditions of the republic. The allocation of another 108,000 hectares for these is already planned in the current year.

Party organizations and communists should also show concern in the future for the improvement of citizens' farmsteads. Fruit and vegetable growing, subsidiary rural shops of industrial enterprises must receive further development.

Or take the problem gaining employment, which even previously had been exclusively acute here; what will the situation be like tomorrow? Judge for yourselves. During the past fiscal year, 437 enterprises and organizations functioned at a loss, with a significant number of them in the system of the former Goskoopkomselkhoz [State Cooperative Commission for Agriculture], (78); Minlegprom [Ministry of Light Industry], (17), and the Ministry of Construction (11). What will become of them? The market will not tolerate subsidies; many of them will be closed down, thus it is necessary to think through today the problem of employment and organization of the operation of a labor exchange.

We are principally opposed both to the interminable dragging out of the introduction of market relations and to the "shock policy" of propagating individual elements of the market with no consideration for the specifics and actual opportunities of the republic at each stage.

The most acute problem, which leaves no one indifferent, is the reform of retail prices being prepared, and the measures for protecting the population's standard of living associated with this reform.

The position of the republic's leadership is simple: First to resolve the issues of compensating income for people, then to go on to increasing prices. We are troubled by the status of those who live on their salaries: teachers, doctors, trainees, invalids and pensioners. Until a compensation method is worked out, there will be no increase in prices. This is simple.

The basic approaches to resolving these complex questions within the condition of the republic have been reviewed at the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet. In addition, I would like to pause on two aspects.

The first. The issue of the sources of funds and resources for the undisrupted functioning of the population's social support system. It seems necessary to act in several directions here.

The resources of enterprises must be activated as a means of their direct participation in the social support of their labor collectives, as well as through the mechanism of taxation. The build-up of the volume of these resources is impossible without raising the profit margin of enterprises, and consequently, without a resolute elimination of the vestiges of the administrative-command system that are hampering the independent and effective work of the fundamental production link.

The second. The budget undoubtedly remains the basic source for the resolution of social problems. For 1991, it has been formed on the basis of principally new approaches. This has been done on the basis of the declaration adopted by the 3rd Session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, as well as stemming from the need for the population's social defense under the conditions of price reform.

Under these conditions the expenditure portion of the State Budget is growing sharply, two-fold by comparison to 1990. This is associated with the increase in expenditures for social-cultural measures, which suppose a further increase in the salaries of workers in this sphere, stipends, pensions, and other payments to the population. The amounts of the budget allocation to the national economy will grow substantially, connected in large part to the fact that the difference in prices for all the foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials we use will be reimbursed by the republic.

In order to ensure such expenditures, totally new items will be introduced in the income portion of the budget. First of all, it is necessary to note that the issue of transferring a portion of income received from products produced outside of the republic from raw material resources that we have exported has been resolved by us and the union organs. This comprises approximately R10.7 billion. Moreover, new incomes are being introduced, such as the sales tax, the 11 percent deduction from the salary fund, 20 percent from amortized deductions, the land tax, and others.

Despite the prospecting for substantial sums of additional income, the State Budget for 1991 is very strained. The task of defending the workers' interests and satisfying their needs forces us to consciously move toward excessively high expenditures. We have therefore not managed to avoid a nondeficit budget; the deficit total has been determined to be R1.9 billion, or 7.45 percent of the total of all expenditures.

Such a situation requires of us communists, party committees, soviet and executive organs of all levels great responsibility in searching for and mobilizing internal reserves. This can be achieved first and foremost on the basis of a build-up of the volumes of products produced, strict economy of material, labor, and financial resources, and developing new forms of economic relations.

In completing the discussion of our practical steps in the resolution of socioeconomic problems, I would like to emphasize the following once again. We oppose harsh centralization, but our platform is firm political power, firm order with complete breakage of economic fetters. Only under these conditions can we provide people's social defense during the transition to a market, create reliable guarantees of life and security, and increase the prestige of the republic as a sovereign economic partner on the internal and foreign markets.

III.

The crisis phenomena in the economy, in the consumer market and the exacerbation of the opposition of political powers in the country are having a direct influence on the sociopolitical and moral-psychological situation in the republic.

The activity of our political opponents hardly serves for stabilization; speculating on actual difficulties, they continue the attacks on the Uzbek CP, they attempt to form in the public conscience an image of communists as a political force incapable of providing a breakthrough in the economy, in spiritual renewal, in the republic's acquisition of political sovereignty, in the radical improvement of the conditions of the people's life.

This is why the propagandistic, mass political work in the activity of party committees is coming to the forefront under today's conditions. The formation of positive public opinion on the goals and tasks of the Uzbek CP, formulated in our Action Program, must become the main content of this activity.

During the period after the congress, party committees conducted certain work in this trend. Obkom, gorkom, and raykom plenums considered the priority tasks. The congress delegates, members of the elected organs, and the ideological aktiv were involved in explicating the documents.

This work, however, frequently bore the mark of a short-term campaign, and in many ways did not achieve its purposes.

The Central Committee Buro became convinced of this on the eve of the plenum upon examining the activity of the Khorezm party obkom concerning the propaganda and explanation of the decisions of the congress. Conversations with people indicated that they had a weak understanding of the Program's statutes, and were poorly informed of the practical affairs of the party organs. In addition, it became clear that even more than a few party workers did not have a very profound mastery of the party program documents. Thus it is not coincidental that the new approaches to the resolution of socioeconomic tasks, the spiritual renewal of society laid in the Action Program have not been given the necessary embodiment in the region.

To one extent or another, these shortcomings are typical of other oblast party organizations as well. The conclusion is natural that there have not yet been substantive movements in ideological work; as previously, it frequently does not correspond to the demands of today, and consequently does not find a response among people.

This is why we must focus attention on increasing the efficacy of ideological work, insuring maximal exploitation of the opportunities of the recently created Uzbek CP Central Committee Scientific Research Institute for Sociopolitical Problems, the Central Committee and

party obkom sociopolitical centers for regular research and analysis of the phenomena and processes taking place in society, conducting sociological polls, and compiling predictions. Relying upon this work, we must react to the changing situation with flexibility, altering the tactics of political work among the population.

We must direct particular attention to the inculcation of morality, the rebirth of national holidays and traditions, and the training of highly-qualified cadres. The first steps in this direction have already been taken. Jubilee measures dedicated to the 550th anniversary of Alisher Navoi are taking place with the direct participation of party organs; the preparation for the national holiday of Navruz is unfolding everywhere.

The Eastern Studies Institute has been formed on the basis of the Eastern and Philosophical-Economic Faculties of TashGU [Tashkent State University]; the Fergana Pedagogical Institute has been transformed into a university. A commission under the Uzbek SSR Cabinet of Ministers has been formed for the coordination of the training of scientific, engineering, and administrative cadres. A new course, the "History of the Peoples of Uzbekistan," has been introduced in the republic's technical institutions of higher education.

A group of young scholars we had sent as interns recently returned from the United States, Canada, FRG [as received] and Belgium. The practice of sending people to the leading scientific and academic centers of the country and the world will be expanded. By April of this year, about 100 republic students who have passed testing will go to the U.S., and 10 student will bring the academic year in leading universities of that country. Within the framework of the program for the search, training, and education of gifted children, eight special boarding school have already been opened, and another five are planned to open this year.

Yet there are also sufficient unsolved problems. In the pre-election platform of the Uzbek CP, which served as the starting point for our Action Program, there were plans to open in 1990 home kindergartens to accommodate 100,000 children, but to this day we have managed to create only somewhat more than 8,000 spaces. Also envisaged by 1993 is an annual reduction by 90,000 of the number of students studying there for the elimination of condemned but still functional schools. But in reality, over 2 years we have just managed to reach 80,000. As we see, the bulk of the work lies ahead. And it is the communists heading the local soviets, working in the area of education, science, and culture who must above all become imbued with the importance of these problems.

The religious factor, the processes of improving state-church relations is taking up an ever more noticeable place in public life. The new law: "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" has been adopted; the preparation of the republic law is close to

completion, and hundreds of previously closed mosques have been returned to the faithful.

It is impossible, however, not to see something else as well. We speak above all about the attempts to create religious-political parties on the basis of Islam; as assessed by an absolute majority of the most faithful these offer society nothing other than a schism among people. However, in their work the republic party organs and ideological institutions lag behind the events taking place. The religious situation in the Fergana valley, Syr Darya and Tashkent oblasts bears witness to most serious miscalculations in this sphere.

Nor can the broad dissemination received recently by the training of young men and women in religious dogmas in the mosques leave us indifferent. And it does not trouble the party committee, nor public education organs that these lessons are not infrequently taking place during school time, to the detriment of general educational training, and that they are even sometimes taught by just anyone.

There is no doubt that we should develop cooperation with religious organizations in the cause of confirming common human values and morals. At the same time we must form in the public conscience an understanding that in recognizing the role of religion in culture, it is impermissible to bring spiritual rebirth down to the religious side alone. Without a genuine revolution in culture and art, bringing the broad masses, particularly youth, to the world of art, literature, architecture, and music, there can be no true spiritual rebirth of a nation.

All these tasks are closely connected with the conduct of a logical **national policy**, the basic principals of which are formulated in the Action Program of the republic's communists.

The first steps undertaken in this direction indicate that the line selected by the communists for the harmonization of interethnic relations, development of historically based international traditions of the Uzbek and other peoples populating the republic enjoys the broad support of the populace and is a factor of no small significance for the stabilization of the situation. The "Appeal" adopted by the 3rd session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet at the initiative of the communist deputies resounded positively; it calls for a decisive halt to interethnic strife, nationalism, and chauvinism, for a respectful attitude toward and defense of the constitutional rights of each person regardless of nationality.

In accordance with the goals outlined in the Action Program, a definite system of managing the processes taking place in the sphere of interethnic relations is formed. There are functioning in the apparatus of the president of the Uzbek SSR the Central Committee commission, the Central Committee department of national policy, the department of interethnic relations. Purposeful work for the creation of analogous structures in local soviets of people's deputies is being conducted.

We assign great significance to the creation of a republic international cultural center, the transformation of the current Museum of the Friendship of the Peoples into the House of Friendship of the Peoples of the Uzbek SSR. All of this is a concrete step in the coordination of activity, the unification of efforts in the resolution of the common tasks of the 40 national cultural centers operating within the territory of the republic.

I would like to confer with the Central Committee members about one more important issue. I speak of the Tashkent Branch of the Central V.I. Lenin Museum. Over the 20 years of its existence, it has played an important role in the propaganda of the theoretical legacy of Marxism-Leninism, and the activity of the Uzbek CP during all its stages.

At the same time, it is obvious today that due to its inherent specifications, the museum is limited in its possibilities. There exists a persistent demand for its profound reorganization, an expansion of its functions as a political, scientific, historical-cultural institution. In this regard, attention and support is merited by the proposal of a number of Uzbekistan's scholars for the unification of the Branch of the Central V.I. Lenin Museum with the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Museum of the History of the Peoples of Uzbekistan, the creation on their basis of a principally new Museum of the History and Friendship of the Peoples of the Uzbek SSR. As an expression of the sense of gratitude of the Uzbek people toward the founder of our party and state it is proposed that the museum being created be given the name of V.I. Lenin.

This measure is aimed above all at expanding the exposition of the museum, fortifying it in the scientific sense and making it a center for educating the growing generation in the best international traditions of the peoples of Uzbekistan.

Party committees, communists in soviets and administrative organs must pay particular attention to the formation of the legal culture of interethnic relations. In the meantime, the issue of the course of the realization of the law on the state language has shown that not even all the leaders know the status of the law. Extremes are frequently encountered in the provinces; the principle of phased introduction is not being observed, and the preparatory work for the planned resolution of the tasks stemming from the law is being conducted poorly. The issue of stable financial support has not yet been resolved.

In the Action Program, communists have defined with the utmost clarity their readiness to cooperate with all constructive forces. The Communist Party's support for the Uzbek SSR Law on Public Associations is an affirmation of this.

However, no constructive dialogue has come about as yet. The populist position taken up by a number of leaders of new sociopolitical movements is, of course, very convenient and simple: make promises, criticize,

present the official organs with problems and by doing so, earn yourself imaginary authority without having to do practically anything.

You could say that this is a no-lose position: if any questions are solved, you've been of service; if they aren't, you can say, we brought them up, but the bureaucrats aren't solving them.

We must all understand a simple truth: It doesn't matter who raises an issue first, but rather how to most quickly solve the problems that have long since become urgent and painful for our republic and people. And issues such as ensuring genuine sovereignty, the elimination of the cotton monoculture, the confirmation of the state language, increasing the population's standard of living, providing people with a life that befits them—this is a common human task from which no one may stand apart.

The fundamental thing for us today is concrete work. And we invite everyone who wishes to work for the good of his people to joint action.

Far from all party committees are taking up a principled position under these conditions. The recent examination by the Central Committee Buro of the issue of the work of the Samarkand party obkom with amateur politicized citizen associations showed that the oblast party organization did not work out a system of interaction with them, did not give a principled political assessment, and did not show the proper opposition to the extremist and anti-legal actions of individual representatives of the informal movements.

It seems that it is likewise time for the primary party organizations to review their position with regard to communists participating in the activity of sociopolitical movements which take a position irreconcilable or negative with regard to the party position. Enough of their sitting on two chairs and waiting out which one to take. Simultaneously, we should concentrate our basic work on the ones who are vacillating, the ones who have fallen under the influence of the euphoria of nihilism, who in the depths of their souls understand that it can lead to no good, and who doubt the correctness of the actions and sincerity of their leaders.

The mass information media have done much that is useful to explain the essence and profound sense of the decisions worked out by the congress over the time that has passed since its second stage.

The republic party press, however, has not made best use of its potential opportunities. Many of its addresses are of a general, declarative nature. The publicistic level of the materials concerning topical issues in the area of interethnic relations and international education is not high. They frequently lack ideological and conceptual clarity, restraint, and tact toward adversity of viewpoints.

The stabilization of the the situation and the strengthening of order and discipline in all spheres depends to a significant degree on conducting an active legal policy. A special role and responsibility in this is entrusted to the manager-communists in the procuracy organs, MVD, Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the republic State Arbitration.

With the understanding that there is a breakup of stereotyping and old approaches in the law enforcement organs, it is not desirable that these processes put the intensification of the fight against crime in the background.

In areas where party committees have principally been in the forefront on these issues and have established precise interactions with soviet and law enforcement organs, labor collectives, and are skillfully relying upon the public there is proof of positive movements, stabilization of the situation and even a reduction of crime overall.

At the same time, this has not yet happened in Andizhan, Bukhara, Syr Darya oblasts, where the greatest growth in crime, including the serious forms, has been permitted. The situation in the republic's capital and in Tashkent Oblast remains complex; here there are 40 percent general and 45 percent serious offenses.

The position of individual leaders who always emphasize that the crime level in Uzbekistan is far lower than in the Union does not suit the party Central Committee. Such a position generates apathy, a mood of dependency and complacency.

IV.

Comrades!

For us, a new situation arises in light of the adoption of the Uzbek SSR Law on Public Associations. The issue of the registration of the Uzbek CP Charter has practically been translated into a commonplace.

Why does this issue arise?

On the one hand, it was announced at the unified Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and TsKK held in late January that in accordance with the USSR law "On Public Associations," the CPSU as a single all-union public association must register its charter with a state organ, the USSR Ministry of Justice. It was noted at the plenum that this act would touch upon all party structures, including the republic Communist Party.

However, in accordance with point 22 of the all-party charter, as well as the Action Program and the charter adopted at the second phase of the 22nd Congress of the republic communists, the Uzbek CP today is an independent political organization of a sovereign republic, for which the Uzbek SSR law stipulates mandatory registration of the charter with the Ministry of Justice.

The judicial recognition of the Uzbek CP opens for the republic's communists new opportunities to strengthen their influence in society.

The Uzbek SSR Law on Public Associations stipulates that members of the leading party organ be the applicants for the registration of the charter, doing so with their own names. If the Central Committee members have no objections, it would be possible at this plenum to endow the members of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro with the appropriate authority.

With its ranks numbering over 658,000 communists, the Uzbek CP today is the most massive political organization of the republic. Our program goals and the practical actions of communists for their realization enjoy broad support among the majority of the workers and population. Under these conditions, the impending registration of our charter will permit more complete use of the legal opportunities to bring the policy of the Communist Party to life.

Important meaning must be assigned today to increasing the capability of the primary party organizations. The charter allocates them broad authority; they have received all the opportunities to become independent. The zone seminars conducted by the party organization secretary have made possible a substantive analysis of the state of internal party life.

The party committees of Tashkent, Bukhara, Fergana, and other oblasts have recently taken steps to expand the network of territorial party organizations, to strengthen them by uniting small organizations operating with a single territory, such as, for example, the party organization of the kishlak [village] soviet, schools, other institutions and production subunits. The practice of placing communist leaders of administrative organs and party members who are people's deputies on permanent or temporary registration in the territorial party organizations is being expanded.

For example, the makhalli [neighborhood] party organizations in Kirovskiy and Chilandzarkiy rayons of the city of Tashkent, in the city of Karman, Novoiyskiy Rayon, and the village of Kokayka, Dzharkurganskiy Rayon are already manifesting themselves actively. They act as initiators for the resolution of such burning issues as youth employment, the creation of new work spaces, and setting up new land parcels; they organize work to support within the territory public order, and the international and legal education of the population, particularly among adolescents.

Naturally, all of this is just the first experiment. We intend in the near future to review in the Central Committee the issue of increasing the efficacy of the party organizations' residence-based work, adding to it a more goal-oriented aspect. This is elicited by the need to encompass all spheres of production and public life, particularly in those sectors which until recently had been outside party influence. We speak first and foremost of the activation of communists' political work

among the populace, where, to be frank, we are still frequently giving ground to the position of the informal associations, ministers' regions.

The primary party organizations should be given comprehensive assistance by members of the Uzbek CP Central Committee and obkoms and local party organs, particularly those which as a result of the single-minded purposefulness of anti-reform activities are now on the verge of collapse and elimination. With the necessity of re-registering such organizations, measures should be taken to strengthen them, directing the most principled and responsible communists for work within them.

Order must be brought to those party echelons in which the demands of the party charter are being violated. Communists themselves are obligated to do this with the assistance of city and rayon party committees, striving that the strict execution of the charter become the everyday norm.

The party gorkoms and raykoms themselves must begin to work more actively. This key link of the party has shown its viability and activity during the most crucial periods. Under the action conditions of the new charter, their role in strengthening the party organizations, in the creative renewal of all the organizational and political work among the workers and population will grow significantly.

Together with the primary party organizations, they bear the fundamental responsibility for new party reinforcement and fortification of the party ranks.

Almost 4,600 people have been accepted into the party since the beginning of the current year, which is noticeably more than last year. That is, the first reassuring signs have appeared that after a certain confusion, the primary party organizations, party gorkoms and raykoms have noticeably increased their activity in this direction. To a certain extent, this is evidence of the growth of interest toward the party, the workers' aspirations to join its ranks.

At the same time, the urgency of the situation with the departure of communists from the party ranks has not abated. The situation in effect has not changed since the adoption in November of last year of the well-known Central Committee resolution for the Bukhara and Tashkent oblast party organizations. The assessments given in that resolution retain their full force.

Under the new political conditions, the responsibility of the party committees for strengthening party discipline, the creative renewal of all organizational and political work among the workers and populace is growing significantly. At the same time, the state of affairs in the provinces indicates that the work style and methods of a number of party obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms are still lagging behind the demands being expressed.

Evidence of this is the heavy stream of visitors to the Central Committee who are concerned with issues that

can and must be resolved in the provinces. People are indignant with the noninterference position of the local organs of power regarding shadow economy dealers, the lack of an effective fight against speculation and corruption, and the undemanding and unprincipled stand toward officials who abuse their positions. The incapacity of party and soviet leaders to deal with the situation, to objectively and knowledgeably resolve the issues of land and water use, territorial division, and setting up personal farm plots is bringing many of these visitors to the Central Committee.

Recent events in the city of Namangan revealed serious miscalculations in the work of the Namangan party obkom (comrade B.Zh. Khakimov). Their tragic outcome is not a concatenation of circumstances, as some imagine. The main thing is the profound connivance and the lack of principles in the party committees, the oblast and city leadership and law enforcement organs. This is their advances toward destructive forces, fanatical elements, a lack of analysis of the processes taking place in public life. This is a shaky and illogical position with regard to the representatives of the shadow economy, indecision in the fight against speculation. In the final analysis, this is a serious dereliction in cadre work.

In the Tashkent party obkom we recently had a serious discussion of increasing the responsibility of leader-communists for strengthening the discipline and vanguard role of the party organizations.

It is necessary for these and other party committees to more decisively awaken from their organizational hibernation, to start to work at full strength, relying upon the aktiv, communists, and the grass roots party echelons. The oblast echelon of the Uzbek CP must display fully its potential in the resolution of the tasks defined by the Action Program of the republic's communists.

The Uzbek CP Charter makes high demands upon the communists elected people's deputies of the USSR, Uzbek SSR and local soviets, and those nominated by party organization to positions of leadership and responsibility. With all their activity, they must justify the trust shown in them, be active champions of party policy, take a principled position in issues related to improving the life of the workers and the populace, and the defense of their social interests.

The party committees must strive as resolutely as possible to see to it that these charter demands are observed steadfastly.

More attention must be given to the formation of an effective reserve of cadres. Now, under the conditions of a transition to market relations and the organization of new structures for managing the national economy, we are feeling an acute shortage of experienced, qualified, new-thinking leaders.

And more on an aspect that concerns cadre training. The party obkoms know that a principally new educational

institution, the Political Science and Administration Institute, [Institute politologii i upravleniya] has been created on the basis of the abolished Tashkent Higher Party School and the Republic Interbranch Institute for raising the qualifications of leading workers and specialists.

At present, institute's office of the dean, together with Central Committee departments and the Cabinets of Ministers under the Uzbek SSR President are determining the number of the proposed student body and the terms for accepting them into the faculties. Appropriate suggestions will be sent to the party obkoms, whose task it is to approach the selection of candidates for students of the Political Science and Administration Institute informally, with the understanding that the future republic lies in these still young people.

In a word, the situation taking shape requires of the party committees and organizations that they activate their cadre work, and utilize to the utmost the party cadre corps to resolve the tasks presented by the 22nd Uzbek CP Congress.

Finally, concerning the financial basis of the Communist Party. The Central Committee members have been given a detailed document on our party budget. To put it briefly, our income has decreased sharply and in spite of the wide-scale reduction of the party apparatus, we have not managed to balance the budget. Subsidies from the CPSU insurance fund amount to R32.7 million this year. That is, over 40 percent of our expenses are being covered, for the time being, from this hardly unlimited source. We can permit ourselves this only one year.

That is why we need firm financial discipline, an active search for resources to replenish the party till, all the more so since our monetary expenditures will grow even more with the transition to the market.

Taking into consideration that the resources for maintaining the apparatus of all party committees are being significantly reduced, it is necessary to pay increased attention to the development of the public sources in party work. The commissions of party committees must begin to work in full force, and the soviets of the secretary of primary organizations have already recommended themselves in many rayons and cities.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize once again that all the dramatic activity of the republic's communists must constantly bear witness to the fact that the Uzbek CP has no interests other than the interests of the people. Using the status of the ruling party, our authority in society, we must firmly and consistently conduct the outlined course toward strong state power, the strengthening of discipline and order, providing civil peace, social justice, worthy living conditions for every person, and spiritual renewal of the peoples of the republic on the basis of achieving the political and economic sovereignty of the Uzbek SSR. No one should have the slightest doubt about this.

CPSU CC Commission on Ethnic Issues Sits*PA12604144591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2*

[Yu. Shabanov report: "What Is Behind the Declarations? From a Sitting of a CPSU Central Committee Standing Commission"]

[Text] Interethnic relations constitute the melting pot in which not so much ethnic as political passions seethe today. It is indeed a diabolical brew since it involves human blood and life itself. It has not hitherto proved possible in any way to halt the boiling process now begun. And some people are deliberately adding fuel to the fire beneath the pot, nurturing their political ambitions.

How can the passions be appeased and interethnic relations made to follow a normal civilized path? This was discussed at a sitting of the CPSU Central Committee Standing Commission on Nationalities Policy chaired by A. Girenko, CPSU Central Committee secretary. The problems raised this time were, so to speak, among the most thorniest. How are the republics' legislative acts on sovereignty being implemented and do they ensure human rights? Is the mechanism for defending ethnic minorities in organs of power and management reliable?

Speaking about the extensive sovereignization process that has not even bypassed what were autonomous entities (17 out of 20 have declared themselves union republics), M. Aliyev, first secretary of Dagestan republic party committee, first singled out the positive elements. They reside in the fact that the declarations of sovereignty formed a basis for the draft Treaty on the Union of Sovereign Republics and created the preconditions for formulating new constitutions, a system of laws, and steps to defend human rights and national interests and restructure the economy.

But, like any process, sovereignization is notable for being extremely contradictory. Separatism, nationalism, and extremism have reared up amid the legitimate expression of the peoples' will. There is no end to attempts to exploit the idea of sovereignty not for consolidation but in order to step up the war of laws, seize power for oneself, and violate the rights of speakers of another language.

Separatist activity on the part of the leadership in the Baltics, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova has already had sorry results. It is no accident that it is in these areas that seats of tension are flaring up.

Sovereignty for autonomous entities presents a particular problem. There are considerable difficulties involved in their exercising sovereignty in practice. For instance, certain provisions of the declarations they have adopted are "frozen" in the absence of the Union and federative treaties.

"The Russian leadership is playing with fire in toying with autonomous formations," B. Zumakulov, first secretary of Kabardino-Balkar republic party committee, commented. "First, we were incited to adopt acts on sovereignty and we then seem to have been brushed aside."

The sovereignization process is closely linked with the defense of the rights of ethnic minorities and the indigenous and nonindigenous population.

The discussion of the mechanism of protection proved quite acute altogether. V. Khishba, first secretary of Abkhaz Georgian Communist Party Obkom [Oblast Party Committee], advocated setting up bicameral parliaments in all republics inhabited by various nationalities with the introduction of a set quota (up to 50 percent) for an indigenous nation that does not form the majority of the total population and the right of veto where its interests are concerned. He met with the objection that such steps will only exacerbate ethnic relations and create plenty of deadlocks within organs of power. In short, a mechanism for protecting the rights of ethnic minorities and speakers of another language requires—and all participants in the sitting agreed on this—further work with consideration for the specific features of the country's regions.

Of interest here is the experience of those party organizations that have gotten down to practical work and done a great deal to meet the social and cultural requests of ethnic minorities and establish good-neighborly relations between various nations. The work of party committees in Uzbekistan, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Moscow, and Tyumen was cited as an example...

The recommendations formulated at the permanent commission's sitting indicate that party committees should clearly explain the interconnection between the declarations of sovereignty and the new Union Treaty, which will help extend the boundaries of sovereignization and suggest a concrete program for defending national minorities. Moreover, party organizations should actively set about preparing and discussing the new Union and republic constitutions today.

State Panel Examines Repatriation of Crimean Tatars*PA12405101591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
24 May 91 First Edition p 2*

[TASS report: "State Commission Continues Its Work"]

[Text] How are the Crimean Tatars to be helped to return to their historical motherland? This question continues to be of concern to the country's public and leadership. A scheduled session of the State Commission for Problems of the Crimean Tatar People, held in Moscow 23 May, was devoted to specific ways to resolve it. It was held under the chairmanship of USSR First Deputy Prime Minister V.Kh. Doludkevich.

The commission took account of information from the State Planning Committee and other state structures in the Ukraine on the progress in fulfilling the USSR Council of Ministers resolution defining priority measures to return representatives of this people to the Crimea. It was pointed out that soviet and economic organs in the republic and the Crimean autonomous entity have done much work over the past 10 months, and the targets are mainly being fulfilled. However, work is still being held up by an acute shortage of material and technical resources.

The commission examined a draft resolution on additional measures for the social protection of Crimean Tatars returning to the Crimea. After finalization it will be submitted to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers for approval.

The commission members went back yet again to the draft state program of the return. In this connection they heard a report from the USSR State Committee for Statistics on the size of the country's Crimean Tatar population. According to amplified data, 350,000 people have confirmed that they belong to this nationality. The comments made during the discussion of the draft program will be taken into account in subsequent work on the document.

State Committee Meets on Crimean Tatars' Return

*LD2405032991 Moscow TASS in English 1146 GMT
23 May 91*

[Text] Moscow May 23 TASS—A regular meeting by the state commission on Crimean Tatars, which was held in Moscow today, discussed how to help Crimean Tatars return to their historic homeland. The meeting was chaired by First Deputy Prime Minister Vitaliy Doguzhiyev.

The commission heard information from several Ukrainian government departments on progress in the implementation of a decision by the Soviet Government, which defined priority measures concerning the return of Crimean Tatars.

It was pointed out that Ukrainian appropriate departments have done much over the ten months. The targets are being implemented. However, work is hampered by a shortage of material and technical resources.

The commission examined a draft decision on additional measures for social protection of Crimean Tatars returning to the Crimea. After some improvement, the document will be submitted to the government for approval.

The commission heard a report by the Soviet statistical committee on the number of Crimean Tatars. According to the latest data, 350,000 people confirmed that they are ethnic Crimean Tatars.

Lukyanov Addresses Journalists' Congress: Answers Questions

91UN1409A Moscow GOLOS in Russian
No 6, 9-15 Feb 91 p 2

[Excerpts from speech of Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to the delegates of the Seventh Congress of the USSR Union of Journalists on 6 February 1991 in Moscow, followed by his answers to questions: "Journalists Bear the Greatest Responsibility for What They Provide the People"]

[Text] One of my comrades (in the creative union) confessed a weakness for alcohol. Trying to vindicate himself, he said that all geniuses of art loved to drink—Pushkin, Mayakovskiy, Yessenin, Beethoven, Mozart. Creativity required this. And then someone asked: I would like to know—what is it Mozart drank? Mikhail Arkadyevich Svetlov replied: "Mozart drank what Salieri gave him."

Every comparison suffers from inaccuracy. But it seems to me that right now our people are drinking that which has been to a significant degree provided them by our journalist, our television reporter, and our editor. Yes, perhaps the comparison is inaccurate. But we know that the drug which listener and viewer feed upon consists of the herbs which sprout up in society. I fully reject the idea that journalists are nothing but Salieris, stirring up emotion in society. This would be a slander on the corps of journalists. You, our journalists, bear responsibility for what you give the people, the greatest responsibility. What are you delivering? A medicine for uniting society, or a poison? And I would very much like you to thoroughly understand this responsibility, so that your work might proceed well.

What am I to tell you, the most communicative people outside of USSR people's deputies?

I arrived at the conclusion, that if I were to say something, that it would concern two things—the position taken by journalists and the responsibility of journalists.

Our country has now reached the sharpest peak of social tension, and you—representatives from the localities—feel this straightaway. Journalists have to determine their position. Yes, you are creativity-oriented employees, but you need a very precise, very accurate, very rigid position, in order to work for the renewal of our socialist system.

We are talking about the role of public property and diverse forms of ownership, and about how these correlate.

We are talking about de-state-ization and approaches to it.

We are talking about the destiny of Soviet power and the Soviet system—what kind of organs should our structures of authority be? Is the Soviet system to be preserved, or will it be replaced by a parliamentary municipal system? Journalists must have a clear and precise position on these fundamental issues.

We are talking about the fate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There is no problem more pressing than this. We hear its echoes from the platform of the Congress of Journalists as well.

Journalists must also have an accurate and well-aligned position with respect to the problems of democracy, glasnost, responsibility for and defense of human rights, no matter where people live, no matter what their nationality. And we must first of all protect the rights of the working individual, because it is through this individual's heart that the most difficult, the most complicated problems are today passing. We must not forget this. Whatever problem is being resolved—a political issue that is all-Union in scope or a republic issue—we must think about the working individual, through whose soul, heart, and mind pass the complex social processes linked to trust and lack of trust, to his future, to his confidence in tomorrow.

Another item I would like to discuss is the need for journalists to show the greatest responsibility for what they write, what they broadcast over radio and television. I am referring to the degree to which a position taken has been thought out.

According to my data, more than 20,000 newspapers are already registered, of which about 400, perhaps more, are private. Amid such an abundance of mass media, it is extremely important not only that their rights be protected, but also that they bear strict responsibility for what is published on the pages of mass and limited-circulation publications, and even privately owned publications. But we are showered with published material of every possible bent—from monarchist to anarchist, from highly cultural to pseudo-cultural or even anti-cultural. It seems to me, therefore, that the question of responsibility presents itself with the greatest criticality. It is especially crucial when we are talking about interethnic relations. Here journalists must be 100, 200, 1,000 times more cautious in what they present. The central press and central television must be more cautious. Every day I sense how each word that appears in central press organs exerts an influence on interethnic relations.

I was sent the newspaper MOLODOY IVERIYETS from Georgia. There is nothing in it except the inflammation of ethnic passions, anti-Russian and anti-Soviet. I would say, pronouncements. If this is how the press is going to be, then it will bear (and has already borne!) a significant share of the responsibility for those interethnic feuds we have seen taking place in the country. Thoroughly reasoned judgment, responsibility, exactingness of oneself—this is what journalists particularly need.

It is about this responsibility, and not about repealing or suspending the Law on the Press—that discussion took place at the latest session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. And the Supreme Soviet has the right to decide what the president proposed. You can think the problem over. And that's all there is to it! But some people had to inflame the issue, had to shoot all their arrows against the president as if he were initiating not just suspension, but overall repeal of the Law on the Press.

I do not believe that those who are inflaming such passions fail to understand what they are doing. Every honest journalist who read the minutes of the Supreme Soviet session or saw the televised transmission will say it is not so. And I can state that a directive was issued in fact to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and to the Committee on Glasnost and Citizens' Rights and Appeals to study the question of increasing objectivity in the reflection of events as portrayed in the mass media, and the question of responsibility according to the Law on the Press. We have been receiving a tremendous amount of mail, proposals, and statements from citizens on this subject.

It was proposed that the committee first discuss a number of questions and draw up recommendations on the results of registering the mass media and on the practice of applying the Law on the Press. It has become increasingly necessary that we have a special Law on Publishing Activity. No one has any intention of either repealing or suspending the Law on the Press. This must function with provision not only for the rights of the mass media, but for their publishing responsibility to the people as well.

The journalist corps, let us be frank, lacks rudimentary tact, a sense of responsibility and, at times, simple decency. We have even stopped reflecting about the fact that personnel in state radio and television broadcasting, commentators and journalists of budgeted magazines and newspapers, receive their salary from the state treasury, yet they blast the state and society, which it would seem they should be serving, at times even with a kind of enjoyment. They say that the person who pays calls the tune. Sometimes with us, the person who pays is unable to order. We must speak to this directly.

If someone disagrees, I will not press it. They have asked me to discuss this question and so I give you my position.

I would like to say something about the unity of journalists. Culture serves to unite the Union and the journalist corps must constantly be engaged in this. The journalists' union must become the connecting link of our great Union—the tremendous achievement of our people. Yes, yours must be a renewed creative union, but no matter what organizational form it selects, you must make every effort to consolidate unity.

It is also very important that the documents of your congress reflect the unity of journalists, their professional assistance and support, so that the state is made

aware of it. It is important, on the principled basis of responsibility before the people, to develop clear and precise positions.

This is very important in connection with the fact that discussion is taking place in the country on the unification of all patriotic and democratic forces in order to prevent the splitting of society, to contain our revolution of renewal on peaceful shores. There is no more important a task.

As chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, I am required to work with all trends, parties, fronts, and religious movements. It is the position of the center—which fate itself has positioned—to consolidate all patriotic and democratic forces in the country. And we are relying on the support of the press, not antagonism from it.

All the same, I wish to repeat once again that in the final analysis, everything will depend on the position taken by journalists and their union, on the responsibility of each of us and of the union in general.

I have no intention of admonishing you. I am not foisting my own point of view upon anyone. But if someone really wants to announce that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet supposedly came to give advice to the Congress of Journalists, he will simply take the blame upon himself. I have believed, and continue to believe, that at a critical moment of our history each individual is obliged to thoroughly scrutinize the world which surrounds us, to honestly weigh causes and consequences and draw conclusions just as honestly, assume his share of the responsibility, bear his share of the burden for such difficult times and for the resolution of problems we are facing. I repeat—each one of us!

A.I. Lukyanov responded to numerous questions. We present his responses here to a few of them.

[Question] At whose initiative was the survey conducted of members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet with respect to the dismissal of Golembiovskiy, first deputy editor-in-chief of IZVESTIYA?

[Lukyanov] There was no survey. We are talking about regular voting here, which is conducted in various forms in the Supreme Soviet Presidium. He is the publisher of IZVESTIYA. We conferred with the collective about the appointment of the editor-in-chief and the first deputy, carefully considered the candidates, listened to the opinion of the collective, and only then made a decision. But in the delicate environment, some people found they had to turn an internal editorial-staff matter into a political issue, had to organize public pressure. Presidium members still have not managed to vote, yet certain of the mass media are already announcing the "news." Yes, I had thorough discussions with Nikolay Ivanovich Yefimov, and with Igor Nesterovich Golembiovskiy, and with representatives from the IZVESTIYA collective, with the party organization secretary, and

with the chairman of the trade union organization. Things were discussed constructively and quite calmly with the leaders of the chambers. With Yefimov and Golembiovskiy we calmly discussed how to preserve the image of the newspaper, its unique style, and its historical traditions. We discussed these same problems with Stanislav Nikolayevich Kondrashov and Anatoliy Stepanovich Yezhelev. And we will thoroughly weigh all considerations in resolving this problem in the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

But if someone wants to organize pressure in the mass media, then let us have representatives of these newspapers discuss matters with those who were in the Supreme Soviet Presidium and who will debate the issue. IZVESTIYA will retain its image and must operate in accordance with the Law on the Press. And its charter must reflect this as well. This is an editorial-operations issue, but there are those who want, I repeat, to bring the problem out for the most widespread discussion in order to prove that democracy and the Law on the Press have been suppressed.

[Question] You call upon the press to advocate centrist positions. For 70 years we advocated such positions and never criticized the government, which underwent a slow aging process and dragged us down into the abyss we find ourselves in presently. Doesn't it seem to you that, in addition to centrist viewpoints, there exists a right and a left press? After all, danger exists to keep people on the alert.

[Lukyanov] I have not campaigned for the press to espouse centrist viewpoints. If that were the case, we would not have to read it. We are concerned here with the position of the state leadership which, by dint of the circumstances themselves, must become the unifying nucleus of all healthy forces in society. But this does not mean that we must eliminate variegated views and positions, criticism of the government, or criticism of any minister.

But how does the criticism proceed? Look at the basic press—it is focused on criticism of the president. Let us have it so that the pages of our newspapers reflect various viewpoints, so that each newspaper has its own face, but first and foremost advocates a constructive foundation.

I see the Leningrad delegation here in the hall and Comrade Kurkova, with whom I had a conversation. We talked about the fact that there should be a divergence of opinions and this divergence must be supported to the maximum extent, that we must concern ourselves with unifying society, not splitting it.

I will respond on the subject of administrative influence on "Vzglyad." Influence exists, supposedly, and a great uproar has been raised. There is talk about dictatorship, about an attack on democracy and on glasnost, but no representative of any of the radical or liberal publications spoke out when entire autonomies were eliminated. Not one! And when Nevzorov cropped up in Tallinn,

they called me on the spot—"Get rid of him for God's sake!" I asked: "What happened—perhaps a tank appeared in Tallinn?" There should not be one-sidedness.

[Question] What is being done in the Supreme Soviet to put an end to the deceitful reporting in the central press and elsewhere which purposely defames the honor of the Army?

[Lukyanov] I have been and shall remain an ally of our Army. Although I really catch it... Not a day goes by that I do not get hit by the newspapers from one side or another. When it is political opponents doing the criticizing—fine. But completely unexpected blows are inflicted as well. I am an adherent of defending our Army. And this is the duty of the people, the duty of representational organs. But the mass media often attempt to drive deeper the wedge between the people and the Army, to split the officer corps from the soldiers, the generals from the Army. If we permit this (and this is not just a matter of supporting the regime, as some have written), we will be dealing with our defensive might, and here we cannot concede.

[Question] How do you assess the fact that last Saturday, Russian Radio was brazenly thrown off the first program and the "Mayak" program?

[Lukyanov] I do not know about this.

General Director of Russian TV Channel Describes Goals

91UN1409B Moscow GOLOS in Russian
No 6, 9-15 Feb 91 p 10

[Interview with Anatoliy Lysenko, general director of the All-Russian State Radio and Television Company, by Marina Tarasova, journalist: "'2' Doesn't Mean Second Rate"; place and date not given]

[Text] According to data provided by sociologists of the Gosteleradio [State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting], 75 percent of 1,474 television viewers polled in 11 regions of the RSFSR are convinced that Russia should have its own television channel.

Among the flow of letters arriving at Central Television are those expressing the fear that Russian Television will become one more official mouthpiece, but there is a danger that its alternative nature will simply boil down to the competitive struggle between central and republic authorities. We hope that the discussion presented here with Anatoliy Lysenko, general director of the All-Russian State Radio and Television Company, will enable our readers to form a certain picture of those who have undertaken the weighty burden of Russian broadcasting.

[Lysenko] It would be quite inappropriate to think of us as people who have lost track of our origins. We are professional radio and television journalists who have devoted years to working in Gosteleradio. I, for example,

arrived at Central Television at the beginning of the 1960's. Incidentally, L. Kravchenko, the current chairman of the committee, also emerged for the first time there, during that period. The only difference between him and me is that I never left television. Joining our Russian team were such masters as TV productions veteran Andrey Torstesen, his young colleagues Viktor Kryukov and Kirill Legat, television journalists Yevgeniy Kiselev and Aleksandr Gurnov, well known for the programs "Vremya" and "120 Minutes." And there are other distinguished names. But I would rather not state them right now since the question of many people departing from Central Television is still not finally resolved.

[Tarasova] By the people themselves?

[Lysenko] No, of course not. The entirety of the matter lies with the Gosteleradio leadership. The committee's position with respect to our newborn organization reminds me of the 360-degree defense of a fortress. One gets the impression that behind the walls guarded by these administrative militiamen lies a city, with its own culture formed over centuries, its own unique architecture, and manuscripts containing the knowledge of the finest minds of the Fatherland. And now the "ascetic" life of the inhabitants of this oasis of spirituality is in danger. It would seem as if a frenzied invasion of Huns threatens to turn all their efforts to ashes and erect on the vacant plot some inimical entity disastrous for the large numbers of television viewers of our country. Is this so? Absurd! The reason we came together is precisely to attempt to preserve all of the best that we ourselves and our Central Television colleagues have managed to achieve. To preserve and propagate that high degree of professionalism, the spark of spirituality and political passion which have always marked the finest television broadcasts.

[Tarasova] Does this mean that we will get to view on the new Russian channel the Central Television programming we have come to love?

[Lysenko] It cannot be ruled out that we will bring back two or three old titles. I stress—titles. For within each one, even the programs which have earned the viewers' appreciation, we will strive to introduce a new scheme of interpreting the material and new forms of presenting it. We are also hoping to create a whole series of entirely new entertainment programs which would meet the requirements of good taste. But it is not yet time to address this in detail. And not just out of superstition. Alas, our technical capabilities and financial reserves are so scanty that not every idea (and we have many) has a realistic foundation as yet. We do not have our own studios, control room facilities, cameras, transportation... Television is very expensive. Here it is not the money denominations confiscated so effectively from the population that we need. True, we expect to be able to lease some things from Gosteleradio, but it does not yet intend to share its assets. We are looking for currency reserves in the republic in order to purchase our own

equipment. We intend to rebuild our premises—in which the former "residents" generously left several dozen beat-up office desks—into a television center.

Things are difficult for us right now in the organizational sense. You get the impression they are trying to throw us off the boat and see how we manage to swim. And perhaps there are people who would like to see Russian Television swimming obediently in the waterway... But I want to announce that we have no intention of sinking to the bottom. And we believe that we will succeed in creating the Russian television channel, whatever it may cost us...

Having seized the unassailable bastion of Gosteleradio's second channel, I see no grounds for sending out our own vigilant patrols and impeding Central Television from broadcasting on this channel. Our mission is to find the face of Russia in the second channel and prove to our enemies that the number "2" in no way signifies anything second-rate in the TV broadcasts it offers. Such a false idea of the second channel has been fairly strongly reinforced by the absence of any precise planning concept for it. Not just the Gosteleradio directors are guilty of this, but the creators of popular programs as well. Otherwise, how do you explain the openly coerced transfer of personality-centered television to the second channel and the inflamed passions in the press in this regard? What kind of equal rights can there be if a broadcast which is artistically poor in L. Kravchenko's opinion is "banished" to the second channel as if in some kind of punishment?

[Tarasova] Yet, all the same, the question of transferring the second channel to Russian Television has still not been resolved?

[Lysenko] A fundamental dispute is underway around the management of the second channel. We want all of the planning organization to be in our hands. You cannot get into the train engineer's compartment if you have no confidence in the dispatcher and can expect him to put up the red signal at any moment. Today we have no firm guarantees that we will not wind up in the situation of "Vzglyad."

Personally, I have nothing against L. Kravchenko. I have known him for many years and remember with gratitude how he helped establish this program, of which I was director at the time. He probably sincerely believes that all his current actions are directed toward defending the USSR president. I would not wish to presume that the president feels likewise. But even the president, in my opinion, does not have the right to decide whether or not Russia is to have its own channel. Incidentally, all the other republics have one.

[Tarasova] The necessity of alternative television broadcasting has long been ripe. In the press, we have already become accustomed to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA not agreeing with PRAVDA in one item or another. This is no longer considered criminal, no longer entails a destruction of foundations...

[Lysenko] And if some of these are destroyed, it means they were rotten foundations, monuments of plaster. Those who today sit at the controls of Gosteleradio are being destroyed by fear, it seems to me. What did the "Vremya" program turn into? Why are such scanty transmissions being broadcast by the Novosti Television Service? Fear engenders suspicion. If you do not have confidence in your own colleagues and constantly expect dirty tricks from them, it is the job which suffers first of all. It is particularly important right now for us to create and be able to protect from head winds an atmosphere of creative freedom and trust in one another, without which a collective of truly like-minded people can never be established.

I am not a fighter by nature. But every time I come up against an administrative dictate of any kind, I feel an internal resistance growing inside...

[Tarasova] From the lips of such a high ranking leader, at the head of republic radio and television broadcasting, such a revelation sounds somewhat paradoxical.

[Lysenko] Do not misunderstand me. I am an adherent of discipline and occupational precision in one's work. But it is my deep conviction that this discipline must be the manifestation of a personal responsibility for one's own labor. There is no better criterion of professionalism than decency and honor. If you learn how to soberly assess yourself and your deeds, then others will heed your assessments as well and you will acquire the moral right to say "I." Too often, people of my generation were forced to say "we"—"We, Soviet youth; we support; we mark..." I must admit that this "we" has still not been completely eradicated from my being. But I believe that the position of general director will help me defend the civil rights of everyone who has decided to link his fate with Russian Television, to speak over the airwaves in his own name. I am not an advocate of the extremist "I" which dominated the recent reporting of Nevzorov from the Baltic region. It is unfortunate that such recurrences of "star fever" are fairly typical of television journalists. I had occasion to observe this while working in Central Television's youth editorial staff... The real "I" is not stated off the cuff on a wave of casual emotion. It must be acquired over time and reinforced by a thorough knowledge of the subject under discussion and by one's personal convictions.

God forbid we come to find ourselves in the same situation the present USSR Gosteleradio leadership finds itself in, and from which creative people are leaving in droves. I do not want to say that it is only untalented people and submissive executors of others' administrative will who are left behind at Central Television. But I know from personal experience that whenever a talented individual leaves you, for one reason or another, it is always tragic.

It is a difficult matter to unite within a single creative organism gifted people who believe in their efforts, who have their own views and position, and by virtue of this

are not about to blindly fulfill any directive of the directorship. We must construct relations as partners. Let people dispute matters, present their arguments, prove the correctness of their views. In some instances I am prepared to accept their point of view after reviewing my own, but I may also retain my previous conviction. In any event, we must not yield to the temptation of using our accustomed levers of administrative pressure: today—Bravo!, tomorrow—Out of here!

I often experience a spiritual discomfort because of my good memory. I cannot forget what one or another colleague of mine wrote 10 or 15 years ago, what he disseminated to the public, what he stated on the air. All of us who were around during that time bear within ourselves a certain burden of guilt before society. For some of us it is the sin of naive ignorance, for others the sin of the lie, and for still others the sin of silence. But I would not try to atone for my sin through ecstatic public repentance or tales about what revolutionary battles I participated in, in my own kitchen. At that time we referred to this ironically as "stairwell eloquence." I see for myself a real opportunity for atonement in providing support to young people. In my contacts with the fellows from "Vzglyad" I was always moved, and sometimes scared, by their impetuous liberation. I myself come from the "intimidated generation." There was one time when we failed to take advantage of a destiny-presented opportunity. This time—this is our last chance. There will very likely not be another for me personally.

[Tarasova] What kind of Russian State Television Channel do you envision?

[Lysenko] I would like to assure you first of all that one should not expect from it the danger of excessive politicization of the airwaves. Judge for yourself. Our television programming structure does not have the usual main editorial staffs. All of the work will be concentrated in three creative-production associations under the following conventional headings: entertainment, culture, commentary. Of course, we will primarily be studying the problems of Russia in our programming. But this does not mean that only Russian music, Russian literature, Russian scientific thought will be presented in our broadcasts. Russia is the backbone of the Federation, where we see a wonderful inter-penetration of various ethnic cultures of the peoples of Russia, of traditions and religions.

Right now we are developing the concept of the second channel. In our view it should supplement the first channel and carry within itself the entire spectrum of distinctive features of universal television broadcasting. Conditions must be created for the television viewer to choose. Let him decide what to watch, whom to show preference. A great deal of the creative planning is related to efforts using local Russian TV studios as the base. According to agreement reached with USSR Gosteleradio, these have been transferred to our committee. Their financing is already being provided through us, beginning in January of this year, out of the Russian

State budget. And we propose to devote about half of the second channel air time to broadcasts prepared in these studios.

[Tarasova] How do you intend to structure your mutual relations with the local committees?

[Lysenko] We will reject, first of all, the defective system of administrative subordination of these subdivisions to the center, the system presently in existence for USSR Gosteleradio. We see our mission as that of providing only procedural leadership, direction in developing a unified broadcasting concept. Unfortunately, as evidenced by the recent meeting with representatives of Russian radio and television committees, by no means are all of them prepared to transition to a new, partnership level of contact with us. Following my assurances regarding the repudiation of administrative pressure from the center, one of the local chairmen decided he should ask for clarification on where he would now coordinate his official trips to Moscow. Honestly—this

question threw me into a dither. We have become so, so accustomed to subordination... All hope lies in the creative potential of these studios. And they do have such potential. One need only look at documentaries on regions of Russia. Under the present system of Central Television planning, TV viewers often do not see these. But many of them are able to elicit at least as much public sensation as the Podnieks tape which caused such a stir—"Is It Easy To Be Young?". We have already incorporated into the broadcasting scheme a Sunday weekly heading devoted to Russian studio TV films. We also want to show these and sell them abroad.

Our plans are many. But time will tell to what extent they are successful in implementation. For the present, I can only say with full weight of authority that the first Russian Television broadcast will be on 31 March. If we are unable to reach agreement with Gosteleradio on leasing a studio, we will have to operate directly out of our premises, against the background of beat-up desks...

Union, Republic Officials Debate Aral Sea Crisis Approach

Salykov Urges Republic Cooperation

91W/04394 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
3 Apr 91 p 3

[Article by K. Salykov, chairman of the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet for Environmental Affairs and Optimum Use of Natural Resources: "Between the Lines of the Document"]

[Text] Decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers: "On Measures To Speed Up the Economic and Social Development of Kara-Kalpak ASSR," and then a similar solution for Kzyl-Orda Oblast in Kazakh SSR, "On Measures To Radically Improve the Environmental and Public Health Situation in the Region of the Aral Sea and To Improve the Efficiency of Use and Strengthen the Protection of the Water Resources and Land Resources in Its Basin"—have solved the immediate and urgent tasks of improving the public health, epidemiological, and environmental situation. However constructive the role of the decrees, they could not have produced very significant results. The personnel and resources were lacking, and new approaches to solving the problem are needed. The question of preserving and restoring the Aral Sea has not been put on the agenda at all.

The country's Supreme Soviet has now taken a new tack in resolving the Aral crisis. A formidable plan of action on the problems of the Aral Sea has been set forth in the decree adopted under the title: "On Progress in Carrying Out the Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet entitled: 'On Urgent Measures To Repair the Country's Environment.'"

A government commission on the problems of the Aral Sea is now sitting, and scientific and production entities have been created. Followup on the decisions taken earlier has been greatly invigorated. Critical assessments have been made of the measures taken. There is no question that they need to be expanded and brought under a plan designed for the long run. That is why it was deemed essential to devise a long-range union-republic program for the period 1991-95 and the period up to the year 2005. The Aral problem has been given the status of a programmatic problem at the union level.

Every point in the decree except one is aimed at people's needs, man is placed at the center. One point is devoted to the general scheme for preservation and gradual restoration of the sea. This has decisive importance. A competition was held for project proposals involving Soviet and foreign specialists, demonstrating the great diversity of approaches and methods to solving the problem. The general scheme should absorb all that is best from the entries submitted to the competition. At the same time, it must be realistic, and it must take into account the problems in the socioeconomic development of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and the

new forms and methods of economic activity. The general scheme must be based on a synthesis of scientific knowledge and the practical experience of many countries in the world.

The world community, as represented by UNEP [United Nations Environment Program], has responded to the Aral problem. The USSR and UNEP are jointly developing a project entitled "Aid to the Soviet Government in Drafting a Plan of Action To Restore the Aral Sea." A team of international experts has been created to evaluate the conceptual developments and features of the project concerning the Aral problem.

In the work to develop the general scheme, particular attention must be paid to combating desertification of the region around the Aral Sea and also to seeking noncontradictory solutions in finding the necessary amount of water to maintain the level of the sea at its present stage and then to restore it. Maintaining the level of the Aral Sea at 37-38 meters is a fundamental issue. The reason is that at a lower level the sea breaks up into a group of bodies of water and finally loses its present characteristics.

Taking into account the increasing acuteness and very rapid deterioration of the environmental situation in the region, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers was given the assignment (the first stage of the long-range program) of approving within one month a union-republic program of urgent measures for 1991 and 1992. This effort is in the final stage. All the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan have made their proposals. The government will soon complete this job.

The decree has paid its main attention to the needs of the inhabitants of the zone of the environmental disaster. We have reason to expect that the entire set of interrelated practical steps to restore people's health, to supply the population nutritious food, to combat degradation of nature, to save and preserve the region's gene pool, to restore the fertility of the soil and achieve optimum water use, and ultimately to restore the equilibrium of the Aral's ecosystem will be reflected in these programs.

The decree has recognized the need to draft within the long-range program a special section entitled: "Feeding the Population of the Aral Region." The low level of consumption of the principal foodstuffs (meat, milk, fish, and vegetables), combined with the poisoned drinking water, is one of the reasons for the rise in the morbidity rate, the tuberculosis rate in particular. Even plague and leprosy have not spared this long-suffering region. And no wonder! The drinking water contains pesticides, heavy metals, nitrates, and biogenic substances. There is no reliable sewer system or sewage treatment. Given those conditions, rural inhabitants and particularly mothers and children are above all at risk. The decree calls for drafting a specific restorative medical program entitled: "Children of the Aral Sea." They must be embraced with particular concern, regardless of whatever economic difficulties there might be.

The problem of supplying good-quality drinking water to the population of the region has not arisen today, nor even yesterday. It has been timidly hushed up, as have all the other problems. To be frank, the problems of the drinking water supply can and must be solved far earlier, without waiting for the specific programs and decrees. For instance, taking the minimum allowance as the point of departure, the sick and children could be supplied water that is brought in from outside. We are placing great hope on the subprogram entitled: "Water Supply to the Population of the Aral Region," which is being prepared.

The measures of combating desertification, which are making headway, need to be discussed in particular. A new desert has already emerged. The people have given it the name Akkum—White Sands. It has managed to absorb about two million hectares of land, and every year conquers about 15,000 hectares of rangeland in the coastal zone of the Aral Sea. The dried-up bed of the Aral Sea is becoming one of the principal suppliers of aerosols in the earth's atmosphere. Specific measures and their sequence will be worked out and presented in the relevant section of the program. But one thing is obvious—there is an urgent need to stabilize the sand, using progressive methods of protecting and improving soils with plants. Sufficient world and Soviet know-how has been accumulated in this field. Creating a chain of lakes and bodies of water in the areas near the delta has become a very effective measure of combating desertification, making it possible, if only partially, to preserve small islands of surviving vegetation and to create the conditions for people to live.

The decree orders the Committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet for Environmental Affairs and Optimum Use of Natural Resources and for International Affairs, jointly with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to request from the UNEP Administration that it help in drafting and carrying out projects to restore the Aral Sea and for inclusion of the problem of the Aral region in the UN Program to Combat Desertification. That is our ultimate aim.

But before turning to the world community for aid, we need to set our own house in order. To get rid of the confusion, mismanagement, and incompetence, to eradicate indifference, because otherwise no program will be carried out.

Order must be restored above all in water use. Someone has to be really in charge of land and water. The decree calls for enhancing the role and status of the basin water management associations "Amudarya" and "Syrdarya" in management of the water resources of the Aral Sea basin, and in 1991 turn over to them the organizations operating water management facilities, the water supply installations, hydroinstallations, and storage reservoirs as was envisaged in the decisions of the country's government made earlier. A reasonable, but mandatory charge for water and fines for polluting it have to be established.

There is a great deal of gossip at present about the concern "Vodstroy." There is no doubt that it is supposed to be a cost-accounting (*khozraschetnaya*) organization operating as a contractor. The scientific-technical personnel of design organizations and the functions of managing water management associations and facilities are to be turned over to the State Committee for Water Resources, whose creation the USSR Supreme Soviet deems urgent to solving many of the problems of water management activity not only in the Aral region, but indeed in the country as a whole. (The committee's name is, of course, provisional.) The decree that has been adopted states: "It is recommended that the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and supreme bodies of state power of the union republics take up the question of creating a state administrative agency and assigning it the functions of interrepublic distribution of water resources and monitoring water use in the country." We can hope that then there will be fewer disputes and suspicions of all kinds concerning the use of personnel and resources. We attribute particular importance in solving these problems to the leaders of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan; their solid support through the Council of the Federation is necessary.

The normative basis for economic activity in the region needs to be essentially strengthened, procurators need to oversee more closely the enforcement of legislation on natural conservation, and land use and water use have to be put on a strictly scientific basis. In that regard, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, jointly with the top state administrative agencies of the republics, have been given relevant orders, and they are reflected in the decree. The decision was also made to strengthen the scientific and information support of the region's socioeconomic development and coordination of the activity of the scientific research organizations of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. These problems simply will not be solved without specific interrepublic entities.

The Institute for the Environment and Water Problems of the Aral Sea Basin of the USSR Academy of Sciences has been created for those purposes using the facilities of the Nukus branch of the "Aral" Scientific Research Monitoring Center. Its affiliates are being created in the cities of Kzyl-Orda, Tashauz, and Urgench.

The decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the problems of the Aral Sea will prove to be realistic if an interrepublic agreement is reached on optimum use of the water resources of the basin of the Aral Sea, which the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan intend to conclude. Creation of interrepublic government and scientific entities will mark a turning point in overcoming the Aral crisis. Only through the joint efforts of the center and the republics, the public and scientists, the entire country and the world community is it possible to overcome the consequences of the environmental disaster and reestablish the region's destroyed ecosystem.

Uzbek Official Stresses Siberian River Diversion

91W N0439B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
3 Apr 91 p.3

[Article by V. Antonov, general director of the association "Vodproyekt" of the UzSSR Ministry for Land Improvement and Water Management: "What Does the New Decree Offer?"]

[Text] Over the last two and a half years, three documents have now come down from the highest level of government on the problems of the Aral Sea and shown concern about a region suffering disaster. The decrees are multiplying, but still there has been no real help. The Committee on Environmental Affairs and Optimum Use of Natural Resources, on the other hand, is "on the job" and is working, as they say, at full tilt. The last document went through lengthy and sound preparation by the committee. It was given various names, wordings were discussed and rewritten repeatedly, clearance was obtained from the republics (the authors failed to obtain the consent of Uzbekistan), and now they have sent it to the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet for its consideration.

I.Kh. Dzhurabekov, first deputy chairman of the Uzbekistan Cabinet of Ministers, expressed doubt in the session about the fate of the republic's proposals: "We do not understand at all for what reason they were not reflected in the proposed draft." Yet those proposals contained very important issues that were actually ignored by those who wrote the text of the decree.

I would like to ask K.S. Salykov if such an attitude is possible toward the proposals and requests of a republic located in the zone of the environmental disaster?

The document adopted seems on the surface rather strict and sound. But let us examine what it offers for resolving this tight ball of socioeconomic, interethnic, and environmental problems of the region, of which the sea that is drying up has become a symbol. But is the sea the whole point?

Half of the length of the decree is taken up by a recital of facts already known and copied from one document to another. To be sure, it has been bolstered and offered in sharper terms than has been done previously.

For instance, it is noted that the environmental situation in the region has gone out of control, a horrifying picture is sketched of the rapid deterioration of the climate, the rise in the level of aggressive groundwater, the disastrous development of the process of desertification, the death of orchards and vineyards, the ruination of structures and death of cultural monuments. All of this is presented exclusively as the result of the sea drying up. It is also pointed out that these processes are compounded as well by the underdevelopment of the productive forces and the low level of the population's living conditions, both social and domestic. Wonderful! It turns out that the low

standard of living is not a consequence, but one of the causes of the adverse processes taking place.

Much space is given to the "flagrant mistakes" that have been committed to the incorrect "selection of development strategy" and location of the productive forces made in the past, to the extensive conduct of economic activity, to the faulty practice of a "wasteful attitude toward water resources," and to oversights that supposedly have caused the large-scale salinization of the soil, and so on.

One wonders for whom all this was intended? For the ignorant person who knows about the problems of the Aral basin only from the articles of S. Zalygin and certain other writers whose efforts have shaped a distorted idea about the events taking place in the region?

Incidentally, a letter of S. Zalygin entitled "Why and With What I Don't Agree" was recently published in IZVESTIYA. In it, he expounded his attitude toward the activity of the committee headed by K.S. Salykov and toward him personally, he commented on the decree which the committee prepared and which the USSR Supreme Soviet has passed on the problems of the Aral Sea.

Having in general offered a correct assessment of that document ("It is nothing but bureaucratic sweet talk and wishes addressed to no one in particular"), S. Zalygin at the same time goes on in his characteristic style to confuse the country's public about the causes of the Aral crisis. Once again he writes about the consumption of 44 km³ of water for "overirrigation," the "write-off" of millions of hectares of irrigated land, he demands that "people in the Ministry of Water Management" be brought to criminal trial, and so on.

People have been persistently trying to suggest to us that the republics of Central Asia and Southern Kazakhstan have been experiencing all their troubles solely because of their own criminal mismanagement of natural resources, while in our water management and irrigation agriculture outright slovenliness has supposedly prevailed.

In their opinion, it turns out that it is sufficient to bring about elementary order in water use, to change the structure of agricultural production, to reduce the area irrigated, to restrict the disorderly taking of water, to lower artificial reservoirs—and immediately there will be environmental harmony, the ruined sea will revive, and, as a consequence of recovery of its initial level—the socioeconomic conditions of people's life will immediately improve all by themselves. How simple it all is, is it not? So the causes of our troubles lie in the level of the sea, not in the fact that the laws governing the economic development of the region so as to take into account its demographic and ethnic peculiarities have been ignored in our region for decades?

Is it incomprehensible that the development of an immense region characterized by extremely rapid growth

rates of the population and limited resource potential should have gotten into a blind alley, that there is no way that we can get along without further development of irrigation, which is possible only through donor replenishment of the water resources of the exhausted Amudarya and Syrdarya? Without that, it is not possible for us to solve the food problem, nor the other complicated socioeconomic and interethnic problems, nor to ensure the sovereign development of the republic and restore the environmental situation to health.

By comparison with 1965, when the level of the Aral Sea began to drop at a fast rate, the population of Uzbekistan has more than doubled and today approaches 21 million persons. By the year 2010, the republic will have 35 million inhabitants, and throughout the entire Aral basin there will be 60 million persons, as against 30 million living here at the present time.

So, is it not concern about how to feed and clothe such a number of people, how to provide work and housing for everyone, how to bring about the necessary conditions for healthy life that should disturb our environmentalists first of all?

Yes, we have to explore ways of saving the sea. There can be no two ways about that. I think that there is not a man who could look indifferently on the death of the Aral Sea. Nor are there such people even among the water management personnel, the so-called "people from the Ministry of Water Management," whom they would like to represent as enemies of nature. Preserving the sea to ensure balance in the region's ecosystem is a matter of immense importance—but who is arguing with that? But it turns out that the committee headed by K.S. Salykov is pushing concern for human beings into the background.

Where in the new document is there any check on progress in carrying out the decree adopted earlier? Where does it express concern about the fate of the future socioeconomic development of the republics located in the Aral basin? How does it propose to guarantee development of the productive forces, employment of the population, and solutions to other problems?

How can the question be raised of reducing the area irrigated, when in Uzbekistan today there is 0.21 hectare of irrigated land per inhabitant (0.3 hectare is required for normal support of life)? And what will it be in 20 years?

Water is needed not only for the Aral Sea, but also for the region's industry and its fuel and power complex which are developing, it is also needed to satisfy the growing needs in the sectors of household drinking water and water for municipal purposes, to water the degraded deltas of the Amudarya and Syrdarya, to grow forests, to develop the raising of fish in lakes and ponds, to increase the productivity of pastures, to maintain the sanitary condition of our rivers, and for many other purposes.

Where is it to be obtained?

Why has the command-administrative veto still not been removed from the idea of adding some water from Siberia to the Amudarya and Syrdarya, which need it so badly? Why is the return to this idea regarded as sedition? When we all finally understand that we have no other way....

In 1989, as is well-known, an all-union competition was announced for developing the general scheme for recovery of the Aral Sea. The deadlines for the competition passed, but the results were never made public. And questions have been arising. First, it is not clear why the idea of the competition was reduced only to seeking ways of restoring the sea, and why it was not extended to solving all the problems of environmental recovery and further harmonious development of the entire Aral region? Second, why from the more than 200 proposals submitted to the competition were those that argued the need to supply additional water to the region immediately eliminated and not examined at all?

Think about it, can it be that the more than 200 proposals submitted, most of which came from rather competent specialists, did not contain anything reasonable?

And what is in the new decree? Again an order to draft in 1991 a general scheme for the "preservation and gradual restoration of the Aral Sea, linking it to the conditions for the socioeconomic development of the republics of Central Asia and the Kzyl-Orda Oblast of Kazakhstan."

To be sure, this time the writing is better thought-out, having taken a year and a half. It is no longer just a matter of restoring the sea at any price, but of a general scheme for its preservation and gradual recovery linked to ensuring the socioeconomic development of republics. Praise the Lord, they have finally understood in the committee that the problem of the sea needs to be linked to the prospects for the region's development, and that this must become a unionwide programmatic task.

But there are still holes in the way this is written. One wonders why it is proposed that this general scheme be linked only to the interests of development of Kzyl-Orda Oblast, and does not Chimkent Oblast, for example, of Kazakh SSR, deserve this as well? Well, fine, we will not cavil. There still has been progress.

What is proposed in the substantive portion of the document? Steps are to be taken to increase the volume of guaranteed water supply to the sea. What steps is not clear. In what manner is it possible to increase the supply of water to the sea? That is not even mentioned, but it seems to be implied—by reducing the area of irrigation.

And beyond that there is also no end of advice and recommendations.

It is proposed that another institute be created in the system of the USSR Academy of Sciences, that the role of the basin administrations "Amudarya" and "Syrdarya" be enhanced, that the question be taken up of

creating in the country a state administrative agency for water resources (to replace the abolished Minvodkhoz, is that it?), and finally there is an order to the committee headed by K.S. Salykov to apply to the United Nations for help.

And that is all. One wonders whether the "valuable advice, recommendations, and wishes" that have been enumerated will help to solve the problem?

Specialists have calculated that restoring the health of the Aral basin, modernizing its water management and

irrigation agriculture, will require about 100 billion rubles of capital investments. So, you will not be able to do it with advice alone.

The authors of the text of the decree have also skirted with graveyard silence the question of the need to divert into the region a portion of the flow of Siberian rivers. And where if not in this document is it to be noted that the ban on the design and construction of the "Siberia-Central Asia" Canal needs to be immediately removed, that there is no alternative to it, and that this is the only strategy for a fundamental solution to the tight tangle of problems?

Gorbachev's New Culture, Education Adviser Interviewed

91UN14574 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA
in Russian 18 Apr 91 p 2

Interview with Vladimir Konstantinovich Yegorov, doctor of philosophical sciences, by V. Zenkovich: "Don't Strangle Culture...."]

[Text] The president of the USSR has appointed an assistant to advise him on matters pertaining to the humanities. He is the 44-year-old Vladimir Konstantinovich Yegorov, a doctor of philosophical sciences.

[Zenkovich] Vladimir Konstantinovich, to begin our conversation, could you tell us something about yourself?

[Yegorov] I'm a native of Chuvashiya and a graduate of the Department of Historical Philology at Kazan University. My wife is a philologist and my son is a sixth-grader. I've worked as an instructor, then in the Komsomol, and in the field of journalism. Prior to becoming a member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1987, I was employed as an editor at the Literary Institute of the USSR Union of Writers.

[Zenkovich] Before being appointed to the post of assistant to the president of the USSR, you were employed as a reader and reviewer for the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and you also engaged in matters pertaining to the humanities. Do you sense any difference in your work?

[Yegorov] Of course. You, know, with the elimination of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, the party's functions changed. It has ceased to "direct" culture. The volume of work in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee has become less, and in connection with this there has been a significant reduction in the personnel staff. And in my new position I have simply gained a genuine sense or feeling for the entire enormous amount of matters, including those pertaining to culture and education, which are moving through state channels.

[Zenkovich] Why, in your opinion, was it specifically you that Mikhail Sergeyevich chose for this post?

[Yegorov] To be honest about it, I don't have the slightest idea. Aside from the fact that I had occasion to carry out some assignments for him, there was no reason to assume that he knew me that well.

[Zenkovich] To your way of thinking, what does culture need nowadays?

[Yegorov] Above all, it needs to create the legal and economic foundations for its development. Quite a bit has already been accomplished. Perestroyka has "divulged the secrets" of many pages of our history and has rehabilitated the extremely rich heritage of previously persecuted philosophers, writers, artists, and musicians.

However, the market-type mechanisms have not yet been completely worked out in our country, nor has the economy been normalized. The state is incapable of allocating sufficient funds for the needs of culture. The marketplace is harsh, even cruel. And our highest-priority task nowadays is to prevent it from strangling culture. It seems invalid to place our hopes on subsidies from the big "neocapitalists," although the analogies with Sava Morozov are very tempting.

[Zenkovich] But it seems to me that the Union-level parliament, by recently adopting the predatory Law on Taxation, has done everything to strangle all kinds of creative work in this country....

[Yegorov] Yes, indeed. This Law turned out to be far from perfect in every regard; to a certain extent it is harsh. The deputies were proceeding on the basis of the experience of the economically more developed states, where a specific and significant percentage of the taxes is also levied on the creative intelligentsia. But our parliament members failed to take into account the fact that the fees charge by the writers, artists, and composers in those countries over there are considerably higher than ours. I think that we should revise our system of fees. But it's one thing to express an opinion, and quite another to ask the question: Where is the money to come from?

However, it cannot be said that nothing is being done in our country to improve the life of the creative intelligentsia. The leaders of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers have already said that in the immediate future the wages earned by persons employed in the fields of education and culture will be increased; taxes will be levied in accordance with a privileged scale on organizations engaging in beneficial or charitable activities. In several republics the salaries of schoolteachers, librarians, and musicians have already been increased substantially.

[Zenkovich] Could you, perhaps, give us something sensational? Tell us what is being studied and worked on in the "inner sanctum" of the president of the USSR?

[Yegorov] I won't tell you that.

[Zenkovich] Why not?

[Yegorov] There are quite a few interesting and, to my way of thinking, interesting concepts. Let's suppose that I were to tell you about them, but—because of some reason or other—their implementation was delayed, or they were not carried out at all. Then there would be all kinds of talk about my statement. Now, let's say, such a statement would be popular. People would say: He wanted to do something good for the creative intelligentsia, but the "party bureaucrats" did not let him. I could earn "points" this way, but, in my opinion, this would be immoral. I'm convinced that the worst or most terrible thing for a politician is to be "obligated."

[Zenkovich] Vladimir Konstantinovich, many figures in the cultural field are obsessed nowadays with the idea of a national rebirth or revival. What's your attitude toward this idea?

[Yegorov] I almost suffered because of it once. At the beginning of the 1980's, when I was still working in the Komsomol Central Committee, I had occasion to defend at an extremely high level the book by the Belorussian writer Oleg Loyko about Yanko Kupala. It had been published by the Molodaya gvardiya [Young Guard] Publishing House in the series entitled "Lives of Remarkable Persons." I was called up "on the carpet" by V.I. Desyaterik, the "curator" of the Komsomol's publishing activity and the director of the Molodaya gvardiya Publishing House. I was even threatened with expulsion from the party.

[Zenkovich] What for?

[Yegorov] The book spoke about the unbearably difficult conditions under which the book's author had been forced to work. In his book he had defended the "identity" of his own people, i.e., Belorussia as a nation. For this reason both the book and its author fell into disfavor. Nowadays it is even somewhat awkward to recall this. A year ago I met Oleg Antonovich in Minsk. We recalled the whole matter and began to laugh. Well, you know, of course, how the times, life itself, and our ideas have changed. To be sure, this laughter was bitter.

[Zenkovich] Nowadays we have begun to move away from a general or universal "leveling" in pedagogy. Do you think that we can and should even permit citizens to open private schools?

[Yegorov] Certainly. Uniformity is ruinous for both education and culture as a whole. The more types of schools and VUZ's that we have, the better. However, we should not go to extremes.

Let's suppose that private schools begin to be opened. But who would be capable of paying "mad" money for having their children taught there? A worker? An engineer? A physician? Hardly. I'm convinced that the state is obligated to make sure that all children, regardless of the financial or professional situation of their parents, receive equal "starting" opportunities for their development. Social justice and leveling are, of course, two different things. We have finally come to understand this.

[Zenkovich] Do you have a moral ideal in your life?

[Yegorov] Yes—Mama

RSFSR Resolution on Protection of Culture, Arts

9JUN1457B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 26 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Decree of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: "On Measures for the Socioeconomic Protection of Culture

and Art Under the Conditions of Making the Transition to Market-Type Relations"]

[Text] 1. In 1991 the following organizations shall be relieved of the need to pay turnover taxes, profits taxes, and taxes on the sale of products utilized by them in order to carry out their chartered assignments: the All-Russian Music Society, All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, RSFSR Voluntary Society of Booklovers, RSFSR Society for Knowledge, Russian Republic Division of the Soviet Fund for Culture, Russian Creative Union of Cultural Workers, RSFSR Union of Architects, RSFSR Union of Journalists, RSFSR Union of Composers, RSFSR Union of Concert Artists, RSFSR Union of Literary Persons, RSFSR Union of Writers, RSFSR Union of Theatrical Persons, RSFSR Union of Artists, RSFSR Union of Photo Artists, as well as the enterprises, associations, and organizations which are included within the systems of these unions and societies.

2. In order to prevent an unjustified price rise on products, work, and services, taxation shall be retained on the profits of the enterprises, associations, and organizations of the above-mentioned creative unions and societies on that portion which exceeds the legislatively set, maximum level of profitability. This shall be done in accordance with the rates specified by the RSFSR Law entitled: "On the Procedure for Applying the USSR Law: 'On Taxes To Be Levied on Enterprises, Associations, and Organizations' on the Territory of the RSFSR."

3. It shall be established that the newly created, above-indicated creative unions and public enterprises, associations, and organizations shall be relieved in 1991 of the need to pay taxes by the RSFSR Ministry of Finance in accordance respectively with the RSFSR Ministry of Culture, RSFSR State Cinema Fund, and the RSFSR Ministry of Press and Mass Media.

4. It shall be recommended that the Supreme Soviets of those republics included within the RSFSR, as well as the local Soviets of People's Deputies, carry out the following actions.

—revise in the appropriate budgets the reimbursement to cultural and artistic institutions the additional expenditures brought about by the increase in prices, rates, salaries, and wages; they shall subsequently make regular revisions, based on indexes of prices and rates, of the monetary norms of expenditures to maintain cultural and artistic institutions;

—examine and consider the issues involved in relieving motion-picture and video exhibition enterprises, as well as video-rental organizations having budgetary incomes, of the need to make any kinds of payments at all

5. The RSFSR Council of Ministers shall carry out the following actions:

...the Ukrainian Writers' Union, which is the only organization in the country that has not been reformed. It is a relic of the Soviet era, a relic of the past, a relic of the old system. It is a relic of the old system, a relic of the old system, a relic of the old system.

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R.I. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman,
RSFSR Supreme Soviet,
Moscow, RSFSR House of Soviets,
10 April 1991.

Future of Ukrainian Writers Union Debated

by N. Hlova-Kos. KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
Moscow, 20 Apr 91, pp. 4-5.

Xenia M. Ryabchuk ["Carthago Delenda Est"]

The 10th Youth Congress of Ukrainian Writers is beginning today in Kiev today. The role of the Writer's Union in the lives of literary figures, its influence on the creativity of them, is the subject of the interview. "We cannot live off of tomorrow's bread," with Pavlo Zahreba. KZ, 28 March 1991. Today, we again return to the topic of writers and the government, in this polemical article, the well-known critic and literary expert Mykola Ryabchuk. Since we support pluralism of thought, we will allow anyone who wishes to argue with the author to express any of the thought he has expressed to be published.

Mykola Ryabchuk is a critic, a literary expert, author of a number of critical and literary essays, and of many articles. He works as assistant editor of the magazine *ISESTVET*.

For the first time, the first time that our newspapers are publishing the fact that Ukrainian writers have begun to organize congresses, congresses with new content, congresses that take these achievements into account, congresses that take the opposite, but simply the opposite, congresses have stopped, at last, being the congresses of the old, the old organization, the old organization in which they were birthed and the old organization has died, and the old organization has died.

Secondly, the congress of the Writer's Union is beginning today in Kiev, and it would, I think, despite all our efforts, be impossible to ignore it for a short time. First of all, because of the truly significant role which the Ukrainian Writer's Union and, in particular, certain literary figures have begun to play in the republic's development.

Secondly, because of the variability of the situation within the Union itself (as in the society as a whole), the totalization of the Union, its very own "denationalization," and, to a certain extent, serve as micro-models for analogous processes in other institutions.

The past, present and future of the Writer's Union have gained far more than a narrowly local or narrowly professional significance, as in a drop of water, we can visualize in the literary and non-literary collisions occurring around the Union, a whole ocean of today's complex social problems.

Within the wide spectrum of varied views of the Writer's Union and its future, the most radical may be described by the words of the ancient Roman censor Marcus Porcius Cato, which is used as the title of this article.

Carthage Must Be Destroyed!

There is a whole slew of arguments in support of such radicalism.

First: The Writer's Union was created as a wholly totalitarian organization, sort of a Stalinist "ministry of literature", or more correctly a branch of the Orwellian "ministry of truth", whose main functions amounted to publication of "approved" socialist realist masterpieces (in other words the most cynical and most shameless lies) and keeping an eye out for their own and outside ideological purity (in other words, writing clever literary denunciations and brutal treatises against "heretics").

The second argument. The Writer's Union discredited itself not only as a totalitarian structure as a whole, it discredited itself and all the members of this Union individually - some for active collaboration with the totalitarian regime, others for passive cooperation with it, for their ostrich-like position of nonintervention in

crimes all around them, especially those which were perpetrated in sight of the "subjectively honest" literary figures, quite often with their "unanimous" participation.

Last of all the third argument: the totalitarian state corrupted the Writer's Union, seducing its members with all sorts of gifts and favors.

All these arguments are sufficiently just, and although defenders of the Union speak of its renewal, of a reckoning with the past and renunciation of their totalitarian heritage, of penitence, of the individual penance of most of the literary figures tainted with collaborationism (truly so!), the radicals believe in this renewal no more than in a "renovation of the CPSU", wholly convinced that the "renovation of Bolshevism" is as much nonsense as "renovation of Nazism", and the preservation of the Stalinist - Brezhnev Writer's Union would be the same as the preservation after the war of Hitler's literary Reichspalace on the premise that, supposedly, most of its members had repented and expressed a willingness to "rehabilitate themselves".

Radicalism of this sort, unquestionably, has its maximal attractiveness, and if the high morally ethical pathos of its supporters is fortified even more with the practical aspect of an appropriate position in life, such spiritual wholeness and tenacity, unquestionably, deserves some respect. But we must remember as well that maximalism always was and is quite unaware of nuances, to the whole, so to say, colorful scale of life's spectrum.

We are speaking, understandably, not of ethical relativism, and not even of Christian all-forgiveness. That which is evil should be called evil, and crimes called crimes, but the degree of evil and the degree of criminality must be clearly differentiated: the tyrant who staged bloody orgies and the clown who entertained him at them are both amoral, and yet the primary responsibility is borne by the one who ordered the music, rather than the one who performed it. Also, you cannot speak of equal responsibility when the order-giver continues to order the same music (except, perhaps, on other, "reconstructed" instruments), while the performer, in anguish and shame, renounces his role as a clown.

Not so long ago Volodymyr Yavorivsky gave a fairly sharp answer to his ex-ordergivers, who today tend to give the author of the "Chain reaction" (a conjectural novel, undoubtedly) almost primary responsibility for the Chernobyl tragedy, and meanwhile those truly responsible remain in the shadows to this day - at their posts, pensioned, and protected personages. "You yourselves twisted our necks and broke our backs, and now you are quoting all the novels and poems which you forced us to write with all your truths and untruths!" - this is the counterargument, and a pretty appropriate one, brought out by this prose-writer.

V. Yavorivsky did not quote his opponents - say, for example, the brochure "The Meaning of L. I. Brezhnev's Book 'Remembrance' for the further improvement of the

ideo-political, work ethic and moral education of workers" (authors - V. I. Ivashko, Yu. N. Yelchenko, A. I. Kornienko, V. I. Shynkaruk and others), having decided, obviously, that such quoting would be appropriate for "retreaters", while the named authors have not abandoned their former views, and judging by conditions, do not plan to do so.

Polemics of this sort are truly unproductive: in any case, they do not bring us any closer to an understanding of the collision between the Ukrainian Communist Party and the Ukrainian Writer's Union - two "equally guilty", seemingly, organizations with Stalinist totalitarian genealogies, one of which prefers to stick to its principles, while the other decisively renounced its holiest principles, for which it was immediately given a reputation of being "unprincipled", "treacherous" "conjectural". Much more productive in this polemic has been not the answer to the question who ate more spice cakes or, let us say, tasted of the whip (after all, thousands of Communists and even NKVD personnel, as we know, became the victims of the repressions), but an explanation of a simpler and more obvious question: in whose hands, after all, were the whips and the spice cakes?

But remember, the opponents of V. Yavorivsky will tell me, the leaders of the Union at various times also took bold advantage of the above-mentioned equipment. But was it ever, in its sixty years, headed by a non-partisan? This is a case, after all, not of formal membership in the Ukrainian Communist Party, but a case that throughout those sixty years we have had consistent partisan leadership of literature, fulfilled effectively through the party committee of the Union, which also carried out the function, irreplaceably necessary within every organization, of a "personnel department" - this is where, precisely, the inflexible distribution of whips and spice cakes was carried out; from each according to his abilities, to each according to his merits.

The problem of detotalitarization of the Union, therefore (as in all of the society) is in this manner acquiring a new aspect:

Carthage Must Be Departicized?

The proposal to eliminate party influences in the Union echoed last year at the secretaries' session of the Kiev Ukrainian Writer's Union and it did not elicit any extraordinary objections among the literary figures. The role of the party committee had become overly odious throughout all the history of this writer's organization - all the ideological raids and hand-wringing took place, as a rule, in the party committee rooms or at the party committee's orders, and all the political denunciations, anonymous letters and notes filtered down here, and it is in the party committee where the instructors of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and, actually, let us not hide the transgressions, the KGB's "curators" felt most at ease.

But on the other hand the experience of the so-called "sociopolitical consolidation" in Czechoslovakia after

the return there in 1968 of Soviet tanks, and the experience of "normalization" in Poland following the assumption of power in 1981 by the military junta shows that the creative individuals, especially the writer's unions, which had by that time become fairly de-totalitarianized, inevitably became the first victims of restored totalitarianism, as that they would not humbly submit to the bayonet-imposed "consolidation". As a result, both the Polish and the Czechoslovak Writer's Unions were disbanded - after unsuccessful attempts to train the disobedient writer's brains and to instill in them the directives desired by the dictatorial regime. Puppet, collaborative "unions" were established on the ruins of these disbanded (actually - banned) organizations, and they included literary failures, conjecturists, morbidly ambitious or simply intimidated individuals - in a word, the ones recruited into this Janissary army with these very same whips and spice cakes.

It seems that within the RSFSR Writer's Union such a "consolidation of healthy forces" has taken place, and that - interestingly - it took place not on a Communist, but on a chauvinist-nationalist, imperialist basis. The "healthy forces" within the Ukrainian Writer's Union, obviously, also thirst for revenge, and in addition the game involves not only the Communist party card (the Communist ideology itself, not sweetened with "candy" and not propped up by the "leadership role", is hardly attractive to anyone today), but also a whole row of other cards of various suits.

Trojan Horses Outside Carthage

We recall that in the so-called "inhibited" times the Union's leaders more than once made much of the number of Communists in this organization which was entrusted to them: they had 70 to 80 percent, in a word, more than in all the other creative unions - which was an undeniable affirmation of the ideological patience and beneficence of the republic's literary agit-propaganda bureau. Today this number has diminished significantly, but not so much that the "healthy forces" would not have any opportunities to "consolidate" everyone around themselves - especially in the event that any "committee of national salvation" or some "group to preserve the memory of 'O. Ye. Korniychuk'" should assume leadership.

There is no doubt that today's Writer's Union is like a cataract in the eyes of any such "committees". This is evident if you just look at what these actual or potential "committee members" publish on the pages of their press about the Union as a whole and about some of its leaders (especially about those who were thoughtless enough to become people's deputies), or if you understand that the problem is not with some "ideological differences" but rather sacred class hatred which is even deeper because it is aimed not against some kind of "uneducated" miners who suddenly desire to take the "feeding trough" away from the nomenklatura, but against yesterday's allies or, at least, servants, who were fed often enough from the same trough.

This black ingratitude, with which Drach, and Korotych, and Yavorivskyy, and Honchar, and Pavlychko have repaid their benefactors for the laurels and other gratuities, no doubt, will never be forgiven; nowhere in the world does the mafia pardon its deserters. I would not like to be a doomsayer, but the experience of the military takeover in Poland convincingly affirms: in the staff headquarters, and in the private quarters of the opposition it is always possible to find mountains of weapons which has been brought there ahead of time by extremely careful searchers, it is even possible to find narcotics, and currency, and even plans for seizing "strategic targets", prepared for the local "plotters" by emissaries of the CIA and the "Mossad".

The Polish press today describes exactly how this was done - we have no reason to doubt that in our case (if it comes to that) such things will be done even more brutally and cynically. In any case, when you read today the sensational testimony of killers and rapists and their connection with Rukh (!) or no less sensational revelations of "licentiousness" in the tent city during the student hunger strike (I will not even speak of such "minor matters" as the case of Khmara), we begin to seriously consider the classic problem of infiltration of Haponivshchyna (or Azefivshchyna) into the opposition movement - a problem as old as it is current.

Without a doubt, party affiliation (or lack of it) of anyone - is a personal matter. That is how it is in all normal societies, and that, possibly, is how it will be here someday. But for this to happen it is necessary, at the least, for the word "opposition" to stop being a swear word, for the word "democrats" to be used without the agit-propaganda prefix "so-called", and that the CPSU become at last a party, and not some kind of clever symbiosis of army, KGB, agroindustry and party nomenklatura, which possessed a controlling array of activities within a gigantic joint stock company created by it 73 years ago to regulate the so-called "government" property and the appropriate division of dividends from this property.

The writer's nomenklatura, having stepped out of the "joint stock company", at the same time broke the chain of common support, with which the "shareholders" have been connected, and in this lies the main and least forgivable crime of the "deserters".

The depolitization of a series of regional writer's organizations (Khmelnyskyy, Lvov, Ternopol, Ivano-Frankovsk) and publishers (of DZVIN and VSESVIT magazines), the resignation of about one third of the Communist writers from the party and the continued membership as simply a formality of many others, and mainly - the almost complete lack within the party ranks of more or less well-known literary names and the complete lack in the CPSU of talented young literary personages make the possibility of "consolidation" of "healthy forces", according to the Czechoslovak or Polish scenario quite problematical. And yet attempts are being made to split apart the writer's "Carthage".

from within - in this there are conflicts not only among Communists and non-Communists, but also writers from the regions with the writers from Kiev (the latter, it is said, monopolized all print media and did not give "provincials" access to it), and in similar matter there is conflict between Russian and Ukrainian writers, the younger ones and the older ones, - in a word, substantial attempts are made to integrate all the factional conflicts into one explosive charge.

Of course, conflicts must be resolved, but we cannot console ourselves with hopes of some mythical "unity", "solidarity", "monolithic stature" of the writer's organization: it was too "diverse" from its very inception, and today it unites people who differ from each other - in political views, ethical principles, esthetic tastes, level of talent, and even in educational level. It would, of course, not be right to thirst for the impossible: to unite that which cannot be united; it is easier to unite that which goes together easily and naturally. This calls for, first of all, maximal de-ideologization and depoliticization of the Writer's Union (for a professional society of literary personages some acceptance of basic democratic principles - defense of human rights, rejection of totalitarianism, support of state sovereignty of the Ukraine - should be sufficient); second, the Writer's Union should become a creative association of various groups and organizations with the most varied cultural platforms; collective membership in the Union should also be considered; third, the organization of writers should be, first of all, a professional union organization, in other words it should defend the interests of its members, as does any other professional syndicate in civilized society, when necessary it should concern itself with the cultural policy of the state and support its members when needed morally and materially (please do not confuse this support with the union's beneficence which has existed to date, which only spoils less-talented writers and gives birth to opportunist elements in many of them. The expenses of sabbaticals, literary stipends, loans for self-publishing books and even partial donations for individual large publications should be granted not all at once, all over the place, but to each individual project, as an exception, and under strict control by an authoritative, elected examination board).

It is on this basis, we believe, that

Carthage Must be Built

Few people, probably, noticed the brilliant article by Serhiy Trymbach in last year's issue No 20 of the Kharkiv magazine PRAPOR, sarcastically entitled "It will never be better than it was under Stalin".

"The state" - writes the author in this article - "frees artists from its guidance, and along with that from its financial support. Now you are free - write what you want and however you wish, and in the same manner earn money, wherever you desire... The malevolence is obvious: what we wanted is what we have."

Whatever you say, the brotherhood of writers lived well in the days of the so-called "stagnation". Not all of them, of course: some were shot, and sent to camps, and packed away to lunatic asylums for forced treatment, attacked in the yellow press, not published for decades - but who is to blame? "Stus was not a member of the Union, I did not even know he wrote poetry" - Pavlo Zahrebelnyy stated recently in an interview in KOMSO-MOLSKEYE ZNAMYA (23 March 1991). Truly: no person - no problem.

Yet everyone, who did not depart from the "general line", or more correctly meticulously wavered with it, were assured that any of their "highly idealistic" writings would be published at some time, and that by their 50th or 60th or later anniversary they would be reissued - as a single volume or multiple volumes; each was guaranteed some kind of laureate's honors, a decoration, a medal, or even a Honorable Declaration from the Supreme Soviet's Presidium, and thereby a personal pension, medical treatment at Feofania, and a place in Baykovyy.

"The literary process" took place, for decades, by itself, and life went on, and there were no common points of contact between these two levels. Contact between these two levels, it seems, tossed many artists into a state of permanent hysteria - in quiet writer's reservations, as well as in non-conformist youthful "undergrounds". Both the one and the other suddenly came in contact with banal reality, sarcastically defined by the young poet Sashko Irvanets: "because all your poems, comrades, are nothing in comparison with the smile of Rish"... And if the doom of social realist (or post social realist) contemplation was not difficult to foresee, then the crash of the youthful "alternative" culture, which at last had become available to more readers and viewers, was a surprise for most.

We were too generous, obviously, in our belief that we live in the "most literate nation" of the world, and that it is enough to remove the ideological prohibitions from the theaters, film studios, art galleries, and the people will head for them in droves - for artistic truth and cultural creativity. For a very short time - at the beginning of "glasnost" - that is what seemingly happened, and yet today, this so-called "new" culture attracts even less interest than the "old". In the "old", people at least looked for some crumbs of truth "about life", some hints and illusion, hidden, unnoticed by the censors. Today they can find that "truth" in tens of independent newspapers, and as to the acceptance of basically cultural, esthetic values, they have never been for mass acceptance anywhere, and in addition they cannot be such in our sorrow-filled, half-educated country, overflowing with malice and exasperation.

Yet here the writers, who made their living off of culture, suddenly stated that it is not right to trade in culture, that this is, it seems, amoral, and that market economy will necessarily and unfailingly destroy culture. Meantime, nearly the whole world lives under conditions of market economy, and some kind of culture, surprisingly, does

exist there to this day. "Some kind" - includes cinemas by Bergman and Fellini, Kurosawa and Antonioni, novels by Faulkner and Marques, Jose Celli and Umberto Eco; plays by Annuj and Albee, Enesco and Becket; this is, after all, the poetry which is published there in quantities tens and hundreds of times greater than here, despite the fact that most of it is excessive and hardly any poets receive compensation for their poetry, or is able to live from it (even Nobel laureates like Czeslaw Milosz, Octavio Paz, Yosyf Brodsky do not shirk from reading lectures at universities and do not consider this as "degrading commercialization" of higher culture.

The western market truly is inundated with artistic products with recreational value alone, but similar "valueless writing" has always predominated in our markets as well - with the difference that our "valueless writing" was in principle incapable of amusing anyone or even of interest to anyone. Mediocre (to avoid saying bad) authors have always existed everywhere; the difference between our manic word producers and theirs lies in the fact that ours were subsidized by the state over the years, while theirs had to subsidize themselves, i. e. - publish at their own cost, or write at least well enough so at least someone would buy it: the American "mediocre writer" therefore has to possess at least a minimal professionalism - in imaginative subject matter, building of intrigue, construction of dialogue; for our "mediocre writer" all this professionalism was always non-obligatory, it was his obligation to maintain "ideological stability" and as unquestioning willingness to react on the basis of decisions by the current congress or plenum.

We could, of course, argue, whether socially realistic kitsch is more harmful than commercial kitsch (in my opinion, it is more harmful, because it pretends to be truth, even truth in the final, Communist party instance, whereas commercial kitsch - is just a fable for adults with vampires and super-agents, which, in general, makes no pretense at the role of "serious" or "real" literature). Also, commercial kitsch has one undeniable superiority: unlike socialist realist kitsch, it feeds itself, earns its own keep - unlike thousands of socialist realist hacks, who together with the military-industrial and party apparatus complex were parasites of the people's poverty.

The threat of the market, which is brought up today by almost all our cultural leaders, is primarily a threat by the barbaric, the early capitalist, and specifically the "socialist", "regulated" market. I believe our humanitarians should rise up today not against the market (the market is truly evil, but, to paraphrase Churchill, we agree that mankind has not thought up anything better to date), they should rise up against its lack of civility and, in particular, its overly peculiar methods of "regulation".

The simplest example: the sale of paper in the USSR takes place at fixed "state" controlled prices, and at free "market" prices. Fixed (comparatively low) prices are set on a fairly limited quantity of paper - purchased through so-called "state orders". Paradoxically, this

"state order" includes not only schoolbooks and reprints of world literary classics in state publishing houses, but also party publications, or mainly Communist party publications. Of course, the directors of paper mills would find it much more beneficial to sell paper at the free, and not the fixed "state ordered" prices: infringements on economic discipline today are not considered a great sin, but yet - infringements of party discipline (all the directors, as a rule, are CPSU members) still are. And so, the state order for Communist party publications still need to be filled, but on the other hand, all the others...

If we add to that which has already been said, that nearly all the polygraphic sources remain in the monopolistic property of the CPSU, and those which are not formally in its ownership are still controlled by the Communist party, since each Communist director knows that the telephone call from the raykom is law; if we are also to acknowledge that CPSU owns one of the largest and best equipped (appropriated from the state, or "bought" at sixty kopecks to the dollar) book and magazine publishing house (PRAVDA) and that each week they print books, not by Marx or Engels or Lenin, but by Alexandre Dumas or Agatha Christie in million-copy print runs (the profits from these, understandably, go not to the state, but to the party coffers), the purpose of a "socially regulated market", I believe, will become understandable for everyone: the "directing" and "adjusting" force of our society is gradually becoming the "regulating" force.

For the Ukraine and Ukrainian culture, the introduction of such a barbaric pseudo-market as in the USSR can thereby have catastrophic results. Even the best Ukrainian book cannot be put out in the print quantities as is possible for a Russian book in the USSR (this is even more true for Byelorussian and Moldavian, not to mention Chukot or Gagauz books), - for the very simple reason that the number of people who speak Russian is at least five, if not ten times greater than that of those who can read Ukrainian. This means that the price of a Ukrainian book must be five times greater.

There are two ways out of this situation: first - to again beg the "good uncle", or the "regulating force", or a "savior of culture" to use his money, resources and the like (to again strike a bargain with Mephistopheles and make ourselves dependent on ideological bribery; after all, the "good uncle" has often stated: this one gets it, and that one, but this other one, the so-and-so, gets none!); or else - the second way out - to seek at the parliamentary and government level a civilized, democratic solution of the problem by way of legislative protection for the internal market, as is practiced worldwide.

In its most general aspects, this economic policy is based on the fact that a state which wishes to protect its production of such and such a commodity, artificially limits the importation of similar commodities from outside its borders. Understandably, such limitations are set not by prohibition, but mainly by raising taxes on

those imports, and in return the taxes are used to develop the production of these goods within their own nation. Obviously, in the realm of culture there should be no restrictions on the import into the nation of newspapers, magazines, books, movies, but there can be and must be controls on the exportation of profits on these products. In the case of the Ukraine, this means, first of all, that the excess profits made by Moscow on sales of central newspapers, magazines, and books should find their way, first of all, into Ukrainian coffers, and should be used especially for support of the culture of national minorities living in the Ukraine (unfortunately, in most Ukrainian cities Ukrainians in effect also have the status of minorities).

We can expect that our Russian colleagues will not perceive any nationality language discrimination in this: similar regulations, remember, are imposed in other nations: so, in the French cinema industry, no less than half the films must be in French (this is a natural desire to protect the native culture from being overpowered by America's Hollywood), in Hong Kong books from the People's Republic of China and Taiwan are sold at higher prices - after all, Hong Kong authors do not have the wide market audiences of their colleagues in mainland, or even the island China [Taiwan]: there are many such examples, but the basic fact is clear: each state (if it is not a backward and totally inept colony) carries out a policy of protection of its internal market and, in particular, the protection of native culture. These discriminatory practices are formally meant to further the goal of removing actual discrimination, which develops as a result of objective conditions.

A union of writer's, obviously, should take on some strategic tasks, to fearlessly walk into parliament with the proper legislative initiatives. Because even the laments brought on by the transition to a market and the so-called neo-denunciations of "pornography" or "dark literature" and other stains on the book market seem to have a double meaning - many accept them as the groans of literary incompetents, who no longer have the accustomed party-designated favoritism.

I will cite in this connection the writing of Polish author Adam Zagajewski, written in 1984 - during the military takeover - and published in the samizdat at that time: "What will happen when one day, one beautiful day, Poland achieves political freedom? Will the remarkable spiritual tension which prevails if not in the whole nation than at least in its fairly numerous and democratic elite be maintained? Will the churches become empty? Will poetry become - as we see now in the lucky nations - only nourishment for a bored handful of experts, and cinema - another outlet of the recreational industry? Will all that which was salvaged in the Polish situation, rescued from the flood, from destruction, and was raised above danger - like a tall, beautiful wall, will all that, which was created as an answer to the threatening call of totalitarianism, disappear on the same day when its challenge disappears?"

It is this question which we would like the builders of our new writer's Carthage to answer: are they prepared to not only lift, but to support that "high wall", which protects culture and the very spirituality of the nation from totalitarianism - whether it be ideological, which has not yet departed from the scene, or consumerist, consumptive, which has truly not yet entered onto the stage.

END OF

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